Fort Worth D.C. Ry. v. Lovett

3 Citing cases

  1. Fort Worth D.C. Ry. v. Lovett

    263 S.W. 643 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924)   Cited 5 times
    In Fort Worth D.C. Ry. Co. v. Lovett et ux. (Tex.Civ.App.) 263 S.W. 643, 644, the trial court, in a case submitted upon special issues, instructed the jury: "It was the duty of defendant's agents and servants in charge of the train, to use, for the safety of the passengers thereon, such high degree of care as would be used by cautious, prudent and competent persons under similar circumstances, and a failure to use such care would be negligence."

    Affirmed. For opinion on former appeal, see 243 S.W. 519. Thompson, Barwise Wharton, of Fort Worth, for appellant.

  2. Wright v. McCoy

    110 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937)   Cited 7 times

    It has long been a settled legal proposition in this state that a defense of contributory negligence, not inferable from the allegations of plaintiff's pleadings, and not conclusively shown by the evidence, must, in order to be available to a defendant, be specially pleaded by him. "In most jurisdictions, as a general rule," says the text of Corpus Juris, "contributory negligence is regarded as a special and affirmative defense, which in order to be available to defendant must be specially pleaded by him." 45 C.J. 1115, ยง 692. Decisions of Texas courts cited as supporting the text are: Dublin Cotton Oil Co. v. Jarrard, 91 Tex. 289, 42 S.W. 959; Missouri P. Ry. Co. v. Watson, 72 Tex. 631, 10 S.W. 731; Texas N. O. Ry. Co. v. Rooks (Tex.Com.App.) 292 S.W. 536; Fort Worth, etc., Ry. Co. v. Lovett (Tex.Civ.App.) 243 S.W. 519; Jones v. Sunshine Groc. Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 236 S.W. 614; International G. N. Ry. Co. v. Ash (Tex.Civ.App.) 204 S.W. 668; Missouri, K. T. Ry. Co. v. Whitsett (Tex.Civ.App.) 185 S.W. 406; Lewis v. Texas, etc., Ry. Co., 57 Tex. Civ. App. 585, 122 S.W. 605; St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co. v. Gammage (Tex.Civ.App.) 96 S.W. 645; Dupree v. Alexander, 29 Tex. Civ. App. 31, 68 S.W. 739; San Antonio, etc., Ry. Co. v. Belt (Tex.Civ.App.) 46 S.W. 374; Missouri, K. T. Ry. Co. v. Jamison, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 689, 34 S.W. 674; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Apple (Tex.Civ.App.) 28 S.W. 1022. See, also, Brown v. Sullivan, 71 Tex. 470, 10 S.W. 288. Other, and mostly later, cases supporting the proposition may be cited as follows: Liner v. United States Torpedo Co. (Tex.Com.App.) 12 S.W.2d 552; Roscoe, S. P. Ry. Co. v. Taylor (Tex.Civ.App.) 191 S.W. 1175; Dunn v. Texas Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 84 S.W.2d 545; Northcutt v. Magnolia Pet. Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 90 S.W.2d 632; Leonard Bros. v. Zachary (Tex.Ci

  3. Universal Transp. v. Ramos

    37 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931)   Cited 5 times

    The allegation in respect to the state license number should be treated as mere surplusage; a plaintiff is only required to allege and prove the substance of an issue. Fort Worth D.C. Ry. Co. v. Lovett (Tex.Civ.App.) 243 S.W. 519; Fishburn Motor Co. v. Davis (Tex.Civ.App.) 287 S.W. 1101. The charge of the court on the proposition of evidence was substantially correct.