But the statute does not confer the right of appeal from a judgment or order sustaining or overruling a demurrer to a complaint, and it has been so declared several times by the appellate courts of this state. ( Litch v. Kerns, 8 Cal.App. 747, [ 97 P. 897]; Kinard v. Jordan, 10 Cal.App. 219, [ 101 P. 696]; Hadsall v. Case, 15 Cal.App. 541, [ 115 P. 330]; Hanke v. McLaughlin, 20 Cal.App. 204, [ 128 P. 772]; Foster v. Bowles, 138 Cal. 449, [ 71 P. 495]; Wood, Curtis Co. v. Missouri etc. Ry. Co., 152 Cal. 344, [62 P. 868].) "In a case like this where the demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, the proper course is to have a judgment entered dismissing the action and then the appeal is taken from this final judgment.
) In the case of Foster v. Bowles, 138 Cal. 451, [ 71 P. 495], there was an allegation in the complaint that one of the defendants had or claimed to have some "right, title etc." to said mortgaged lands.
As the contract was not legally enforceable, any error in the admission of evidence was harmless. (Thorndike v. City of Boston, 1 Met. 242, 247; Smith v.Russ, 22 Wis. 439; Winkley v. Foye, 33 N.H. 171;Dayton v.McAllister, 129 Cal. 192; Foster v. Bowles, 138 Cal. 449; PacificInvestment Co. v. Ross, 131 Cal. 8.) 55 Am. Rep. 409.
[3] In the instant case respondent concedes that the law does not require an express promise to pay as a part or in addition to the acknowledgment of indebtedness where the statute has not already run. In Foster v. Bowles, 138 Cal. 351 [ 71 P. 495], it is said: "It was not necessary that respondent should promise to pay the indebtedness in order to establish a new date for the statute to commence running. All that was required was a plain and distinct acknowledgment in writing of the existence of the mortgage.