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refusing to draw an inference of discriminatory motive where there is no allegation "that any of defendant's employees ever made a disparaging or discriminatory remark about women, pregnant women, or the plaintiff"
Summary of this case from Campbell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.Opinion
02-CV-6597T.
August 23, 2004
DECISION and ORDER
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Melissa Foster, ("Foster"), brings this action pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the "ADA"), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), and the New York State Human Rights Law claiming that the defendant Livingston-Wyoming Arc, ("ARC" or "the Agency"), a non-profit organization founded for the purpose of assisting developmentally disabled persons, discriminated against her on the basis of her disability and gender. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that she was terminated from her position as Coordinator of Public Relations/Special Events because of her pregnancy condition and because she is a female.
Defendant denies plaintiff's allegations, and contends that plaintiff's employment was discontinued when her job was eliminated in conjunction with a departmental reorganization and change in management of the Agency. Specifically, defendant contends that upon the appointment of a new Executive Director of the Agency and the resignation of plaintiff's former supervisor, the Agency reorganized the public relations department and eliminated plaintiff's former position.
By motion dated May 7, 2004, defendant ARC moves for summary judgment against the plaintiff on grounds that plaintiff has failed to state a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, Title VII, or the New York State Human Rights Law. Defendant further contends that even if plaintiff has stated a prima facie case of discrimination, she has failed to rebut the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason proffered by the defendant for the termination of plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff opposes defendant's motion, and contends that there are numerous questions of fact which preclude the Court from granting defendant's motion.
BACKGROUND
On November 15, 1999, plaintiff Melissa Foster was hired by the defendant Livingston-Wyoming Arc as the Coordinator of Public Relations/Special Events. At that time, plaintiff had acquired approximately one and one half years of work experience following her May, 1998 graduation form the State University of New York College at Brockport. Plaintiff reported to Karen Rumfola, the Assistant Executive Director for Development. The Livingston-Wyoming Arc is a non-profit organization dedicated to serving the needs of developmentally disabled persons in the Counties of Livingston and Wyoming, New York.
In November 2001, Foster began a period of disability leave due to complications related to her pregnancy. In December 2001, while Foster was on leave, the Executive Director of the Agency was fired, and a new Interim Executive Director, Cynthia Ryan Huether ("Huether") was appointed. Also during December 2001, plaintiff's Supervisor Karen Rumfola resigned from the Agency. Rumfola was not replaced, and her position was eliminated.
Foster gave birth on March 5, 2002, and was cleared by her doctor to return to work on April 16, 2002. On April 15, 2002, Foster contacted Huether to inquire about working part-time until she exhausted her unused vacation time. Huether would not consent to Foster working part-time, but did allow her to use the vacation time to extend her maternity leave by two additional weeks.
Six days later, on April 22, 2002, Huether met with Foster to announce that the Agency would be reorganizing the Public Relations Department, and that Foster's position was being eliminated in favor of a new position with significantly more responsibility. Huether explained to Foster that Foster lacked the qualifications necessary for the position, and offered her a part-time data entry position. Plaintiff declined to accept the part-time data entry position, and therefore her employment was effectively terminated as of April 22, 2002.
Ten days later, on May 2, 2002, Foster called Huether to further discuss the termination of her employment. Foster secretly tape recorded the conversation, during which Huether explained that for the newly created position, ARC sought a candidate more experience than Foster. Foster indicated that she understood Arc's desire for a more experienced candidate, and acknowledged that she did not have the required experience.
On June 25, 2002, approximately two months after her position was eliminated and her employment terminated, Foster filed a discrimination complaint with the EEOC. In her complaint she claimed that she was fired as a result of her gender and disability. The EEOC investigated plaintiff's complaint, and determined that Foster had failed to establish that the defendant discriminated against her in any way. Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint on November 14, 2002.
