Opinion
Case No.: O1-CV-70864-DT
February 11, 2002
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that the Court grant Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, deny Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, and enter judgment for the Commissioner.
II. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This is an action for judicial review of the Defendant's final decision denying Plaintiff's application for disability insurance benefits ("DIB"). Plaintiff filed the application on January 14, 1998. (TR. 48, 51, 55). She alleges disability as of November 1994 due to a back impairment. (TR. 36-37, 74, 81). The Social Security Administration ("SSA") denied benefits initially and upon reconsideration. (TR. 61-64, 67-68). A de novo hearing was held on January 11, 1999, before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Anthony B. Roshak. (TR. 34-58). In a decision dated April 6, 1999, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was capable of performing a restricted range of unskilled light and sedentary work. (TR. 15-24). Accordingly, Plaintiff was found not disabled. The Appeals Council denied review, and Plaintiff commenced this action for judicial review.
Plaintiff's insured status expired on December 31, 1994. (TR. 36-37).
A. Testimony and Medical Evidence
Examination of the parties' briefs reveals that an additional recitation of the Plaintiff's testimony and medical evidence would be repetitive. As such, the pertinent medical evidence and testimony relied upon by this Court are articulated in the Analysis.
See Section E, infra.
C. Vocational Expert's Testimony
Elizabeth Pasikowski, a vocational expert ("VE"), also testified at the hearing. (TR. 54-58). She classified Plaintiff's previous work as follows: cashier, unskilled and performed at the medium exertional level; dental assistant, semi-skilled and performed at the light exertional level; assembler, unskilled and performed at the sedentary exertional level; clerk cashier, unskilled and medium; cashier cook, unskilled and medium; bacon assembler, unskilled and light; and demonstrator, unskilled and light. (TR. 55-56).
The ALJ relied on a hypothetical question to the VE that assumed a claimant of Plaintiff's age, education, and work experience as well as the veracity of Plaintiff's testimony of exertional limitations. (TR. 56). In response, the VE testified that although such a claimant would be unable to perform Plaintiff's prior work, he or she would be able to perform a range of unskilled sedentary and light work with a sit/stand option. (TR. 56-57). Specifically, she stated that approximately 17,400 unskilled sedentary jobs and 15,700 unskilled light jobs existed in the regional economy. Id. The ALJ last asked the VE whether the hypothetical claimant could perform any jobs if Plaintiff's testimony of nonexertional restrictions was credited. (TR. 56-57). The VE testified that the claimant would be unable to work if Plaintiff's testimony of pain severity and the need to elevate her legs for comfort was credited. (TR. 57).
D. ALJ's Conclusions
After reviewing the testimony presented at the hearing and the medical evidence in the record, the ALJ found that although Plaintiff suffered herniated disks at L4-L5 and L5-S1, she did not have an impairment or combination of impairments listed in, or medically equal to one listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. The ALJ found Plaintiff's testimony of pain, limitations and restrictions not fully credible. (TR. 22). He determined that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform unskilled light and sedentary work reduced by the need for a sit/stand option. Id. Thus the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled.
E. Analysis
The Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment contends that the ALJ's adverse credibility decision is not supported by substantial record evidence. The Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment contends that the ALJ's nondisability decision is supported by substantial record evidence. This matter is now ready for decision.
This Court's review of the ALJ's conclusions is limited. The findings of the ALJ regarding Plaintiff's disabled status are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence based on the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)(1997). Substantial evidence means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427 (1971);Walters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997). It is more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance of evidence. Brainerd v. Secretary of Health Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 217 (1938)). This standard presupposes that there is a zone of choice" within which the ALJ may make a decision without being reversed. Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994). Even if the court might arrive at a different conclusion, an administrative decision must be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence. Walters, 127 F.3d at 528; Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting Baker v. Heckler, 730 F.2d 1147, 1150 (8th Cir. 1984)).
1. Time Frame For Review of a DIB Application
Based on the arguments asserted in Plaintiff's Motion, I am compelled to reiterate that as a DIB claimant, Plaintiff is only entitled to benefits upon a showing that she became disabled on or before the expiration of her insurance disability coverage. Higgs v. Bowen, 880 F.2d 860, 862 (6th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff does not dispute that her onset date was November 1994, and that her insured status expired on December 31, 1994. As a result, the operative time frame for this Court's review of Plaintiff's DIB application is November 1994 through December 1994. In other words, for purposes of this Court's DIB review, it is irrelevant whether the Plaintiff is currently disabled, or whether she became disabled after December 31, 1994. The sole inquiry is whether Plaintiff was medically disabled on or before December 31, 1994. Gibson v. Secretary, 678 F.2d 653, 654 (6th Cir. 1982).
