Opinion
No. 7903.
Decided June 3, 1942.
1. — Compromise — Settlement — Evidence.
Where the employee injured in a collision at a railway crossing was subject to the provisions of the Federal Employer's Liability Act, under which employees assume the risks incident to their employment, a release and compromise settlement of his cause of action may be set aside if the evidence raised and supported the jury's finding that the condition upon which employee relied as a basis for such compromise settlement proved to be untrue.
2. — Charge of Court — Assumed Risk.
In an action for damages by an employee of a railroad company, who was subject to the terms of the Federal Employer's Liability Act, a charge of the court asking the jury if they found from a preponderance of the evidence that employee's injuries "arose from risks ordinarily incident to the employment in which he was engaged" does not disclose any confusion in the manner of submitting an issue on assumed risk, and plaintiff having made no objection to the submission of the issue nor challenged the finding thereon, is bound by the affirmative answer against him.
3. — Findings by Jury — Risks.
The finding that plaintiff's injuries arose from the risks ordinarily incident to his employment was determinative of the case upon a fact basis.
Error to the Court of Civil Appeals for the Third District, in an appeal from Brown County.
Action in damages brought by Alton Pickens against the Fort Worth Rio Grande Railway Company seeking recovery for injuries sustained by him when the motor handcar on which he was riding collided with an automobile at a highway crossing. Other facts are stated in the opinion. A judgment for plaintiff was reversed by the Court of Civil Appeals and the cause remanded to the trial court, 153 S.W.2d 252, and the railway company has brought error to the Supreme Court.
The case was referred to the Commission of Appeals, Section B, for their opinion thereon and the Supreme Court adopted same and ordered judgment entered in accordance therewith.
Judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is reversed; judgment of the district court set aside, and judgment is here rendered in favor of the railway company.
McCartney McCartney and J. Edward Johnson, all of Brownwood, and Allen Gambill, of Fort Worth, for plaintiff in error. Callaway Callaway, of Brownwood, for defendant in error.
Alton Pickens, an employee of the Fort Worth Rio Grande Railway Company, sued the company for damages for injuries sustained by him when the motor handcar on which he was riding collided with an automobile at a highway crossing. At the time of the accident plaintiff was engaged in an employment by the railroad company that brought the adjudication of his rights under the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, under the terms of which employees assume the risks incident to their employment. No authority need be cited since plaintiff apparently concedes this fact. The special issue verdict of the jury and the judgment rendered thereon by the trial court were in his favor except upon the question of assumed risk. The issue was answered in the company's favor but the trial court failed to give effect to it. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded the cause on account of the trial court's refusal to submit an alleged issue of sole proximate cause. See opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals for full statement of the case. 153 S.W.2d 252.
1 The first assignment of error in the company's application for the writ alleges that the courts below erred in refusing to render judgment in its favor because the evidence shows that plaintiff released and compromised his cause of action, if any, against it. We agree with the Court of Civil Appeals that the evidence raised and supports the jury's findings upon which the release was set aside. See opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals on this point and cases there cited; also the recent opinion of this Court in Graves v. Hartford Accident Indemnity Co. (Com. App.), 138 Tex. 589, 161 S.W.2d 464. The assignment is overruled.
2 The next assignment complains of the action of the Court of Civil Appeals in refusing to render judgment for the company "in view of the unchallenged finding of the jury that the injuries sustained by plaintiff arose from risks ordinarily incident to the employment in which he was engaged." The Court of Civil Appeals does not discuss the question further than to say "there was an issue of fact as to whether appellee (plaintiff) assumed the risk from which the injuries * * * resulted"; and that "issues of assumed risk were submitted to the jury in a somewhat confused manner." We cannot agree that the record discloses any confusion with respect to the submission of the issue. The following special issue was submitted to the jury and answered in the affirmative:
"Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the injuries, if any, sustained by the plaintiff, Pickens, on the occasion in question, arose from risks ordinarily incident to the employment in which he was engaged?"
Inasmuch as plaintiff neither objected to the submission of the issue nor challenged the finding in response thereto, he is bound by the affirmative answer against him. Rosenthal Dry Goods Co. v. Hillebrandt (Com. App.), 7 S.W.2d 521; Consolidated Underwriters v. Strahand, 82 S.W.2d 1058.
3 It is unnecessary to pass upon the remaining assignments. The finding that plaintiff's injuries arose from the risks ordinarily incident to his employment was determinative of the case upon a fact basis. See 45 USCA, No. 11, sec. 54, p. 436; C.R.I. G. Co. v. DeBord, 109 Tex. 20, 192 S.W. 767; B. O.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368; 37 L.Ed. 772; Elliot on Railroads, Vol. 4, sec. 1849. The trial court should have rendered judgment in favor of the company upon the assumed risk finding, and the Court of Civil Appeals erred in not so holding and in not rendering judgment in favor of defendant instead of reversing and remanding the cause. Its judgment is therefore reversed and the judgments below set aside, and judgment is here rendered for the company.
Opinion adopted by the Supreme Court June 3, 1942.