Foster Creighton v. Wilson Contracting

35 Citing cases

  1. Operations Management Intern. v. Tengasco, Inc.

    35 F. Supp. 2d 1042 (E.D. Tenn. 1999)   Cited 16 times
    Finding a check cashing company's threat of criminal prosecution against the plaintiff whose check was dishonored constituted a deceptive act under the TCPA

    There is also an implied obligation in every contract that a party thereto will not interfere with the other party's performance — the other party must be afforded the opportunity to perform. Foster v. Creighton Co. Wilson Contracting Co., 579 S.W.2d 422, 425-26 (Tenn.App. 1978). The courts must construe written contracts of doubtful meaning so as to give them effect rather than destroy them.

  2. Johnson v. Lockhart

    No. M2002-00623-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Sep. 5, 2003)   Cited 3 times
    Stating that the "doctrine of promissory estoppel is unnecessary . . . since the oral contract was supported by adequate consideration"

    Where one makes a promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee, and where such promise does in fact induce such action or forbearance, it is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.Foster Creighton Co. v. Wilson Contracting Co., 579 S.W.2d 422, 427 (Tenn.App. 1978) (citing 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 74); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(1) (1979). This theory of recovery is sometimes referred to as "detrimental reliance" because, in addition to showing that the defendant made a promise upon which the plaintiff reasonably relied, the plaintiff must show that this reliance resulted in detriment to the plaintiff.

  3. McBee v. Elliott

    No. M2002-00277-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2003)

    Paragraph 11. of the court's Final Order refers to Appellee relying upon promises made by the Appellants, not by Appellee's mother. In Foster Creighton Co. v. Wilson Contracting Co., Inc., 579 S.W.2d 422 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1978), this court set out the definition of promissory estoppel. We stated:

  4. Bank of Gleason v. Weakley

    No. W1999-02161-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2000)

    See Engenius Entertainment, Inc. v. Herenton, 971 S.W.2d 12, 17 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1997) (citing Arcadian Phosphates, Inc. v. Arcadian Corp., 884 F.2d 69, 73-74 (2d Cir. 1989); United Magazine Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 877 F. Supp. 1076, 1084-85 (S.D. Ohio 1995); Quake Constr., Inc. v. American Airlines, 141 Ill.2d 281, 152 Ill.Dec. 308, 565 N.E.2d 990, 1004 (1990)). Under the theory of promissory estoppel, "when one . . . by his promise induces another to change his situation, a repudiation of the promise would amount to a fraud."Foster Creighton Co. v. Wilson Contracting Co., Inc., 579 S.W.2d 422, 427 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1978) (citing 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 74). This theory of recovery is also referred to as "detrimental reliance" because, in addition to showing that the defendant made a promise upon which the plaintiff reasonably relied, the plaintiff must show that this reliance resulted in detriment to the plaintiff.

  5. Engenius Entertainment, Inc. v. Herenton

    971 S.W.2d 12 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 64 times
    Finding that the plaintiff's allegation that "[t]he City and County repeatedly promised and represented that they would enter into a contract with a private developer for construction of improvements to the Leasehold Space of the Pyramid, and further repeatedly represented and promised to award that contract to EnGenius" was enough to satisfy the first and second elements of a claim for promissory estoppel

    Where one makes a promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee, and where such promise does in fact induce such action or forbearance, it is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.Foster Creighton Co. v. Wilson Contracting Co., 579 S.W.2d 422, 427 (Tenn. App. 1978) (citing 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 74); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(1) (1979). This theory of recovery is sometimes referred to as "detrimental reliance" because, in addition to showing that the defendant made a promise upon which the plaintiff reasonably relied, the plaintiff must show that this reliance resulted in detriment to the plaintiff.

  6. Stones River v. Metropolitan Governmt

    981 S.W.2d 175 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 5 times

    An action based on estoppel may be brought where the promises of one party are relied on by another party to his detriment. In Foster Creighton Co. v. Wilson Contracting, 579 S.W.2d 422 (Tenn.App. 1979), this court said: [W]hen one man by his promise induces another to change his situation, repudiation of the promise would amount to a fraud.

  7. Engenius v. Herenton

    C.A. No. 02A01-9704-CH-00078 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 1997)

    Where one makes a promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee, and where such promise does in fact induce such action or forbearance, it is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. Foster Creighton Co. v. Wilson Contracting Co., 579 S.W.2d 422, 427 (Tenn.App. 1978) (citing 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 74)); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(1) (1979).

  8. Stones River v. Nashville

    Appeal No. 01-A-01-9505-CH-00217 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 1995)

    An action based on estoppel may be brought where the promises of one party are relied on by another party to his detriment. In Foster Creighton Co. v. Wilson Contracting, 579 S.W.2d 422 (Tenn.App. 1979), this court said: [W]hen one man by his promise induces another to change his situation, a repudiation of the promise would amount to a fraud.

  9. Sparton v. Util-Link

    248 F. App'x 684 (6th Cir. 2007)   Cited 27 times
    Holding that since the jury found a contract existed this finding "precludes, as a matter of law, a damage award based on promissory estoppel concerning the same subject matter"

    In 1978, a Tennessee Court of Appeals decision explicitly recognized a remedy on this basis, although the decision relied on out of state precedents. Foster Creighton Co. v. Wilson Contracting Company, Inc., 579 S.W.2d 422 (Tenn.App. 1978). Finally, however, the Tennessee Supreme Court, after finding it unnecessary to decide the issue as late as 1982, see Alden v. Presley, 637 S.W.2d 862 (Tenn. 1982), unequivocally accepted promissory estoppel as a cause of action in 1991.

  10. Scipio v. Sony Music Entertainment, Inc.

    173 F. App'x 385 (6th Cir. 2006)   Cited 10 times

    Where [1] one makes a promise [2] which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee, and [3] where such promise does in fact induce such action or forbearance, it is binding [4] if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.Stones River Utils., Inc. v. Metro. Gov't, 981 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1998) (quoting Foster Creighton Co. v. Wilson Contracting Co., 579 S.W.2d 422, 427 (Tenn.App. 1979)). If the facts here supported those criteria, the Scipio Plaintiffs should be estopped from denying the validity of the Proposed Agreement, and the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Fugee Defendants should be affirmed.