Opinion
HHDCV146054790S
09-08-2016
Kellie Forrest v. The Golub Corporation dba Price Chopper
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE #105
Kevin G. Dubay, J.
The matter before the court arises out of a dispute between an employee and her employer. Presently before the court is the defendant's motion to strike certain portions of the plaintiff's prayer for relief. For the following reasons, the court grants the defendant's motion in part and denies it in part.
I
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The plaintiff, Kellie Forrest, commenced this action against the defendant, The Golub Corporation d/b/a Price Chopper, by service of process on October 17, 2014. The plaintiff's three-count complaint, alleging disability discrimination in violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA), General Statutes § 46a-60(a)(1), reasonable accommodation discrimination in violation of § 46a-60(a)(1) and violation of the Connecticut Minimum Wage Act (CMWA), General Statutes § 31-58 et seq., is based on the following facts, which are accepted as true for purposes of this motion. The plaintiff is an employee of the defendant and is a " lead manager" regularly working more than forty hours per week. As a lead manager, she is expected to work alongside overtime eligible employees, but without overtime pay. On December 29, 2012, she suffered a work-related injury to her back. Subsequently, her treating physician placed a physical restriction on the plaintiff of no lifting over ten pounds. Thereafter, the plaintiff continued to perform the essential functions of her job while the " ten pound restriction" was in place.
On or about July 22, 2013, the defendant stopped allowing the plaintiff to work with the ten-pound restriction and failed to initiate a reasonable accommodation interactive process. Moreover, between July 22, 2013, and sometime in February 2014, the defendant prevented the plaintiff from working her job. The plaintiff filed charges with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO) on or about October 22, 2013, and received her release of jurisdiction from the CHRO on July 22, 2014.
In her prayer for relief, the plaintiff requests appropriate damages including, inter alia, punitive damages and penalty damages under General Statutes § § 46a-104, 31-68 and 31-72. On April 10, 2015, the defendant filed a motion to strike with an accompanying memorandum of law. The plaintiff filed her objection on May 18, 2015, and the defendant filed its reply on May 28, 2015. This court heard argument on the defendant's motion during the May 23, 2016 short calendar and now provides the following memorandum of decision.
General Statutes § 46a-104 provides that " [t]he court may grant a complainant in an action brought in accordance with section 46a-100 such legal and equitable relief which it deems appropriate including, but not limited to, temporary or permanent injunctive relief, attorneys fees and court costs. The amount of attorneys fees allowed shall not be contingent upon the amount of damages requested by or awarded to the complainant."
General Statues § 31-68 provides in relevant part that " (a) [i]f any employee is paid by his or her employer less than the minimum fair wage or overtime wage to which he or she is entitled under sections 31-58, 31-59 and 31-60 or by virtue of a minimum fair wage order he or she shall recover, in a civil action, (1) twice the full amount of such minimum wage or overtime wage less any amount actually paid to him or her by the employer, with costs and such reasonable attorneys fees as may be allowed by the court, or (2) if the employer establishes that the employer had a good faith belief that the underpayment of such wages was in compliance with the law, the full amount of such minimum wage or overtime wage less any amount actually paid to him or her by the employer, with costs and such reasonable attorneys fees as may be allowed by the court. Any agreement between an employee and his or her employer to work for less than such minimum fair wage or overtime wage shall be no defense to such action."
General Statues § 31-72 provides in relevant part that " [w]hen any employer fails to pay an employee wages in accordance with the provisions of sections 31-71a to 31-71i, inclusive, or fails to compensate an employee in accordance with section 31-76k or where an employee or a labor organization representing an employee institutes an action to enforce an arbitration award which requires an employer to make an employee whole or to make payments to an employee welfare fund, such employee or labor organization shall recover, in a civil action, (1) twice the full amount of such wages, with costs and such reasonable attorneys fees as may be allowed by the court, or (2) if the employer establishes that the employer had a good faith belief that the underpayment of wages was in compliance with law, the full amount of such wages or compensation, with costs and such reasonable attorneys fees as may be allowed by the court. Any agreement between an employee and his or her employer for payment of wages other than as specified in said sections shall be no defense to such action."
