Fort Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Kiel

9 Citing cases

  1. Luther Transfers&sStorage, Inc. v. Walton

    156 Tex. 492 (Tex. 1956)   Cited 19 times
    Discussing an Act of God as part of proximate causation analysis in negligence lawsuit

    However, for a defendant to be relieved of liability for an unprecedented flood, there must be no negligence of the defendant concurring with the act of God to cause the damage resulting. [156 Tex. 498] The case of Fort Worth & Denver City Ry. Co. v. Kiel, 143 Tex. 601, 187 S.W.2d 371, 373, was for damages done to plaintiff's property by flood waters. Plaintiff alleged, and the jury found, that defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the injury which brought about the damages.

  2. Fort Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Kiel

    195 S.W.2d 405 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946)   Cited 23 times

    The Supreme Court granted a writ of error and reviewed the opinion by this court. See Fort Worth Denver City Ry. Co. v. Kiel, 143 Tex. 601, 187 S.W.2d 371. The former opinions are of little assistance to us on this appeal; this for the reason, on the identical pleadings of both parties and substantially the same testimony the jury upon the first trial answered special issues favorable to the defendant and the court entered judgment for plaintiff non obstante veredicto, while upon the last trial, as indicated above, all special issues were answered favorable to plaintiff.

  3. Scott v. Atchison T. S. F. R. Co.

    572 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. 1978)   Cited 57 times
    Recognizing that federal law controls substantive rights in FELA claims brought in state court

    Prior to our opinion in Yarborough v. Berner, 467 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. 1971), and the 1973 amendment to Rule 277, the railroad would have been entitled to a separate finding on this type of rebuttal issue. Yarborough v. Berner, supra; Fort Worth D.C. Railway Company v. Kiel, 143 Tex. 601, 187 S.W.2d 371 (1945); Gulf, C. S. F. Ry. Co. v. Boyce, 39 Tex. Civ. App. 195, 87 S.W. 395 (1905, writ ref'd). The submission of inferential rebuttal issues has been discouraged since this Court's opinion in Yarborough v. Berner, supra, and they have been prohibited since the adoption of the 1973 amendment to Rule 277.

  4. Texas & New Orleans Railroad v. Barnhouse

    293 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956)   Cited 8 times

    It is true that there is a difference between the term `unprecedented flood' and `an act of God,' but under the facts in this case the jury's findings on both questions were supported by some evidence of probative force. Gulf, C. S. F. R. Co. v. Holliday, 65 Tex. 512; Sabine E. T. R. Co. v. Wood, 69 Tex. 679, 7 S.W. 372; City of Austin v. Howard, Tex.Civ.App., 158 S.W.2d 556; Ft. Worth D.C. Ry. Co. v. Kiel, 143 Tex. 601, 187 S.W.2d 371. Appellant further contends that its culvert in the vicinity of Mississippi Street was sufficient when constructed, and that conditions have changed since that time-brush has grown up in San Diego Creek, more streets have been paved in Alice, more houses built, etc.

  5. Tex-Jersey Oil Corp. v. Beck

    292 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956)   Cited 4 times

    In Ft. Worth D.C. Ry. v. Kiel, 143 Tex. 601, 187 S.W.2d 371, it was held: "Railway company's negligence in constructing and maintaining a structure over a stream, concurring with an extraordinary and unprecedented flood causing damage to another, makes the railway company liable for damages, notwithstanding fact that the flood was extraordinary and unprecedented.

  6. Walton v. Luther Transfer

    286 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956)   Cited 1 times

    Concerning the liability of appellee to appellants as a result of the findings that appellee was guilty of negligence which proximately caused the flood, we must consider such together with the finding of an unprecedented rainfall that caused the flood which resulted in the damages. We think the rule of law governing the matters here presented is well stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Fort Worth Denver City Ry. Co. v. Kiel, 143 Tex. 601, 187 S.W.2d 371, 373, in the following language: "The rule of nonliability of a railway company or person for damages caused by an extraordinary and unprecedented flood is subject to the exception that negligence in constructing

  7. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co. of Texas v. Thomas

    282 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955)   Cited 1 times

    (Emphasis ours.) See also Ford Rent Co. v. Hughes, Tex.Civ.App., 90 S.W.2d 290; Pageway Coaches, Inc., v. Bransford, Tex.Civ.App., 71 S.W.2d 561, 564; Bransford v. Pageway Coaches, Inc., Tex.Com.App., 129 Tex. 327, 104 S.W.2d 471, 472; City of Panhandle v. Byrd, Tex.Com.App., 130 Tex. 96, 106 S.W.2d 660, 662; Fort Worth D.C. Ry. Co. v. Kiel, 143 Tex. 601, 187 S.W.2d 371, 373; Williams v. Zang, Tex.Com.App., 279 S.W. 815; Little Rock Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Dunn, 148 Tex. 197, 222 S.W.2d 985, 991; Siratt v. Worth Const. Co., Tex., 273 S.W.2d 615, 616. The railroad company insists that the answer to issue 10 (that the jury did not find from a preponderance of the evidence that operation of the train in excess of 12 miles per hour was a proximate cause of the collision), is a specific finding relative to speed which controls the general finding in answer to issue 7 (that operation of the train at an 'excessive speed' was a proximate cause of the collision).

  8. Meier v. Thompson

    248 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952)   Cited 2 times

    See Burlington-Rock Island R. Co. v. Newsom, Tex.Civ.App., 219 S.W.2d 129, points 3 and 4 on page 132. See also Ft. Worth D.C. R. Co. v. Kiel, 143 Tex. 601, 187 S.W.2d 371, point on page 373. The evidence tendered is without dispute that the culvert was constructed in compliance with the foregoing provision of the statute and no negligence is charged in the construction or maintenance of the culvert.

  9. Lewis v. Texas N. O. R. Co.

    199 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947)   Cited 3 times

    This statute has been the subject of judicial construction many times. In the recent case of Fort Worth D.C. Ry. Co. v. Kiel, 143 Tex. 601, 187 S.W.2d 371, 373, the Supreme Court, in a restatement of the law applicable thereto, said: "If a structure placed over a stream does not obstruct the natural and ordinary flow of water of the stream, and an extraordinary and unprecedented flood occurs, of such a size as had not been known or heard of before, and which a person of ordinary care and prudence, under the circumstances, could not have foreseen or anticipated, no damage can be recovered for the injury caused by the extraordinary and unprecedented flood.