DISCUSSION
I. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." When considering whether a genuine issue of fact exists for purposes of a motion for summary judgment, all inferences and ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. See R.B. Ventures, Ltd. v. Shane, 112 F.3d 54 (2d Cir. 1997). It is only if after considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the court finds that no rational jury could find in favor of that party, a grant of summary judgment is appropriate. See Annis v. County of Westchester, 136 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 1998).
II. Plaintiff's Disability Discrimination Claims.
Although plaintiff originally brought this action under Title VII, the New York Human Rights Law, and the ADA, she now concedes that she is not a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA, and accordingly withdraws her claims under the ADA.See Affidavit of Plaintiff's Attorney Donna Marianetti at ¶ 6.
III. Title VII Claims
A. Prima Facie Case
Plaintiff alleges in her Complaint that she was discriminated against on the basis of her gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits an employer from "hir[ing] or . . . discharg[ing] any individual, or otherwise . . . discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Title VII also prohibits discrimination against women based on pregnancy.Kerver v. Kingly Mfg., 156 F.3d 396, 400 (2nd Cir. 1998). "To establish a prima facie case for denial of promotion or failure to hire under Title VII, a plaintiff must show (1) that he is a member of a protected class, (2) that he applied and was qualified for the position in question, (3) that he was rejected for the position in question, (4) and that he was denied the job under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination." Gadsden v. Jones Lang Lasalle Americas, Inc., 210 F.Supp.2d 430, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing Brown v. Coach Stores, Inc., 163 F.3d 706, 709-10 (2nd Cir. 1998). For a female plaintiff to establish a claim for unlawful termination resulting from gender discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must establish that she is a female, was qualified for the position she held, was discharged, and that the discharge occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Should a plaintiff establish a prima facie case of unlawful gender discrimination, the defendant must come forward with a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for taking the adverse employment action against the plaintiff. Id. Once an employer has stated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for taking adverse action against the plaintiff, the plaintiff must come forward with evidence that the employer's stated reason is pretextual, and that the real reason for the action was impermissible gender discrimination. Id.
B. Plaintiff has failed to establish a Prima Facie Case of Discrimination
1. Plaintiff has failed to establish that she was qualified for the newly created public relations position
In the instant case, plaintiff has failed to state a prima facie case of gender or pregnancy discrimination with respect to defendant's failure to hire her for the newly created public relations position. It is uncontroverted that plaintiff's job was eliminated, and that a new position was created. The desired qualifications for the new position included four years of experience in coordinating public relations for a non-profit organization and fund-raising. While the candidate eventually hired for the position did not have four-years of public relations experience in the not-for-profit sector, she did have 18 years of experience in public relations and marketing in the for-profit sector. It is further undisputed that Foster did not have four years of experience in any position, and in fact, the evidence demonstrates that plaintiff herself knew that she did not have the necessary qualifications for the new position. Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to establish that she was qualified for the new public relations position.
2. Plaintiff has failed to establish that she was discharged under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination
There is no dispute that plaintiff is a female, and that her employment was terminated. To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge, plaintiff must also establish that she was qualified for her position and that she was terminated under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Assuming arguendo that plaintiff was qualified for her position, I find that plaintiff has failed to establish that her employment was terminated under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.
Initially, there are no allegations or evidence that any other employee of the defendant has been discriminated against on any basis. Further, there is no evidence of any discriminatory animus on the part of any of the defendant's employees, including all levels of management. There are no allegations that plaintiff was ever demeaned or criticized because of her gender or pregnancy condition.
It is clear from the evidence that while the plaintiff was on maternity leave, the defendant made substantial management changes. Plaintiff's supervisor resigned, and the supervisor's former position was eliminated. Following the elimination of that position, the newly appointed Executive Director of the Agency determined that a new consolidated position in the Public Relations department should be created, and that plaintiff's position should also be eliminated. There is no evidence that the decision to eliminate plaintiff's position was made on any impermissible basis, and indeed the evidence indicates that plaintiff's job was eliminated in light of the newly created public relations position in which the newly-hired employee performed the combined functions previously performed by the plaintiff and the plaintiff's former supervisor.