II
DISCUSSION
A
Standard of Review
The principles of law governing this court's review of the defendant's motion to strike are well established. " A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading . . . and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court . . . [The court] take[s] the facts to be those alleged in the complaint . . . and . . . construe[s] the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency . . . [I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied . . . In doing so, moreover, [the court] read[s] the allegations broadly . . . rather than narrowly." Sturm v. Harb Development, LLC, 298 Conn. 124, 130, 2 A.3d 859 (2010). " A motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 349, 63 A.3d 940 (2013). Additionally, " Practice Book [§ 10-39] . . . allows for a claim for relief to be stricken only if the relief sought could not be legally awarded." Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 325, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998); see also Practice Book § 10-39(a)(2).
B
Punitive Damages under CFEPA
The defendant argues that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff cannot obtain punitive damages under CFEPA. In support of its contention, the defendant directs this court's attention to Tomick v. United Parcel Service, 157 Conn.App. 312, 115 A.3d 1143, cert. granted, 317 Conn. 916, 117 A.3d 854 (2015). In Tomick, the Appellate Court held, inter alia, that a plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages under § 46a-104 because the statute does not explicitly provide for such damages. Id., 341. At oral argument, counsel for the plaintiff conceded that the Appellate Court's in Tomick holding is dispositive of her claim for punitive damages under CFEPA. This court agrees. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to strike the relief seeking punitive damages based on the alleged CFEPA violations alleged in counts one and two is granted.
The Connecticut Supreme Court granted certification limited to the following issues: " 1. Did the Appellate Court properly determine that General Statutes § 46a-104 does not authorize the award of punitive damages? 2. If the answer to the first question is in the negative, does the award of punitive damages in § 46a-104 fall within the province of the court or the jury?" Although the Connecticut Supreme Court is set to hear argument on Tomick, the Appellate Court's holding is controlling precedent until overruled or qualified. See, e.g., State v. Jahsim T., 165 Conn.App. 534, 545, 139 A.3d 816 (2016) (" It is axiomatic that [a] decision of [an appellate court] is controlling precedent until overruled or qualified" [internal quotation marks omitted]); Ferrigno v. Cromwell Development Associates, 44 Conn.App. 439, 443, 689 A.2d 1150 (1997), aff'd, 244 Conn. 189, 708 A.2d 1371 (1998).
C
Double Damages under General Statutes § § 31-68 and 31-72
As it pertains to the plaintiff's claim for double damages under § § 31-68 and 31-72, the defendant argues that the plaintiff's complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to support such an award. Specifically, the defendant argues that the complaint lacks any factual allegations to support a finding that the defendant acted in bad faith, arbitrarily, or unreasonably. In response, the plaintiff argues that, when read broadly under governing motion to strike standards, the complaint sufficiently alleges the defendant's bad faith. Additionally, at oral argument before this court, the plaintiff argued that the legislature's recent amendments to these statutes eliminated the need to establish bad faith, arbitrariness, or unreasonableness in order to obtain double damages.
Courts have consistently noted that " [§ ]31-72 provides for a discretionary award of double damages to employees who are successful in actions against their employers for wages due. Although the statutory language does not require evidence of bad faith, arbitrariness or unreasonableness, cases interpreting and applying this statute have required such evidence." (Emphasis added; footnote omitted.) Butler v. Hartford Technical Institute, Inc., 243 Conn. 454, 470, 704 A.2d 222 (1997); accord Ravetto v. Triton Thalassic Technologies, Inc., 285 Conn. 716, 724, 941 A.2d 309 (2008); Sansone v. Clifford, 219 Conn. 217, 229, 592 A.2d 931 (1991); Crowther v. Gerber Garment Technology, Inc., 8 Conn.App. 254, 265, 513 A.2d 144 (1986).
Additionally, absent evidence to the contrary, courts will ordinarily afford the same meaning to the same or similar language in the same statutory scheme. See, e.g., Williams v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 257 Conn. 258, 282, 777 A.2d 645 (2001). Although our appellate courts have not commented on whether a showing of bad faith, arbitrariness, or unreasonableness is necessary for double damages under § 31-68, the Superior Court has required such a showing. See, e.g., Stokes v. Norwich Taxi, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV-04-4100689-S, (November 15, 2006, Leuba, J.T.R.) Thus, courts have generally required a showing of bad faith, arbitrariness, or unreasonableness in order to obtain double damages under both § § 31-68 and 31-72.