2. Credibility
Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's finding that her testimony of pain and functional limitations was less than fully credible. In particular, Plaintiff contends that: (1) the ALJ failed to recognize the objective medical record supports her claims of pain severity; (2) the ALJ failed to "mention" her record of severe pain complaints, prescription pain medications, and use of a transcutaneous electrical nerve stimulator ("TENS Unit") prior to surgery to relieve pain; and (3) the ALJ failed to properly state her testimony of daily activities. See Plaintiff's Bf. in Support of Mtn. for S.J. p 6-9. I will proceed to address each of Plaintiff's claims individually below.
a. Disabling Pain Under Duncan
As stated, Plaintiff's Motion contends that the ALJ erred when he concluded that her subjective testimony of constant disabling pain prior to December 31, 1994 was not fully credible. See Plaintiff's Bf. in Support. of Mtn. for S.J. p. 7-8.
Pain can constitute a disability where it is the result of a medical impairment. King v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 968, 974 (6th Cir. 1984). A claimant's statements as to pain, however, will not establish disability. Walters, 127 F.3d at 528; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a); 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(a). This circuit has a two-pronged standard for evaluating disabling pain complaints. First, it must be determined whether there is objective medical evidence of an underlying medical condition. Second, if there is such objective medical evidence, it must be determined: whether objective medical evidence confirms the severity of the alleged pain arising from the condition; or, whether the objectively established medical condition is of such a severity that it can reasonably be expected to produce the alleged disabling pain. See Duncan v. Sec. of Health Human Servs., 801 F.2d 847, 853 (6th Cir. 1986). The Agency's regulations set out "reliable indicators" of pain that the ALJ should consider in determining whether a claimant's alleged pain is disabling. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (2000). In applying this rule, it must be kept in mind that credibility determinations relative to subjective complaints rest with the ALJ. Gaffney v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 98, 101 (6th Cir. 1987); Kirk v. Sec. of Health Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 538 (6th Cir. 1981).
In this case, the first prong of the Duncan test is satisfied because the ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff had two herniated disks at L4-L5 and L5-S1 based on images from a computerized tomography scan ("CT-Scan") ordered by her treating physician, Jennilyn Wetzel, M.D., on January 11, 1995. (TR. 19, 119). However, the ALJ did not believe that the objective evidence of disk herniation confirmed Plaintiff's complaints of "unbearable" low back pain radiating to her lower extremities, nor did he believe Plaintiff's objectively established condition was so severe it could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged degree of pain prior to December 31, 1994. This is essentially a finding that Plaintiff failed to satisfy the second prong of the Duncan test.
I conclude that substantial evidence supports this finding.
First, the medical record of Plaintiff's back treatment prior to the date last insured does not confirm or reasonably show pain severity of the constant, excruciating degree alleged.
Specifically, the record first reveals that Plaintiff visited Bon Secours Hospital Emergency Room ("BSHER") on October 18, 1994, complaining of "three days of [severe] back pain" in the right sacroiliac area. See (TR. 217). However, her physical examination was normal except for "slight" tenderness on palpitation of the right sacroiliac joint.Id. She was diagnosed with acute right sacroiliac joint sprain, prescribed Toradol for pain, and told not to work or drive for five days. (TR. 216-217). Over a month later, on October 23, 1994, Plaintiff returned to BSHER, and complained of flu-like symptoms and a back strain that developed after a "coughing episode[.]" See (TR. 220). Her physical examination was unremarkable. Id. Aside from sinusitis, Plaintiff's diagnosis was listed as "[b]ack strain with history of back disease." (TR. 221). She was discharged in "good" condition, and dispensed 20 Darvocet N-100 for pain. Id. The next day, on November 24, 1994, Plaintiff returned to BSHER complaining of persistent symptoms of fever, headaches, and severe back pain. See (TR. 223-224). She was observed on intake to be "well developed, well nourished, awake, alert and in no acute distress." (TR. 224). Similarly, her physical examination reveals no findings pertaining to lumbar muscle strain. (TR. 224-225). Plaintiff was diagnosed with inflammation of the pelvis of the kidney and held for 24 hours. (TR. 225-226). The following day, on November 25, 1994, Plaintiff was admitted to Bon Secours Hospital for five days for pneumonia. (TR. 228). On workup, her complaints were "lower back pain," chills, fever, a productive cough, and severe headaches. (TR. 229). Her physical examination was unremarkable; however, on musculoskeletal and neurological examination, she was listed as alert and oriented, with "grossly intact" motor and sensory function, normal reflexes, and normal muscle strength. (TR. 229). On November 27, 1994, Plaintiff's complaints were summarized as "headache, generalized myalgias and elevated temperature." (TR. 231). Her examination was unremarkable except for the note that she was awake, alert, pleasant and "in no acute distress." Id. Plaintiff was discharged on December 1, 1994, with no mention of her back condition. (TR. 230-232). Accordingly, Plaintiff's hospital records clearly do not confirm the onset of constant, low back pain of unbearable severity.
