Forestview Homeowners Ass'n v. Co. of Cook

34 Citing cases

  1. Metropolitan Housing v. Village of Arlington Heights

    469 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. Ill. 1979)   Cited 18 times
    In Metropolitan Housing, the court approved a consent decree covering the issue of liability in a case involving racial discrimination in housing.

    The intervenors have a legal interest in the annexation and rezoning of the neighboring land. See Anundson v. City of Chicago, 44 Ill.2d 491, 256 N.E.2d 1 (1970); Forestview Homeowners Association, Inc. v. County of Cook, 18 Ill. App.3d 230, 309 N.E.2d 763 (1st Dist. 1974). See also Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, Inc. v. Citizens for Community Action, 558 F.2d 861 (8th Cir. 1977); Wolpe v. Poretsky, 79 U.S.App.D.C. 141, 144 F.2d 505 (1944).

  2. 1350 Lake Shore Associates v. Casalino

    352 Ill. App. 3d 1027 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)   Cited 11 times
    Summarizing La Salle factors

    LSA, however, cites to a line of cases which holds that the presumption of validity is substantially weakened where the municipality lacks a comprehensive plan. Forestview Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. County of Cook, 18 Ill. App. 3d 230, 240, 309 N.E.2d 763 (1974); Rodriguez v. Henderson, 217 Ill. App. 3d 1024, 1034, 578 N.E.2d 57 (1991). We have no quarrel with this proposition.

  3. Rodriguez v. Henderson

    217 Ill. App. 3d 1024 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)   Cited 16 times
    Holding plaintiffs stated a claim and had standing to challenge the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance where they alleged, among other things, lost job opportunities arising from the rezoning of a manufacturing district to a commercial/residential district

    Additional factors that have been identified include (7) whether a comprehensive government zoning plan for land use and development exists; (8) if so, whether the ordinance is in harmony with it; and (9) the evidence or lack of evidence of community need for a proposed use. See Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. Village of Richton Park (1960), 19 Ill.2d 370, 378, 167 N.E.2d 406, 411; Forestview Homeowners Association, Inc. v. County of Cook (1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 230, 240-41, 243, 309 N.E.2d 763, 771, 773. • 3 Whether a rezoning ordinance (as here) or an original zoning ordinance (as in La Salle) is at issue, the same factors for determining validity apply.

  4. People ex Rel. Long Grove v. Buffalo Grove

    515 N.E.2d 438 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)   Cited 6 times

    67 Ill. App.3d 924, 926. Similarly, in Forestview Homeowners Association, Inc. v. County of Cook (1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 230, the village of Northbrook was allowed to intervene in the plaintiff's suit seeking an injunction and declaration of invalidity of a rezoning ordinance and a special use permit granted by the board of county commissioners of Cook County. The property involved was located within 1 1/2 miles of Northbrook's territorial limits. The court found Northbrook was properly given leave to intervene where its ordinances reflected a valid governmental interest in the subject of litigation.

  5. Thompson v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals

    96 Ill. App. 3d 561 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)   Cited 30 times
    In Thompson, the court strictly construed the language of the zoning ordinance in making a determination regarding the validity of a protest.

    Under section 13.97-3, the application is "deemed to have been denied" unless an extension has been granted. ( Forestview Homeowners Association v. County of Cook (1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 230, 240, 309 N.E.2d 763.) We find nothing in the ordinance, however, that requires the same result when the Zoning Board of Appeals has failed to submit its findings within the period required by law. Schroeder v. County of Winnebago (1978), 58 Ill. App.3d 207,

