820 ILCS 305/8(d)(1) (West 2006).We interpreted the language emphasized above in Forest City Erectors v. Industrial Comm'n, 264 Ill. App. 3d 436 (1994) and Greaney v. Industrial Comm'n, 358 Ill. App. 3d 1002 (2005).¶ 67 In Forest City Erectors, the claimant was injured while working as an ironworker for the respondent.

As previously stated, the legislature did not amend legislation; the legislature enacted a completely new law; therefore, that presumption does not apply. Ellinger erroneously relied on Forest City Erectors v. Industrial Comm'n, 264 Ill. App. 3d 436, 636 N.E.2d 969 (1994), for this presumption. However, Forest City Erectors did not address the legislature's enactment of a new law but rather dealt with an amendment to the Workers' Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 48, par. 138.8(d)(1)).

Additionally, when the legislature deleted certain language from previous legislation, it is presumed that the legislature intended to change the law. Forest City Erectors v. Industrial Comm'n, 264 Ill. App. 3d 436, 636 N.E.2d 969 (1994). Our construction of statutory provisions involves a question of law, which we review de novo.

"Under the rules of statutory construction, changes in wording and phrasing will be presumed to have been deliberately made. If words used in a prior statute to express a certain meaning are omitted [from the later statute] it will be presumed that a change of meaning was intended." In re Marriage of Sutton, 136 Ill.2d 441, 447, 145 Ill.Dec. 890, 892-93, 557 N.E.2d 869, 871-72 (1990) (collecting cases); see also Forest City Erectors v. Industrial Com'n, 264 Ill. App.3d 436, 440, 201 Ill.Dec. 537, 540, 636 N.E.2d 969, 972 (1st Dist. 1994) ("This court must give effect to the amended law in a manner consistent with the amendment."). Here, exemption of wages affected by wage deduction summons was clearly eliminated.

Although Cassens argues that this lack of jurisdiction is purely to the advantage of the employee, we note that the Act similarly gives the Commission no jurisdiction to reopen an installment award if an employee's wages should fall below the level contemplated in the initial award. See Forest City Erectors v. Industrial Comm'n, 264 Ill. App. 3d 436, 441 (1994). Instead, the Act establishes that employees and employers alike must use the opportunity of their initial hearing to present evidence showing the likely duration of an injury and its effect on the claimant's earning capacity.

Respondent contends that an employee cannot accept a lower-paying job if he is qualified for a higher-paying job. See Forest City Erectors v. Industrial Comm'n, 264 Ill.App.3d 436 (1994). However, respondent did not present any evidence showing that claimant's earning capacity was greater than the amount asserted by claimant at arbitration.

The words of a statute are given their plain and commonly understood meanings. Forest City Erectors v. Industrial Comm'n, 264 Ill. App. 3d 436, 439, 636 N.E.2d 969, 972 (1994). Only when the meaning of the enactment is unclear from the statutory language will the court look beyond the language and resort to aids for construction.

Moreover, when the General Assembly amends a statute by deleting certain language, it is presumed to have intended to change the law in that respect. Forest City Erectors v. Industrial Comm'n, 264 Ill. App. 3d 436, 440 (1994). In amending section 2-301, the General Assembly deleted language referring to actions that amount to a "general appearance."

A wage differential award should be calculated based on the number of hours constituting "full performance" of the claimant's particular occupation. Forest City Erectors v. Industrial Comm'n, 264 Ill. App. 3d 436, 440, 636 N.E.2d 969 (1994). At the arbitration hearing, the claimant testified that he was a full-time employee of Michel scheduled to work five days a week and that, as a full-time employee, his work day was 8.5 hours long.

We must presume from the absence of a statute of limitations period in the Enforcement Act regarding the filing of a foreign judgment that the legislature intended to change the law in this respect. See Collins v. Board of Trustees of the Firemen's Annuity Benefit Fund, 155 Ill.2d 103, 113, 610 N.E.2d 1250 (1993) (it is well established that when the legislature uses certain language in one instance and completely different language in another, it intends different results); Chicago School Reform Board v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 309 Ill. App.3d 88, 95, 721 N.E.2d 676 (1999) (a material change to a statute creates an assumption that the legislature intended to change the existing law); Deloney v. Board of Education of Thornton Township, 281 Ill. App.3d 775, 782, 666 N.E.2d 792 (1996) ("when a statute is amended, it is presumed that the legislature intended to effect some change in the law as it formerly existed"); Forest City Erectors v. Industrial Comm'n, 264 Ill. App.3d 436, 440, 636 N.E.2d 969 (1994) (when the legislature amends an act and deletes certain language, it is presumed it intended to change the law). Based on the fact that the Enforcement Act previously contained a statute of limitations for registration of a foreign judgment and the current Enforcement Act does not contain such a limitations period, and the fact that Johnson did not hold that a statute of limitations applied to registration, we conclude there is none.