Foster v. Bowles

4 Citing cases

  1. City of Napa v. Maxwell

    36 Cal.App. 103 (Cal. Ct. App. 1918)   Cited 1 times

    But the statute does not confer the right of appeal from a judgment or order sustaining or overruling a demurrer to a complaint, and it has been so declared several times by the appellate courts of this state. ( Litch v. Kerns, 8 Cal.App. 747, [ 97 P. 897]; Kinard v. Jordan, 10 Cal.App. 219, [ 101 P. 696]; Hadsall v. Case, 15 Cal.App. 541, [ 115 P. 330]; Hanke v. McLaughlin, 20 Cal.App. 204, [ 128 P. 772]; Foster v. Bowles, 138 Cal. 449, [ 71 P. 495]; Wood, Curtis Co. v. Missouri etc. Ry. Co., 152 Cal. 344, [62 P. 868].) "In a case like this where the demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, the proper course is to have a judgment entered dismissing the action and then the appeal is taken from this final judgment.

  2. Raggio v. Palmtag

    155 Cal. 797 (Cal. 1909)   Cited 15 times
    In Raggio v. Palmtag, 155 Cal. 797, [103 P. 312], the taking possession was by a mortgagee who had presented against the estate of the mortgagor what purported to be her claim on note and mortgage, the same had been allowed by the administrator and approved by the judge of the court, and the mortgaged property was subsequently sold in the probate proceedings to the mortgagee for two hundred and eighteen dollars in excess of the amount of her claim, the mortgage debt being credited on the purchase price as allowed by the law.

    ) In the case of Foster v. Bowles, 138 Cal. 451, [ 71 P. 495], there was an allegation in the complaint that one of the defendants had or claimed to have some "right, title etc." to said mortgaged lands.

  3. Rulofson v. Billings

    140 Cal. 452 (Cal. 1903)   Cited 18 times

    As the contract was not legally enforceable, any error in the admission of evidence was harmless. (Thorndike v. City of Boston, 1 Met. 242, 247; Smith v.Russ, 22 Wis. 439; Winkley v. Foye, 33 N.H. 171;Dayton v.McAllister, 129 Cal. 192; Foster v. Bowles, 138 Cal. 449; PacificInvestment Co. v. Ross, 131 Cal. 8.) 55 Am. Rep. 409.

  4. First National Bank of Parks Rapids v. Pray

    86 Cal.App. 484 (Cal. Ct. App. 1927)   Cited 11 times
    In First Nat. Bank of Park Rapids v. Pray, 86 Cal.App. 484 [ 260 P. 933], the acknowledgment was made up of a series of correspondence between the parties, running over a number of years, wherein the debtor at all times treated the obligation as subsisting, and one which he was liable and willing to pay. It was held, therefore, that the law implied a promise to pay according to the tenor and terms of the obligation.

    [3] In the instant case respondent concedes that the law does not require an express promise to pay as a part or in addition to the acknowledgment of indebtedness where the statute has not already run. In Foster v. Bowles, 138 Cal. 351 [ 71 P. 495], it is said: "It was not necessary that respondent should promise to pay the indebtedness in order to establish a new date for the statute to commence running. All that was required was a plain and distinct acknowledgment in writing of the existence of the mortgage.