  6. Village of Barrington Hills v. Village of Hoffman Estates

    75 Ill. App. 3d 461 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)   Cited 1 times

    See Village of Bensenville v. County of Du Page (1961), 30 Ill. App.2d 324, 174 N.E.2d 403 (abstract); Village of Mount Prospect v. County of Cook (1969), 113 Ill. App.2d 336, 252 N.E.2d 106; Krembs v. County of Cook (1970), 121 Ill. App.2d 148, 257 N.E.2d 120; Village of Arlington Heights v. County of Cook (1971), 133 Ill. App.2d 673, 273 N.E.2d 706; Village of Arlington Heights v. Cook County (1971), 3 Ill. App.3d 213, 278 N.E.2d 841. However, in Forestview Homeowners Association v. County of Cook (1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 230, 309 N.E.2d 763, appeal denied (1974), 56 Ill.2d 582, we upheld the Village of Northbrook's permissive intervention in a suit challenging the county's rezoning of property located approximately one and one-half miles from Northbrook's corporate limits. We held that article VII, section 6(a) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill.

  7. Yusuf v. Village of Villa Park

    120 Ill. App. 3d 533 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)   Cited 25 times

    The determination of whether a petition is timely is a matter left largely to the sound discretion of the trial court. Forestview Homeowners Association, Inc. v. County of Cook (1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 230, 309 N.E.2d 763. Presented with circumstances similar to those in the case at bar, the court in Standard Bank Trust Co. v. Village of Oak Lawn (1978), 61 Ill. App.3d 174, 377 N.E.2d 1152, held that the intervention petition of homeowners was timely even though filed after trial and after the trial court had entered its order approving an agreement between the developer and the village.

  8. Harris Trust Savings Bk. v. Duggan

    105 Ill. App. 3d 839 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)   Cited 9 times
    In Harris Trust Savings Bank v Duggan, 105 Ill. App.3d 839; 435 N.E.2d 130 (1982), the trial court had invalidated an amendatory ordinance.

    ( Reeve v. Village of Glenview (1963), 29 Ill.2d 611, 195 N.E.2d 188; La Salle National Bank v. City of Chicago (1970), 130 Ill. App.2d 457, 264 N.E.2d 799.) Courts are, however, authorized to pass upon the validity of an existing zoning ordinance, whether or not plaintiff has proposed a specific use. Treadway v. City of Rockford (1963), 28 Ill.2d 370, 192 N.E.2d 351; Forestview Homeowners Association, Inc. v. County of Cook (1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 230, 309 N.E.2d 763. • 4 Oakdale's reliance on Richton Park is misplaced.

  9. Standard Bk. Trust v. Vil. of Oak Lawn

    61 Ill. App. 3d 174 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978)   Cited 17 times
    In Standard Bank, the plaintiffs-landowners challenged the denial by the defendant-village of a site plan which provided for the development of the subject property as a shopping center.

    The intervention statute does not impose any time limits on the filing of the petition, and the determination of whether a petition is timely is a matter left largely to the sound discretion of the trial court. In re Appointment of Special State's Attorneys (1976), 42 Ill. App.3d 176, 356 N.E.2d 195; Forestview Homeowners Association, Inc. v. County of Cook (1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 230, 309 N.E.2d 763. • 2 As of July 20, 1976, shortly after plaintiffs filed the original suit, the policy of the Village Board, as expressed in the unanimous vote of the trustees present at the meeting, was to defend the Village's position. It was not reasonable to expect petitioners to foresee a change in that position. Particularly, it was not reasonable that petitioners could anticipate that a subsequent election changing the Village Board's composition would indicate a corresponding change in policy.

  10. La Salle National Bank v. County of Cook

    367 N.E.2d 131 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977)   Cited 5 times

    • 1 It is now axiomatic that a presumption exists in favor of the validity of the zoning ordinance. ( Forestview Homeowners Association v. County of Cook (1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 230, 309 N.E.2d 763.) This presumption can only be overcome if the one challenging the ordinance shows (1) its invalidity by clear and convincing evidence ( Buhrmaster v. County of Du Page (1973), 16 Ill. App.3d 212, 215, 305 N.E.2d 722, 725), and (2) that it is arbitrary and unreasonable and has no substantial relation to the public health, safety or welfare. ( La Salle National Bank v. City of Evanston (1974), 57 Ill.2d 415, 428, 312 N.E.2d 625, 632.