Furthermore, Plaintiff saw treating physician, Dr. Jennilyn Wetzel, only twice during the insured period, despite registering a complaint on December 14, 1994, of severe back pain lasting three weeks. In that visit, Plaintiff told Dr. Wetzel she "fell off [a] porch" in August 1994 causing back pain, and the pain "died off until [the] start of [her] pneumonia." (TR. 189). Plaintiff characterized her back pain as a "burning" sensation, that radiates to her buttocks and right leg. Id. On examination, Plaintiff had pain and palpitations at L3-L5, as well as mild right-sided paralumbar muscle spasms. Id. Plaintiff's knee reflexes were not elicited, but her ankle jerks were 1 + bilaterally. Id. Dr. Wetzel prescribed Parafon Forte for pain, and ordered an x-ray of her lumbosacral spine to rule out radiculopathy at L3-L4. Id. A spinal x-ray was obtained on December 14, 1994. (TR. 188). It revealed a loss of normal lordosis (thought to represent possible muscle spasm) and showed "some minimal intervertebral disc space narrowing at L4-S1." Id. Thereafter, on December 20, 1994, Plaintiff returned to Dr. Wetzel. (TR. 190). However, on intake, Dr. Wetzel noted only that Plaintiff was "still having [radiating] pain[,]" and that she "[s]till [had] pain getting up/out of [a] chair." Id. In addition, Dr. Wetzel noted that Plaintiff had "pain" on palpitation on at the midline of her lumbosacral spine. Id. Lastly, Dr. Wetzel's notes on December 20 do not show that Plaintiff was prescribed additional pain medication. Id.
As a result, the record of Plaintiff's two examinations with Dr. Wetzel during the insured period do not confirm the onset of disability; at worst, they show that Plaintiff's nondisabling condition was worsening, especially where Dr. Wetzel had only just begun to evaluate her for a possible radiculopathy at L5-S1.
Second, the post-insured medical records available between late January 1995 and late February 1995 provide additional support for the ALJ's finding that she did not suffer an objective condition that would confirm or reasonably give rise to constant unbearable pain as of December 1994.
As ALJ Roshak recognized, about two weeks after Dr. Wetzel's exam in December 1994, Plaintiff submitted to a CT-Scan of her lumbosacral spine on January 11, 1995. It showed three areas of concern: (1) diffuse disk bulging at L3-L4, (2) diffuse disk bulging with a left central disk herniation at L4-LS, and (3) a prominent central disk herniation at LS-S1. (TR. 119). Also on that date, Plaintiff underwent electrodiagnostic studies of the nerves and muscles in her lower back with Dr. John Pollina. (TR. 118). He reported that Plaintiff's studies revealed "low grade lumbar nerve root irritation consistent with[,] but not diagnostic of[,] low grade lumbar nerve root irritation." Id. Following the diagnostic report, however, the objective record of treatment for Plaintiff's allegedly disabling back condition through January 1995 is scant. Through mid-February, at most, only two records exist. The first is a physical therapy intake record from St. John's Hospital that reveals Plaintiff was not enrolled in physical therapy ("PT") for her back until January 25, 1995. (TR. 235). The second is a physical examination office note of Dr. Wetzel from what appears to be from January 16, 1995. (TR. 187). In it, Plaintiff's primary complaints all relate to the resolution of her pneumonia. Id. As to her back, Dr. Wetzel recorded only that Plaintiff "still [has] back pain," and that she "saw [a] chiropractor who stated he could cure [her] pain."Id. Moreover, Dr. Wetzel's notes reveal that Plaintiff's back was not examined, and she was not prescribed any pain medication. Id. This was the last record of Plaintiff having consulted Dr. Wetzel for pain until April 24, 1995. (TR. 183).
