"Generally, the mere statement of the affiant that the testimony given comes from personal knowledge is sufficient." Formaro v. SunTrust Bank , 306 Ga. App. 398, 400 (1), 702 S.E.2d 443 (2010) (citation and punctuation omitted). More fundamentally, Rafac did not make this objection to the trial court; instead, he argued in his brief to the trial court that the affidavit "indicate[d] that [Lu] had personal knowledge of the facts in question[.]"

he appellants’ claim that the payoff statement and payment history are inadmissible "summaries" essentially ignores Jones's affidavits, which the trial court was entitled to credit absent other record evidence — which the appellants have not identified — calling into question the veracity of the affidavits. See Roberts , 331 Ga. App. at 366, 371-372 (2), 771 S.E.2d 68 (in a suit on a personal guaranty of a promissory note, a report of the loan history that listed each transaction and ensuing principal balance by date and was authenticated by a bank officer with personal knowledge of the account was admissible as a business record); Angel Bus. Catalysts v. Bank of the Ozarks , 316 Ga. App. 253, 255-257 (1)-(2), 728 S.E.2d 854 (2012) (in a suit on a promissory note, the affidavit of the lender's special assets manager regarding his knowledge of the origin of payoff statements listing the total amounts owed by each guarantor was sufficient to qualify the statements as business records); Formaro v. SunTrust Bank , 306 Ga. App. 398, 400 (1), 702 S.E.2d 443 (2010) ("Generally, the mere statement of the affiant that the testimony given comes from personal knowledge is sufficient.") (citation and punctuation omitted); Whitaker v. Trust Co. of Columbus , 167 Ga. App. 360, 361 (2), 306 S.E.2d 329 (1983) ("A statement in an affidavit that it is based upon personal knowledge generally is sufficient, especially when its averments are supported by attachments to the affidavit.")

Cronan objected in detail at the first summary judgment hearing, including to Rundquist's lack of personal knowledge, and nothing more is required. See Harris v. State , 307 Ga. 657, 663 (2) (a), 837 S.E.2d 777 (2020) ("[A]t a minimum, a timely objection or motion to strike [is required] to preserve appellate review of a ruling on the admission of evidence.") (citations and punctuation omitted); see, e.g., Formaro v. SunTrust Bank , 306 Ga. App. 398, 399-400 (1), 702 S.E.2d 443 (2010) (recognizing that an objection to an affidavit is one way to preserve appellate review of an affidavit). Rundquist averred that her affidavit was "based upon knowledge gained from my review of the records," that she was employed by Chase "as a Legal Specialist III," and that she was "authorized to execute this [a]ffidavit on behalf of [Chase]."

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Formaro v. SunTrust Bank, 306 Ga.App. 398, 399-400 (1), 702 S.E.2d 443 (2010). Accordingly, we do not address this objection.

(Citation, punctuation, and footnote omitted). Formaro v. Suntrust Bank , 306 Ga.App. 398, 399–400 (1), 702 S.E.2d 443 (2010). No deposition transcripts, if such exist, are in the record on appeal. However, we may look to the pleadings, documents, and affidavits in the record in order to determine if issues of fact were raised. See Collins v. Byrd , 204 Ga.App. 893, 894(1), 420 S.E.2d 785 (1992).

As a result, any infirmity in the clerk's affidavit is waived. See, e.g., Chapman v. McClelland, 248 Ga. 725, 726(2), 286 S.E.2d 290 (1982) ; Shuford v. Aames Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 327 Ga.App. 844, 847(1), 761 S.E.2d 395 (2014) ; Formaro v. Suntrust Bank, 306 Ga.App. 398, 399 –400(1), 702 S.E.2d 443 (2010).--------

This is sufficient to preserve his appellate argument. Cf. Formaro v. SunTrust Bank, 306 Ga.App. 398, 399–400(1), 702 S.E.2d 443 (2010) (failure to raise arguments in an objection to affidavit, motion to strike the affidavit, or in summary judgment constituted waiver). “Affidavits purporting to establish the amount of a debt without accompanying business records, where appropriate, are insufficient to sustain summary judgment.”

” (Punctuation omitted.) Formaro v. SunTrust Bank, 306 Ga.App. 398, 399–400(1), 702 S.E.2d 443 (2010). Likewise, by failing to object to any opinion evidence or lack of foundation for expert opinion evidence in Tidwell's affidavit, Aames has waived such objections for purposes of summary judgment.

Pretermitting the question of whether Melman waived these arguments by not raising them below, they are without merit. See Finch v. Caldwell, 155 Ga.App. 813, 815, 273 S.E.2d 216 (1980) (noting that a challenge to the adequacy of the business records foundation can be waived); see generally Caves v. Columbus Bank, etc., 264 Ga.App. 107, 111(2)(a), 589 S.E.2d 670 (2003) (objection in trial court that testimony regarding account lacked foundation, without stating in trial court what the proper foundation should have been, presented nothing for consideration on appeal); see also Formaro v. SunTrust Bank, 306 Ga.App. 398, 400(1), 702 S.E.2d 443 (2010) (argument that affidavit was defective because affiant lacked personal knowledge of transaction and documents were not attached to affidavit was not preserved when no such argument had been made to the trial court, either in motion to strike affidavit or in summary judgment brief); but see Parlato v. MARTA, 165 Ga.App. 758, 759(1), 302 S.E.2d 613 (1983) (while failure to object to affidavit would have constituted waiver as to form, failure to object did not waive deficiency as to substance of affidavit, which had set forth contentions and conclusions without reference to any factual basis therefor). OCGA § 24–3–14(b) provides:

Pretermitting the question of whether Melman waived these arguments by not raising them below, they are without merit. See Finch v. Caldwell, 155 Ga. App. 813, 815 ( 273 SE2d 216) (1980) (noting that a challenge to the adequacy of the business records foundation can be waived); see generally Caves v. Columbus Bank Trust Co., 264 Ga. App. 107, 111 (2) (a) ( 589 SE2d 670) (2003) (objection in trial court that testimony regarding account lacked foundation, without stating in trial court what the proper foundation should have been, presented nothing for consideration on appeal); see also Formaro v. SunTrust Bank, 306 Ga. App. 398, 400 (1) ( 702 SE2d 443) (2010) (argument that affidavit was defective because affiant lacked personal knowledge of transaction and documents were not attached to affidavit was not preserved when no such argument had been made to the trial court, either in motion to strike affidavit or in summary judgment brief); but see Parlato v. MARTA, 165 Ga. App. 758, 759 (1) ( 302 SE2d 613) (1983) (while failure to object to affidavit would have constituted waiver as to form, failure to object did not waive deficiency as to substance of affidavit, which had set forth contentions and conclusions without reference to any factual basis therefor). OCGA § 24-3-14 (b) provides: