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Forest City Residential Mgmt., Inc. v. Burns

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS APPEALS COURT
Mar 14, 2019
No. 18-P-836 (Mass. App. Ct. Mar. 14, 2019)

Opinion

18-P-836

03-14-2019

FOREST CITY RESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT, INC. v. DOUGLAS BURNS.


NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28

The plaintiff, property manager Forest City Residential Management, Inc., brought this summary process action against one of its tenants, Douglas Burns, seeking to evict him for "[f]ailure to vacate pursuant to a lawful notice terminating tenancy, and following expiration of the lease term." More specifically, the notice of termination informed Burns that he had "repeatedly engaged in . . . inappropriate, derogatory, and racist comments and conduct towards minority staff members . . . conduct [that] has interfered with management's ability to perform its duties, and constitutes a business reason for . . . terminating your tenancy." A Housing Court judge dismissed the case, concluding that "[a]ll issues raised in the present action have been litigated in a prior matter."

That prior matter was a jury trial in the District Court in which the plaintiff sought unsuccessfully to terminate the lease agreement with Burns before the expiration of its term based on allegations of his racist misconduct toward the plaintiff's employees. Because we conclude that the issue in this summary process action in the Housing Court is not identical to the issue already litigated in the District Court, the Housing Court action is not collaterally estopped by the prior verdict. Accordingly, we vacate the order dismissing the case.

Background. We summarize the factual and procedural background. In September 2016, the plaintiff served Burns with a notice terminating his tenancy, citing Burns's alleged racist misconduct as a material violation of the terms of his lease. Specifically, the notice alleged that Burns had approached African-American staff members in a threatening manner and made derogatory and racist comments to them. When Burns did not vacate the premises, the plaintiff brought an action in the District Court seeking to evict him. Ultimately, the case proceeded to trial and the jury returned a verdict for Burns.

On April 29, 2017, one month before the lease term ended, the plaintiff served Burns with a second notice, which stated that his lease would not be renewed and that the tenancy was terminated. This notice provided, "[Y]ou have repeatedly engaged in, what management and maintenance staff interpret as, inappropriate, derogatory, and racist comments and conduct towards minority staff members. . . . Your conduct has interfered with management's ability to perform its duties, and constitutes a business reason for non-renewing and/or terminating your tenancy at the end of the current term." Based on this claim, the plaintiff initiated a second summary process action in the District Court seeking to evict Burns. That action was transferred to the Housing Court in January of 2018.

Burns's lease contained an addendum regarding the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development's Section 8 housing choice voucher program (HUD addendum), in which Burns participated. The HUD addendum provided that the landlord could terminate the tenancy for good cause, including business or economic reasons.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment, arguing that there was no genuine issue of material fact to be decided and that, as a matter of law, it had a valid business reason for terminating the tenancy. That motion was denied. Burns filed a cross motion for summary judgment, arguing that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded the second action. Although the judge did not rule on Burns's cross motion for summary judgment, she essentially adopted the collateral estoppel argument set forth in his summary judgment pleadings. When the judge dismissed the action, she reasoned that the "[p]laintiff cannot re-litigate the issue as the issue was tried before a jury. Plaintiff instead attempts to terminate Defendant's tenancy based on the same set of facts but under the guise of a 'business need' rather than as material noncompliance with the lease." The plaintiff's motion for reconsideration was denied and this appeal followed.

Discussion. Although the judge's order does not identify the rule under which the case was dismissed, we treat it as a summary judgment order because that is what the parties argued. Generally, summary judgment is allowed when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. However, "[s]ummary judgment, when appropriate, may be rendered against the moving party." Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (c), 365 Mass. 822 (1974). Where summary judgment is allowed in favor of the nonmoving party, we view the record in the light most favorable to the moving party, in this case the plaintiff. See Graham v. Quincy Food Serv. Employees Ass'n & Hosp., Library & Pub. Employees Union, 407 Mass. 601, 603 (1990). Our review is de novo. See Alicea v. Commonwealth, 466 Mass. 228, 234 (2013).

Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, as it is commonly known, prohibits a party from litigating an issue that was already the subject of a valid and final judgment. See Kelso v. Kelso, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 226, 231 (2014). Issue preclusion applies where (1) the earlier judgment is final and on the merits; (2) the party estopped was a party, or in privity with a party, in the previous case; (3) the past and present issues are identical; and (4) the issue was essential to the prior judgment. Id. Here, it is undisputed that the prior trial resulted in a final judgment and that the parties in each action were identical. The contested elements are whether the issue decided in the earlier District Court proceeding was identical to the one raised in the Housing Court action, and whether the issue decided in the earlier litigation was essential to the judgment. Our analysis requires us to "look to the record to see what was actually litigated." Kobrin v. Board of Registration in Med., 444 Mass. 837, 844 (2005).

Burns argues, with some force, that issue preclusion was properly applied because the allegations of his racially motivated misconduct were at the core of each case. While we agree that there may be significant factual overlap in the two actions, we are not persuaded that the issues are identical for purposes of issue preclusion. In the first action the plaintiff's specific allegation was that Burns's misconduct violated paragraph nineteen of the lease agreement, which provided that occupants were not permitted to "commit any acts of misconduct, violations of law, or otherwise engage in any activity that disturbs the peace and quiet of other Residents or the Landlord's management staff." Paragraph nineteen further provided that such misconduct violated the lease agreement and entitled the plaintiff to terminate the lease agreement before the lease term ended.

However, in the subsequent Housing Court action, the plaintiff sought to enforce paragraph eight of the HUD addendum to the lease agreement (see note 1, supra), which described the circumstances in which the plaintiff could terminate the tenancy after the initial lease term ended. The HUD addendum provided that the plaintiff was entitled to terminate the tenancy after the initial lease term for "other good cause" including a "business or economic reason." In the notice of nonrenewal, the plaintiff notified Burns that, based on his misconduct, "several staff members have been made to feel uncomfortable, unsafe, and/or unable to perform their job functions . . . constitut[ing] a business reason for non-renewing . . . your tenancy at the end of the current [lease] term." Thus, the issue to be decided in the Housing Court action had to do with the impact of Burns's behavior on the plaintiff's employees and business, rather than with the behavior itself. That issue, although related, is not identical to the issue tried in the District Court.

Moreover, we are not persuaded by Burns's argument that the District Court jury "must have disbelieved the landlord's witnesses and believed Burns when he said that the incidents described by the landlord's witnesses did not occur." The jury were never asked whether the plaintiff had proved that Burns engaged in the alleged racially motivated misconduct. The only question put to the jury was: "Did [Burns] engage in material violations of the Lease Agreement, and thus entitle the Plaintiff to termination of the tenancy?" Despite the parties' requests that the jury be instructed that the material violation alleged was the racially motivated assaults on the plaintiff's employees, the judge did not give that instruction. Instead the jury were instructed that the material violation was that Burns "remained on the premises after the landlord properly terminated the relationship." Thus, the District Court jury could have concluded that the racially motivated assaults occurred, but that they were not material violations of the lease agreement. Because we cannot discern from this record exactly what the jury decided regarding the issue of the alleged racially motivated assaults, we cannot conclude that that issue was necessarily decided and essential to the earlier judgment. See Kobrin, 444 Mass. at 844.

Conclusion. For these reasons, we conclude that the doctrine of issue preclusion does not foreclose the plaintiff's Housing Court action. The order of dismissal is vacated.

The defendant's request for appellate attorney's fees is denied.

So ordered.

By the Court (Hanlon, Kinder & Englander, JJ.),

The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

/s/

Clerk Entered: March 14, 2019.


Summaries of

Forest City Residential Mgmt., Inc. v. Burns

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS APPEALS COURT
Mar 14, 2019
No. 18-P-836 (Mass. App. Ct. Mar. 14, 2019)
Case details for

Forest City Residential Mgmt., Inc. v. Burns

Case Details

Full title:FOREST CITY RESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT, INC. v. DOUGLAS BURNS.

Court:COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS APPEALS COURT

Date published: Mar 14, 2019

Citations

No. 18-P-836 (Mass. App. Ct. Mar. 14, 2019)