The specific month of Plaintiff's record examination with Dr. Wetzel is unclear from the photocopies in the record. See (TR. 187).
The remaining record of treatment prior to Plaintiff's surgery in May 1995, consists of two PT records from St. John Hospital in late February, and a report to Dr. Wetzel from Plaintiff's neurologist, Peter Sorini, on February 23, 1995. All three records comprise the first significant physical examination findings on record, and confirm that Plaintiff's symptomology had progressively worsened.
The first record of PT on February 13, 1995, reveals that Plaintiff was treated with a combination of heat, massage, a TENS Unit and a home exercise program. (TR. 234). Plaintiff told therapist Debrah Pilgrim that her subjective pain complaints had decreased to a 7 on a 10 scale. Id. Plaintiff also complained that she was able to do "a little bit more functionally with normal household [activities] but [that she] frequently experiences aggravation of pain." Id. Ms. Pilgrim noted that Plaintiff's trunk range of motion ("ROM") was limited by 25-50%, that Plaintiff had symptoms of radiating pain into her left thigh, and that "over the past week" Plaintiff complained of numbness in her "large toe." Id. On February 22, 1995, the second (and final) PT record reveals that she had completed seven sessions through February 10, 1995. (TR. 233). Ms. Pilgrim noted that Plaintiff's PT was discontinued by Dr. Sorini and that, while receiving PT, Plaintiff complained of lower back pain with radiating symptoms into her left lower extremity. Id. Lastly, on February 23, 1995, Dr. Sorini reported to Dr. Wetzel that upon initial evaluation of January 23, Plaintiff's "signs and symptoms did not deserve operative intervention."(TR. 156, 240). Dr. Sorini informed Dr. Wetzel that Plaintiff had "moderate improvement" in her back and leg pain, but that she continued to complain of "episodic lower [right-side dominant] extremity pains." Id. He noted that Plaintiff's physical examination "remains nonfocal," that she continued to have positive right straight leg raises ("SLRs"), and that she was not taking any pain medication. As such, Dr. Sorini informed Dr. Wetzel surgical intervention was still "not indicated[,]" and that, "[i]mportantly," Plaintiff "remains neurologically intact." Id. He thus informed Dr. Wetzel that Plaintiff was "happy to continue with conservative care[,]" and that she was to return "if her symptoms should recrudesce [break out] or if she should develop any weakness." Id.
After Dr. Sorini's letter of February 23, 1995, there are no records of treatment to show the recurrence of Plaintiff's back condition until least late April 1995. However, in the period between April 1995 and May 1995, Plaintiff's records show that her pain complaints markedly increased in severity and frequency.
Specifically, Dr. Wetzel's office notes reveal that on April 24, 1995, Plaintiff was prescribed Demerol and Vistaril for pain, but that no physical examination was performed. (TR. 183). Dr. Wetzel's subsequent office notes show no office visits by Plaintiff until mid-May 1995. Id. The next record of treatment of May 3, 1995, shows that Plaintiff presented to physical medicine specialist, Dr. John Pollina, with renewed complaints of "low back pain radiating into her lower extremities." (TR. 116). Plaintiff told Dr. Pollina that her problem began in November 1994, and that her "respiratory infection" and frequent "coughing" precipitated her "discomfort." Id. Plaintiff also reported to Dr. Pollina that her course of PT between January and February 1995 "made her problem worse." Id. She told Dr. Pollina of increased pain while standing and sitting, decreased upon lying down or elevating her legs, and "some tingling [sensations] in her right big toe." Id. On physical examination, Plaintiff exhibited moderate tenderness of the right sciatic notch. Id. Otherwise, Dr. Pollina reported that she was seated comfortably; she had no problems moving from sitting to standing; she performed normal SLRs and deep tendon reflexes; she had full hip, knee and ankle ROM without pain; she showed no focal, lower extremity, sensory or motor deficits; and she exhibited no gross muscle atrophy. Id. Dr. Pollina's impression was a "central disk herniation at L5-S1 with resultant significant pain in [the] lower back and legs." (TR. 116-117). As such, he prescribed Plaintiff an epidural steroid injection to be followed by a course of PT. Id.
