Opinion
February 25, 1985
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Becker, J.).
Order reversed, with costs, and motion denied. Plaintiff's time to respond to defendants' demand for a bill of particulars is extended until 20 days after service upon her of a copy of the order to be made hereon, with notice of entry.
Since a bill of particulars is not a disclosure device, it is technically improper to make a demand for a bill of particulars the subject of a motion to suspend disclosure ( Union Natl. Bank v Russo, 64 A.D.2d 759). Under the circumstances of this case, a motion to vacate defendants' demand pursuant to CPLR 3042 (a) would likewise have been improper. From the complaint as it now exists, defendants are unable to reasonably ascertain what it is plaintiff intends to prove at trial. In soliciting statements of the reasons or grounds underlying plaintiff's conclusory allegations in paragraphs 8 through 12 of the complaint, defendants were justifiably attempting to obtain a more expansive statement of the plaintiff's contentions rather than a description of the evidence to be adduced at trial ( see, Siegel, N Y Prac § 238).
Notwithstanding plaintiff's bald assertions, there is no proof that compliance with defendants' demand would require disclosure of any work product or material prepared for litigation ( see, Zimmerman v Nassau Hosp., 76 A.D.2d 921, 922; Chemical Bank v National Union Fire Ins. Co., 70 A.D.2d 837). Nor are the subject demands palpably improper ( Bergman v General Motors Corp., 74 A.D.2d 886) or so burdensome to supply that compliance would entail an unreasonable task ( Mull v Kenyon, 118 Misc.2d 114).
Under these circumstances, plaintiff should have been ordered to respond to the subject demand with the specificity requested by defendants. Mangano, J.P., Bracken, Weinstein and Niehoff, JJ., concur.