Opinion
C.A. No. 05C-01-211 RRC.
Submitted: May 3, 2007.
Decided: May 16, 2007.
On Defendant's "Motion for New Trial or Remittitur." DENIED.
On Plaintiff's "Motion for Costs and Interest." GRANTED.
Kenneth M. Roseman, Esquire, Delaware.
Michael A. Pedicone, Esquire, Delaware.
Dear Counsel:
Before the Court is Defendant's motion for new trial or remittitur. This case arose out of Defendant's alleged failure to reimburse Plaintiff for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident caused by an underinsured motorist. The jury awarded Plaintiff $127,751.52. The Court reduced that amount to $100,000 pursuant to a pretrial agreement between the parties that any award could not exceed the underinsured policy limits.
Defendant claims that the jury award is "shocking in light of the evidence." Defendant asserts that the evidence showed that Plaintiff failed to mitigate her damages. Furthermore, Defendant states that the treating orthopedic surgeon's testimony and the medical records were inconsistent with Plaintiff's testimony. Defendant also references the arbitrator's award of $30,000 in this case and the settlement discussions that took place between the parties prior to trial (that apparently included Plaintiff's counsel's willingness to in recommend to his client binding arbitration with a "high" cap of $25,000) in order to suggest that the verdict was "excessive."
Def. Mot. for New Trial or Remittitur, D.I. 36, at 1.
In response, Plaintiff contends that settlement offers as well as arbitration awards should not be considered by the Court. In addition, Plaintiff maintains that "the jury award was not grossly out of proportion to the permanent injuries suffered by the 35 year old plaintiff."
Pl. Resp. to Def. Mot., D.I. 37, at 2.
The applicable standard when ruling on a motion for new trial was set forth by the Supreme Court as follows:
Under Delaware law, enormous deference is given to jury verdicts. In the face of any reasonable difference of opinion, courts will yield to the jury's decision. It follows that, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, the validity of damages determined by the jury should likewise be presumed. Accordingly, a jury award should be set aside only in the unusual case where it is "clear that the award is so grossly out of proportion to the injuries suffered as to shock the Court's conscience and sense of justice."
Young v. Frase, 702 A.2d 1234, 1236-37 (Del. 1997) (quoting Mills v. Telenczak, 345 A.2d 424, 426 (Del. 1975)).
Futhermore, the Court's assessment of whether the jury award is supported by the evidence "must necessarily be based on the evidence presented to the jury and not on facts outside of the jury's purview." Therefore, a jury's verdict should not be disturbed "[a]s long as there is a sufficient evidentiary basis for the amount of the award."
Id. at 1237-38. See also Clough v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1997 Del. Super. LEXIS 283 at *2 (holding that on consideration of the defendant's motion for new trial or remittitur, the "arbitrator's award and the offer of settlement were not evidence of record here and are both legally immaterial to the present issue").
Id. at 1237.
Applying this high standard to the present case, the Court finds that there was a sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury's award. The jury heard evidence that Plaintiff, with a life expectancy of 40 years, suffered a permanent injury to her knee that interferes with her ability to perform daily activities. The jury was also told that Plaintiff underwent two knee surgeries and attended numerous physical therapy sessions. Neither the arbitrator's award nor any settlement offers were presented to the jury. Therefore, considering only the evidence before the jury, the jury's award was not "so grossly out of proportion to the injuries suffered as to shock the Court's conscience and sense of justice." This Court's required "enormous deference" to a jury verdict means just that.
For the above reasons, Defendant's motion for new trial or remittitur is DENIED.
Plaintiff also has filed a motion for costs and interest. As agreed upon by the parties, Plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest in the amount of $30,533.62 and $3,017.00 for costs and expert fees.