Plaintiff attempts to demonstrate that she was fired under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination because her employment was terminated while she was on maternity leave, and that she was fired despite the fact that she had always received satisfactory performance ratings. Plaintiff's arguments that she was a satisfactory employee, however, are inapposite, as plaintiff was not terminated because of poor performance, but instead was let go because her job was eliminated. Indeed, it is uncontroverted that the defendant offered plaintiff a different part-time position as a data entry clerk, which plaintiff rejected. Thus, assuming plaintiff's claims that she was a satisfactory employee to be true, this fact does not constitute evidence that her employment was terminated under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination: her performance history is irrelevant given that her position was eliminated and replaced with a new position for which plaintiff was not qualified. Finally, although the timing of the termination of an employee's job can in some circumstances create an inference of discrimination, in this case no reasonable inference of discrimination can be drawn from the timing of defendant's decision to eliminate plaintiff's former position. The evidence demonstrates that the newly appointed executive director of the Agency had made substantial changes to the public relations department, including the elimination of the position formerly held by plaintiff's supervisor. Additionally, had plaintiff not taken an additional two weeks off from work following the completion of her maternity leave, plaintiff's position would not have been eliminated while plaintiff was on leave following the birth of her child.
In attempting to demonstrate that the termination of her employment occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination, plaintiff relies on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Kerzer v. Kingly Mfg., 156 F.3d 396 (1998). In Kerzer, the court held that plaintiff Bonnie Kerzer had established a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination where she demonstrated that: (1) the president of the company had made comments suggesting that an employer could disguise firing a pregnant employees by simply eliminating the employees position; (2) the president remarked that her pregnancy was a sign of laziness; (3) the company asked her to return to work earlier than expected despite later claiming that her job was eliminated for lack of work; (4) she was informed over the telephone shortly before her return date that she was fired; and (5) a new employee was hired to perform substantially the same functions as Kerzer.
The decision in Kerzer is distinguishable from the instant case on several grounds. First, unlike Kerzer, where the president of the company made remarks suggesting a discriminatory animus towards pregnant women, there is no evidence, nor even an allegation, that any of the defendant's employees ever made a disparaging or discriminatory remark about women; pregnant women; or the plaintiff. Additionally, unlike Kerzer in which the defendant asked Kerzer to come back to work earlier than planned, and then fired her claiming that there was insufficient work, in this case, the defendant did not ask plaintiff to return to work early, and did not claim that there was insufficient work in plaintiff's department. Rather, the defendant decided to consolidate two positions and create one position with more responsibility. Finally, unlike Kerzer, in which plaintiff was replaced with an employee who performed substantially the same duties that she had performed, the defendant in this case hired an employee who was required to perform substantially more duties than the plaintiff. In this case, defendant hired an employee with significantly greater experience than the plaintiff, and the newly appointed employee performed tasks that had been previously performed by two employees: Foster and Foster's supervisor, Karen Rumfola. Accordingly, because the factual scenario in Kerzer is significantly different from the factual basis in this action, I find that plaintiff's reliance on Kerzer does not support her claim that she has established a prima facie case of discrimination.
3. Plaintiff has failed to rebut the Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory reason proffered by the defendant for eliminating plaintiff's position.
Even if plaintiff were able to state a prima facie case of discrimination with respect to her termination, plaintiff has failed to rebut the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason proffered by the defendant for eliminating plaintiff's position, and consequently, her employment. Defendant has asserted that plaintiff's position, and the position of her supervisor were eliminated, and that a new consolidated position was created. Plaintiff has failed to rebut this explanation for the termination of her employment, and has failed to present any evidence suggesting that discrimination played a role in the decision to eliminate her position and terminate her employment.
IV. New York State Human Rights Law
For the reasons stated in Sections II and III above, plaintiff's discrimination claims under New York law must be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, I grant defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismiss plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice.
ALL OF THE ABOVE IS SO ORDERED.