By mid-May 1995, Plaintiff returned to Dr. Sorini with complaints of low back pain radiating to both extremities. (TR. 153). On presentation, Dr. Sorini noted that Plaintiff's symptoms are "equal on the right and left now." Id. He also noted that Plaintiff's pain increased upon coughing and sneezing, and was "particularly problematic wh[ile] sitting." Id. Dr. Sorini explained that because Plaintiff's exams were "normal" and "she was only having pain," he had believed that her condition merited "conservative care[.]" Id. However, in addition to Plaintiff's increased symptomology, he noted that "[s]he [return[ed] today mentally exhausted and wanting more done for her problem." Id. Dr. Sorini wrote that surgery had become "feasible at this time[,]" and explained to Dr. Wetzel that Plaintiff wishe[d] to proceed." Id. Further, in a pre-surgical report on May 5, 1995, Dr. Sorini reported that surgery was in Plaintiff's "best interest"due to the increased severity and frequency of Plaintiff's symptomology which included "vague" urinary complaints and possible cauda equina syndrome (nerve compression-related symptoms). (TR. 121). Accordingly, with Plaintiff's consent Dr. Sorini opted to perform a L4-L5, L5-S1 microdiskectomy on May 16, 1995, as well as a repeat L5-S1 microdiskectomy on May 23, 1995. See (TR. 121-127).
Based on the record between October 1994 and mid-May 1995, I am satisfied that substantial record evidence supports the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff failed to satisfy the second prong of the Duncan test. In particular, Plaintiff's medical evidence of hospital admission during the insured period reveals sparse physical findings and diagnoses of muscle strain. In fact, at various points these records confirm that Plaintiff was not in acute distress. Plaintiff's record visits (two) with Dr. Wetzel during the insured period are also scant. Specifically, Dr. Wetzel treated Plaintiff only once for back pain on December 14, 1994, and later, on December 20, 1994, she found only that Plaintiff had "pain" on palpitation of the spine. Neither record examination confirms unbearable pain. Moreover, in mid-January 1995, while Plaintiff's CT-Scan impressions show two herniated disks, her diagnostic studies revealed "low grade lumbar nerve root irritation" at L5-S1. Similarly, Dr. Sorini's reports in late January 1995 revealed that Plaintiff was neurologically intact, and that her pain complaints merited only conservative treatment. It was only after Plaintiff was enrolled in PT in late January and mid-February 1995, that her record startlingly revealed symptomology of markedly increased severity. This was confirmed by Dr. Wetzel's prescription for Demerol and Flexeril in April 1995, which is notable because she had not treated Plaintiff for pain since January 1995. Finally, the remaining records of Drs. Pollina and Sorini through the time of Plaintiff's first surgery document that her back condition progressively worsened between the time of her PT and the time of her surgery. This is also evident by comparing the high level of Plaintiff's record of complaints and treatment between February and May 1995, with the relative absence of record complaints and treatment between October 1994 and January 1995.
Plaintiff's testimony of her residual functional capacity also provided significant support for the ALJ's finding that she failed to satisfy the second Duncan prong. Specifically, Plaintiff testified that during the insured period, she was capable of sitting for thirty minutes, standing for ten to twenty minutes, walking one block, lifting twenty-five pounds, carrying twenty pounds, and driving an automobile for thirty minutes. See (TR. 43, 45). In addition, Plaintiff testified that she had difficulty bending, reaching, pushing, pulling, stooping, kneeling, crawling, crouching and crawling, but unequivocally testified that she had no problem manipulating her fingers, understanding detailed instructions, remembering detailed instructions, maintaining attention, and getting along with co-workers and supervisors. See (TR. 43-35). Her testimony was adopted by the ALJ and deemed sufficient by the VE at Step Five to permit the exertional performance of the described range of unskilled sedentary and light jobs. See (TR. 56-57). Finally, the ALJ relied on Plaintiff's testimony and written statements of daily activities, which he found to be inconsistent with her claims of disabling pain as of December 31, 1994. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i) (ALJ can consider daily activities in assessing credibility of pain severity); Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 348 (6th Cir. 1983) (ALJ may consider a claimant's household activities in evaluating complaints of disabling pain). He recognized Plaintiff testified that during the relevant period she could, i.e., take care of her personal needs, shop for groceries, perform various household chores, get her children ready for school, garden to a limited extent, attend church services, and visit with friends and relatives, etc. (TR. 39-42).
