Foreman v. State

5 Citing cases

  1. State v. Armstrong

    179 W. Va. 435 (W. Va. 1988)   Cited 25 times
    In State v. Armstrong, 179 W. Va. 435, 369 S.E.2d 870 (1988), we stated in Syllabus Point 3: "The trial court is vested with sound discretion to permit a witness to testify in narrative form, rather than by question and answer."

    An example of the trial court's discretion as to the examination of witnesses is the principle that the trial court is vested with sound discretion to permit a witness to testify in narrative form, rather than by question and answer. See, e.g., Foreman v. State, 50 Ala. App. 236, 239, 278 So.2d 238, 241 (1973) (toxicologist testifying for the state); Jones v. State, 477 N.E.2d 353, 358 (Ind.Ct.App. 1985) (psychiatrist testifying for the state), transfer denied (Ind. Nov. 19, 1985); Coble v. State, 476 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind. 1985) (court-appointed psychiatrist; narrative testimony precluded objections and resulted in inadmissible testimony cured by instruction; mistrial motion properly denied); State v. Wall, 452 So.2d 222, 226 (La.Ct.App. 1984) (trial court required defense counsel to move to strike each time state's witness testified improperly during narrative, rather than allowing a general objection to form of testimony; no abuse of discretion). Under W. Va.R.Evid. 702, quoted in its entirety in note 4 supra, an expert witness may testify "in the form of an opinion or otherwise."

  2. St. John v. State

    358 So. 2d 812 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978)   Cited 4 times

    ". . . . It is settled law that evidence of prior difficulties as part of the chain of events leading up to the killing is admissible when offered by the State but when offered by the defendant, such evidence is admissible only if the defendant was not the aggressor in the difficulty resulting in the killing and if the defendant has offered some evidence tending to show self-defense. Foreman v. State, 50 Ala. App. 236, 278 So.2d 238; Byrd v. State, 257 Ala. 100, 57 So.2d 388; Sanders v. State, 242 Ala. 532, 7 So.2d 483."

  3. Cole v. State

    337 So. 2d 40 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976)   Cited 11 times

    We do not agree. It is settled law that evidence of prior difficulties as part of the chain of events leading up to the killing is admissible when offered by the State but when offered by the defendant, such evidence is admissible only if the defendant was not the aggressor in the difficulty resulting in the killing and if the defendant has offered some evidence tending to show self-defense. Foreman v. State, 50 Ala. App. 236, 278 So.2d 238; Byrd v. State, 257 Ala. 100, 57 So.2d 388; Sanders v. State, 242 Ala. 532, 7 So.2d 483. There was not the slightest evidence of self-defense in this case.

  4. Mauldin v. State

    328 So. 2d 612 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976)   Cited 2 times

    Evidence of a prior difficulty is admissible only if the defendant was not the aggressor at the time of the homicide and if defendant had offered some evidence tending to show self-defense. Foreman v. State, 50 Ala. App. 236, 278 So.2d 238 (1973). The right to stand one's ground in his own home and if necessary to kill his adversary, without being under obligation to retreat from one's home, exists only when there is freedom from fault in bringing on the difficulty and a danger of eminent peril to the accused.

  5. Jones v. State

    53 Ala. App. 542 (Ala. Crim. App. 1974)   Cited 4 times

    Our appellate courts have long held that in the organization of a jury in a capital case under these sections, the defendant has a right to be present when any excuses are presented by the jurors seeking to be relieved from jury duty, and when such request is granted by the court, a failure to observe this rule is reversible error. Foreman v. State, 50 Ala. App. 236, 278 So.2d 238; Thigpen v. State, 49 Ala. App. 233, 270 So.2d 666; Draper v. State, 250 Ala. 679, 36 So.2d 73; Lassiter v. State, 36 Ala. App. 695, 63 So.2d 222. It is now familiar law that our courts have recognized since the case of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346, that the death penalty in a capital case has been abrogated and is no longer enforceable.