The intervenors have a legal interest in the annexation and rezoning of the neighboring land. See Anundson v. City of Chicago, 44 Ill.2d 491, 256 N.E.2d 1 (1970); Forestview Homeowners Association, Inc. v. County of Cook, 18 Ill. App.3d 230, 309 N.E.2d 763 (1st Dist. 1974). See also Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, Inc. v. Citizens for Community Action, 558 F.2d 861 (8th Cir. 1977); Wolpe v. Poretsky, 79 U.S.App.D.C. 141, 144 F.2d 505 (1944).
LSA, however, cites to a line of cases which holds that the presumption of validity is substantially weakened where the municipality lacks a comprehensive plan. Forestview Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. County of Cook, 18 Ill. App. 3d 230, 240, 309 N.E.2d 763 (1974); Rodriguez v. Henderson, 217 Ill. App. 3d 1024, 1034, 578 N.E.2d 57 (1991). We have no quarrel with this proposition.
Additional factors that have been identified include (7) whether a comprehensive government zoning plan for land use and development exists; (8) if so, whether the ordinance is in harmony with it; and (9) the evidence or lack of evidence of community need for a proposed use. See Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. Village of Richton Park (1960), 19 Ill.2d 370, 378, 167 N.E.2d 406, 411; Forestview Homeowners Association, Inc. v. County of Cook (1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 230, 240-41, 243, 309 N.E.2d 763, 771, 773. • 3 Whether a rezoning ordinance (as here) or an original zoning ordinance (as in La Salle) is at issue, the same factors for determining validity apply.
67 Ill. App.3d 924, 926. Similarly, in Forestview Homeowners Association, Inc. v. County of Cook (1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 230, the village of Northbrook was allowed to intervene in the plaintiff's suit seeking an injunction and declaration of invalidity of a rezoning ordinance and a special use permit granted by the board of county commissioners of Cook County. The property involved was located within 1 1/2 miles of Northbrook's territorial limits. The court found Northbrook was properly given leave to intervene where its ordinances reflected a valid governmental interest in the subject of litigation.
Under section 13.97-3, the application is "deemed to have been denied" unless an extension has been granted. ( Forestview Homeowners Association v. County of Cook (1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 230, 240, 309 N.E.2d 763.) We find nothing in the ordinance, however, that requires the same result when the Zoning Board of Appeals has failed to submit its findings within the period required by law. Schroeder v. County of Winnebago (1978), 58 Ill. App.3d 207,
See Village of Bensenville v. County of Du Page (1961), 30 Ill. App.2d 324, 174 N.E.2d 403 (abstract); Village of Mount Prospect v. County of Cook (1969), 113 Ill. App.2d 336, 252 N.E.2d 106; Krembs v. County of Cook (1970), 121 Ill. App.2d 148, 257 N.E.2d 120; Village of Arlington Heights v. County of Cook (1971), 133 Ill. App.2d 673, 273 N.E.2d 706; Village of Arlington Heights v. Cook County (1971), 3 Ill. App.3d 213, 278 N.E.2d 841. However, in Forestview Homeowners Association v. County of Cook (1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 230, 309 N.E.2d 763, appeal denied (1974), 56 Ill.2d 582, we upheld the Village of Northbrook's permissive intervention in a suit challenging the county's rezoning of property located approximately one and one-half miles from Northbrook's corporate limits. We held that article VII, section 6(a) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill.
The determination of whether a petition is timely is a matter left largely to the sound discretion of the trial court. Forestview Homeowners Association, Inc. v. County of Cook (1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 230, 309 N.E.2d 763. Presented with circumstances similar to those in the case at bar, the court in Standard Bank Trust Co. v. Village of Oak Lawn (1978), 61 Ill. App.3d 174, 377 N.E.2d 1152, held that the intervention petition of homeowners was timely even though filed after trial and after the trial court had entered its order approving an agreement between the developer and the village.
( Reeve v. Village of Glenview (1963), 29 Ill.2d 611, 195 N.E.2d 188; La Salle National Bank v. City of Chicago (1970), 130 Ill. App.2d 457, 264 N.E.2d 799.) Courts are, however, authorized to pass upon the validity of an existing zoning ordinance, whether or not plaintiff has proposed a specific use. Treadway v. City of Rockford (1963), 28 Ill.2d 370, 192 N.E.2d 351; Forestview Homeowners Association, Inc. v. County of Cook (1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 230, 309 N.E.2d 763. • 4 Oakdale's reliance on Richton Park is misplaced.
The intervention statute does not impose any time limits on the filing of the petition, and the determination of whether a petition is timely is a matter left largely to the sound discretion of the trial court. In re Appointment of Special State's Attorneys (1976), 42 Ill. App.3d 176, 356 N.E.2d 195; Forestview Homeowners Association, Inc. v. County of Cook (1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 230, 309 N.E.2d 763. • 2 As of July 20, 1976, shortly after plaintiffs filed the original suit, the policy of the Village Board, as expressed in the unanimous vote of the trustees present at the meeting, was to defend the Village's position. It was not reasonable to expect petitioners to foresee a change in that position. Particularly, it was not reasonable that petitioners could anticipate that a subsequent election changing the Village Board's composition would indicate a corresponding change in policy.
• 1 It is now axiomatic that a presumption exists in favor of the validity of the zoning ordinance. ( Forestview Homeowners Association v. County of Cook (1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 230, 309 N.E.2d 763.) This presumption can only be overcome if the one challenging the ordinance shows (1) its invalidity by clear and convincing evidence ( Buhrmaster v. County of Du Page (1973), 16 Ill. App.3d 212, 215, 305 N.E.2d 722, 725), and (2) that it is arbitrary and unreasonable and has no substantial relation to the public health, safety or welfare. ( La Salle National Bank v. City of Evanston (1974), 57 Ill.2d 415, 428, 312 N.E.2d 625, 632.