It is significant to note, however, that each of these aforementioned cases dealt with versions of § § 31-68 and 31-72 that provided for the discretionary award of double damages. See, e.g., Ravetto v. Triton Thalassic Technologies, Inc., supra, 285 Conn. 719 n.5 (" When any employer fails to pay an employee wages in accordance with [governing statutes] . . . or fails to compensate an employee . . . such employee or labor organization may recover . . . twice the full amount of such wages . . ." [Emphasis added.]); Butler v. Hartford Technical Institute, Inc., supra, 243 Conn. 455 n.1 (same). The legislature recently amended both § § 31-68 and 31-72. As amended by No. 15-86 of the 2015 Public Acts, both § § 31-68 and 31-72 mandate the imposition of double damages on an employer for failure to pay an employee minimum wage, overtime wages, or compensation unless the employer establishes a good faith belief that the underpayment was in compliance with the law. See General Statutes § § 31-68, 31-72, as amended by Public Acts 2015, No. 15-86, § § 1, 2 (noting that employee shall recover twice full amount of minimum wage, overtime wages, or compensation). Thus, the court is now without discretion to consider an employer's bad faith, arbitrariness, or unreasonableness in awarding double damages.
The legislature's amendments to § § 31-68 and 31-72 impact the remedies available to a plaintiff following an employer's failure to pay an employee minimum wage, overtime wages, or compensation. Moreover, the amendments shift the burden of proof onto the employer to establish a good faith belief that underpayment complied with the law. Such amendments are procedural in nature and, therefore, are presumably intended to apply retroactively. " Whether to apply a statute retroactively or prospectively depends upon the intent of the legislature in enacting the statute . . . In order to determine the legislative intent, [courts] utilize well established rules of statutory construction. [A court's] point of departure is General Statutes § 55-3, which states: No provision of the general statutes, not previously contained in the statutes of the state, which imposes any new obligation on any person or corporation, shall be construed to have retrospective effect. The obligations referred to in the statute are those of substantive law . . . Thus, we have uniformly interpreted § 55-3 as a rule of presumed legislative intent that statutes affecting substantive rights shall apply prospectively only.
The rule is rooted in the notion that it would be unfair to impose a substantive amendment that changes the grounds upon which an action may be maintained on parties who have already transacted or who are already committed to litigation . . . In civil cases, however, unless considerations of good sense and justice dictate otherwise, it is presumed that procedural statutes will be applied retrospectively . . . Procedural statutes have been traditionally viewed as affecting remedies, not substantive rights, and therefore leave the preexisting scheme intact . . . [A]lthough [courts] have presumed that procedural or remedial statutes are intended to apply retroactively absent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary . . . a statute which, in form, provides but a change in remedy but actually brings about changes in substantive rights is not subject to retroactive application . . . While there is no precise definition of either [substantive or procedural law], it is generally agreed that a substantive law creates, defines and regulates rights while a procedural law prescribes the methods of enforcing such rights or obtaining redress." (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) D'Eramo v. Smith, 273 Conn. 610, 620-21, 872 A.2d 408 (2005); accord Fulco v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 27 Conn.App. 800, 803-04, 609 A.2d 1034 (1992), appeal dismissed, 226 Conn. 404, 627 A.2d 931 (1993).
Neither the plain language of § § 31-68 and 31-72, as amended by Public Acts 2015, No. 15-86, § § 1, 2, nor the legislative history of the amendments negate the presumption that such amendments apply retroactively. Indeed, courts addressing the retroactivity of these amendments have concluded that such amendments apply retroactively. See, e.g., Morrison v. Ocean State Jobbers, Inc., United States District Court, Docket No. 3:09CV1285 (AWT), (D.Conn. April 15, 2016). Accordingly, the court concludes that the amendments to § § 31-68 and 31-72 divest the court of discretion to consider the bad faith, arbitrariness, or unreasonableness of the employer's conduct and that such amendments apply retroactively.
III
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to strike the prayer for relief seeking punitive damages based on violations of CFEPA in counts one and two is granted. The motion to strike the prayer for relief seeking double damages in count three based on violations of CMWA, however, is denied.