Hence, I conclude that substantial record evidence supports the ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff's objective record did not confirm her complaints of disabling pain, or establish that her disk herniation was so severe that it could reasonably be expected to produce disabling pain on December 31, 1994.
b. Adequacy of Credibility Findings
Plaintiff's Motion next contends that, in reaching the above conclusion, the ALJ did not "apply the full test" set out in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 for evaluating complaints of pain. See Plaintiff's Bf. in Support of Mtn. p. 6-7. In support, Plaintiff's Motion proceeds to argue only that the ALJ's decision failed to "mention" the "numerous" record references of severe pain; that it "made little or no mention" of the record evidence of her "high powered pain medications"; and lastly, that it failed to "mention" she tried a TENS Unit during PT before her surgery in May 1995. Id. at 8-9.
ALJ Roshak wrote a two and a half page single spaced summary of Plaintiff's medical record, and he wrote a five paged single spaced opinion detailing his findings and analysis. See (TR. 16-23). In so doing, he provided the minimal level of articulation necessary to support his legal conclusions. See Morris v. Sec. of Health Human Servs., 845 F.2d 326, *2 (6th Cir. 1988)("We emphasize that we do not require a written evaluation of every piece of testimony and evidence submitted."). The fact that Plaintiff would have liked ALJ Roshak to mention her trial with a TENS Unit in February 1995 or to have increased his references to her pain complaints and prescription medications, does not mean that these aspects of the record were ignored. To the contrary, the ALJ's opinion specifically states that "all of the medical source opinions have been considered and evaluated and given appropriate weight in determining Plaintiff's disability." (TR. 20).
c. Misrepresentation of Daily Activities
Plaintiff's Motion contends that the ALJ's decision misrepresented her testimony of daily activities during the insured period. See Plaintiff's Bf. in Support of Mtn. for S.J. p. 9. Plaintiff first argues the ALJ wrote that she could cook, clean, shop and lift, but failed to mention that she performed these activities on a limited basis. See (TR. 19-20, 84-85). Her argument is meritless. As to cooking and cleaning, the ALJ wrote that she could do "light housework." (TR. 19). Her testimony and written statements support this finding. See (TR. 39, 84). As to shopping, the ALJ wrote that she could "shop for groceries." (TR. 19-20). Plaintiff testified to the same: "I do shop with assistance of holding on to a cart." (TR. 41). As to her ability to lift, the ALJ wrote that she could "lift 25 pounds[.]" (TR. 16). Plaintiff testified she could lift 25 pounds. (TR. 42-44).
Similarly, Plaintiff's Motion contends that the ALJ wrote that she attended church, swept floors and washed clothes, but failed to mention that she performed these activities with restrictions. See Plaintiff's Bf. in Support of Mtn. for S.J. p. 9. This argument is also meritless. The ALJ wrote that Plaintiff was able to "go to church." (TR. 19-20). She testified to attending church "twice a month." (TR. 40). The ALJ wrote that Plaintiff was able to "sweep[.]" (TR. 19). Plaintiff was asked if she swept the floors and she answered: "[y]es." (TR. 39). Lastly, the ALJ wrote that Plaintiff could "do the laundry[.]" (TR. 19). She testified that she washed clothes. (TR. 40). Thus, Plaintiff s claim that the ALJ misrepresented her activities has no record support.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, I find that the ALJ's decision to deny Plaintiff benefits is substantially supported in the record. Accordingly, I respectfully recommend that the court GRANT Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, DENY Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, and enter judgment for the Commissioner.
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties are hereby notified that within ten days after being served with a copy of the recommendation they may serve and file specific, written objection within ten days after being served with a copy thereof. The parties are further informed that failure to timely file objections may constitute a waiver of any further right of appeal to the United States Court of Appeals. United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
In accordance with the provisions of Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b), the court in its discretion, may enlarge the period of time in which to file objections to this report.