The essential elements of a cause of action for false arrest or false imprisonment are that the plaintiff was restrained or arrested by the defendant, and that the defendant acted without having reasonable grounds to believe that an offense was committed by the plaintiff. See Karow v. Student Inns, Inc. (1976), 43 Ill. App.3d 878; Shelton v. Barry (1946), 328 Ill. App. 497; R. Michael, 3 Illinois Practice ยง 24.7, at 371 n. 5; see also Fort v. Smith (1980), 85 Ill. App.3d 479, 484 (Jones, P.J., dissenting). The defendants claim that the trial court properly dismissed counts III and IV of the plaintiff's complaint, because those counts do not sufficiently allege that Marcolini was acting without reasonable cause to believe that the plaintiff had committed a criminal trespass at the time he detained and arrested him.
Finally, Toney-El had a cause of action in the Illinois courts for false imprisonment. See Fort v. Smith, 85 Ill.App.3d 479, 40 Ill.Dec. 886, 407 N.E.2d 117 (1980); Karow v. Student Inns, Inc., 43 Ill.App.3d 878, 2 Ill.Dec. 515, 357 N.E.2d 682 (1976). Because Illinois law and the informal procedures of the Department of Corrections provided Toney-El with remedies that were both adequate and available, Toney-El has failed to allege a violation of the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment.
"It is essential, however, that the confinement be against the plaintiff's will and if the person voluntarily consents to the confinement, there can be no false imprisonment." Id. at 50, 81 Ill.Dec. at 510, 466 N.E.2d. at 1312 (citing Fort v. Smith, 85 Ill. App.3d 479, 481, 40 Ill.Dec. 886, 888, 407 N.E.2d 117, 119 (5th Dist. 1980)). Assuming arguendo that the officers lacked legal authority to require Magnuson's presence at the Rolling Meadows Police Station, Magnuson's claim of false arrest nevertheless must be dismissed.
Such a confinement must be "involuntary." Fort v. Smith, 85 Ill. App.3d 479, 40 Ill.Dec. 886, 407 N.E.2d 117 (5th Dist. 1980). While the facts as alleged in the instant case appear to show that plaintiff Marcano may have been justified in choosing to remain with the automobile and the personal belongings allegedly contained therein, such a choice does not raise the conduct of defendant to the level of a false imprisonment.
ยถ 35 Although defendants frame the issue as an abuse of discretion, they cite section 2-603(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which requires each separate cause be stated in a separate count (735 ILCS 5/2-603(b) (West 2018)), and they note "[t]he sufficiency of each count in the ultimate resolution of a claim for relief is a separate legal question," which we review de novo. (Fort v. Smith, 85 Ill.App.3d 479, 482 (1980) (emphasis added)). Under either standard, the result would be the same.
An assertion in one count is precluded from denying the validity of an assertion in another. ( Fort v. Smith (1980), 85 Ill. App.3d 479, 407 N.E.2d 117.) We find the trial court erred in dismissing counts I through VI and counts VIII through XI brought by Fritzshall in the name of the limited partnership for lack of standing based on the allegation in count VII that Lewis wound up the limited partnership.
In its motion, Kane County argued that, because Weimann failed to challenge the validity of the warrant on which he was arrested, plaintiff had not adequately alleged an unlawful detention. Because unlawful restraint is a necessary element of a false-imprisonment claim (see, e.g., Fort v. Smith (1980), 85 Ill. App.3d 479; Sparling v. City of La Salle (1980), 83 Ill. App.3d 125), we believe the motion made was appropriate. We reject plaintiff's argument that the motion introduced "other affirmative matter" appropriate only under a section 2-619 motion (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2-619), because reversing the dismissal on that basis would be inappropriate in any event in the absence of any resulting prejudice.
A plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to state a cause of action. ( Fort v. Smith (1980), 85 Ill. App.3d 479, 480-82, 407 N.E.2d 117, 118-20; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2-603.) Rather than indicating a basis for the due process claim, plaintiff simply filed a new complaint in which he omitted all reference to due process or other rights under the Federal constitution.
Illinois requires a plaintiff to state sufficient facts to support a cause of action; the complaint must "reasonably inform the opposite party" of the claim which he must counter. ( Fort v. Smith (1980), 85 Ill. App.3d 479, 481, 407 N.E.2d 117, 119; see also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2-603.) A motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2-615) concedes, for purposes of the motion, all factual allegations by the plaintiff.
Restatement (Second) of Torts secs. 38 through 41 (1965). It is essential, however, that the confinement be against the plaintiff's will, and if a person voluntarily consents to the confinement there can be no false imprisonment. ( Fort v. Smith (1980), 85 Ill. App.3d 479, 481, 407 N.E.2d 117.) "Moral pressure, as where the plaintiff remains with the defendant to clear himself of suspicion of theft * * * is not enough; nor, as in the case of assault, are threats for the future * * *. Any remedy for such wrongs must lie with the more modern tort of the intentional infliction of mental distress." Prosser, Torts sec. 11, at 45 (4th ed. 1971).