"A motion for summary judgment is designed to test the merits of a claim." Forest City Gun Club v. Chatham County, 280 Ga.App. 219, 221 (633 S.E.2d 623) (2006) (punctuation omitted). Where, as here, the motion at issue did not seek to dispose of any claim, the ruling on the motion does not constitute a viable grant of summary judgment.

Forest City Gun Club v. Chatham County, 280 Ga.App. 219, 220 (633 S.E.2d 623) (2006) (citations omitted).

Thus, an order granting summary judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a contradiction in terms.Ogden Equip. Co. v. Talmadge Farms, Inc., 232 Ga. 614, 614 ( 208 SE2d 459) (1974); Forest City Gun Club v. Chatham County, 280 Ga. App. 219, 221 ( 633 SE2d 623) (2006).Stephens v. Shields, 271 Ga. App. 141, 141, n. 1 ( 608 SE2d 736) (2004); Bd. of Regents c. of Ga. v. Oglesby, 264 Ga. App. 602, 605 ( 591 SE2d 417) (2003).

Because Bryan Cave failed to follow the interlocutory appeal procedure and the state court's order did not include the express determinations of OCGA § 9-11-54 (b), Bryan Cave's application for discretionary appeal was improvidently granted, and we dismiss its appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Because we lack jurisdiction over Bryan Cave's appeal, and "there is no independent jurisdictional basis for [Gebo Law's] cross-appeal," Forest City Gun Club v. Chatham County, 280 Ga.App. 219, 222 (633 S.E.2d 623) (2006), we also dismiss the cross-appeal. Id.

"A motion for summary judgment is designed to test the merits of a claim." Forest City Gun Club v. Chatham County, 280 Ga.App. 219, 221 (633 S.E.2d 623) (2006) (punctuation omitted). Such a motion is not a proper vehicle for obtaining reconsideration of a claim that has already been adjudicated.

Here, the trial court's order did not pertain to the merits of the case and thus cannot reasonably be construed as the grant of summary judgment. See Forest City Gun Club v. Chatham County , 280 Ga. App. 219, 221, 633 S.E.2d 623 (2006).

The trial court's order, in substance, served only to deny the motion for reconsideration as the trial court did not address the issue of recusal. See Forest City Gun Club v. Chatham County, 280 Ga.App. 219, 220 (633 S.E.2d 623) (2006) (appellate court construes orders according to substance and function). Furthermore, any motion to recuse made after final judgment would be untimely.

Accordingly, the September 24 order was an order denying the motions to set aside. See Forest City Gun Club v. Chatham County, 280 Ga.App. 219, 220 (633 S.E.2d 623) (2006) (explaining that the Court must construe orders "according to their substance and function and not merely by nomenclature"). "[T]he denial of a motion to set aside a final judgment under OCGA § 9-11-60 is not directly appealable and instead requires the filing of an application for discretionary appeal under OCGA § 5-6-35 (b)."

Accordingly, these orders are not final. See Forest City Gun Club v. Chatham County, 280 Ga.App. 219, 220 (633 S.E.2d 623) (2006) (explaining that the Court must construe orders "according to their substance and function and not merely by nomenclature"). In order to appeal from these non-final orders, Nawkaw was required to follow the interlocutory appeal procedures set forth in OCGA § 5-6-34 (b), including obtaining a certificate of immediate review and filing an application.

Although Ross entitled his motion as one to set aside a void judgment, we are not bound by his characterization of the motion; courts construe motions "according to their substance and function and not merely by nomenclature." Forest City Gun Club v. Chatham County, 280 Ga.App. 219, 220 (633 S.E.2d 623) (2006). The relief sought by Ross is the removal of his charges from the dead docket.