Opinion
No. 15–P–1475.
12-15-2016
John FORDHAM v. BOSTON UNIVERSITY BOARD OF TRUSTEES & others.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiff, John Fordham, appeals from a judgment issued by a judge of the Superior Court dismissing his complaint against the Boston University board of trustees and associated individuals (together, the University). We affirm in part and vacate in part.
Background. The relevant allegations in Fordham's pro se complaint may be summarized as follows. In or about April, 2002, Fordham, an inmate at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Norfolk, entered into an arrangement with the University whereby he would act as a "clerk" for the prison education program (PEP) that the University ran at the institution. The University initially paid him the monthly sum of $150, which it raised to $200 per month in 2006. In connection with this arrangement, Fordham filled out a Federal W–4 tax form and, at the end of each year, received a Federal W2 tax form showing tax withholdings.
In or before March, 2013, the director of PEP, Jennifer Drew, led Fordham to believe he was entitled to be paid the minimum wage. That month, the University stopped paying him; however, Drew told him that he would receive retroactive payment for all of his labor once the University "corrected the legal status of [his] wages." Based on this "oral promise" of retroactive payment, he continued to work as a clerk for PEP. In June, 2014, Fordham "retired" from performing his duties because the University had not resumed payments.
In January, 2016, Fordham filed this civil action. On the University's motion pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), his complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Discussion. Our review is de novo. Curtis v. Herb Chambers I–95, Inc., 458 Mass. 674, 676 (2011). We accept as true the allegations in the complaint, drawing every reasonable inference in Fordham's favor, and consider whether the facts alleged plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. Ibid. See Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 635–636 (2008). Because Fordham represents himself, we are especially mindful of the rule that "[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice ." Mass.R.Civ.P. 8(f), 365 Mass. 749 (1974).
a. Statutory claims (count I). Fordham's claims based on the Fair Minimum Wage Law, G.L. c. 151, §§ 1 and 1A, and the Wage Act, G .L. c. 149, §§ 148 and 150, were properly dismissed, as he was not an "employee" within the meaning of these statutes. Contrary to Fordham's assumption, his Federal W–2 and W–4 tax forms are not determinative of his status; what must be considered are the statutes and their purpose.
We are guided in this regard by Federal case law interpreting the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2000). See Mullally v. Waste Mgmt. of Mass., 452 Mass. 526, 531 (2008) ; Vitali v. Reit Mgmt. & Research, LLC, 88 Mass.App.Ct. 99, 103 (2015). Federal cases hold that an inmate performing prison work is not an "employee" under FLSA, because the primary goals of the statute—ensuring a basic standard of living and preventing wage structures from being undermined by unfair competition in the marketplace—are not applicable in that context. See, e.g., Miller v. Dukakis, 961 F.2d 7, 9 (1st Cir.1992) ; Villarreal v. Woodman, 113 F.3d 202, 207 (11th Cir.1997). Indeed, in Danneskjold v. Hausrath, 82 F.3d 37, 43–44 (2d Cir.1996), a case remarkably similar to the one before us, it specifically was held that an inmate is not an "employee" under FLSA even when he is engaged in voluntary labor for an entity other than the prison itself, so long as that labor is serving the institutional needs of the prison. The plaintiff in that case, an inmate employed as a clerk-tutor by a consortium of colleges providing courses to prisoners, therefore was not entitled to be paid minimum wage. Ibid.
The rationale of the Federal cases is equally applicable to the Massachusetts statutes at issue here. As matter of law, Fordham is not an employee entitled to relief under the Fair Minimum Wage Law and the Wage Act.
This conclusion is bolstered by our Legislature's apparent understanding that the Fair Minimum Wage Law and the Wage Act do not generally cover prisoners. Pursuant to G.L. c. 127, § 49, 4th par., as appearing in St.1972, c. 777, § 13, "[t]he rates of pay and other conditions of employment" of prisoners working outside their correctional institution in work release programs "shall be the same as those paid or required in the locality in which the work is performed." We infer from this provision that the Legislature recognized that prisoners ordinarily are not entitled to such protection, and made an exception for those employed outside the correctional facility in order to prevent employers from undercutting the ordinary costs of labor by hiring prisoners.
b. Breach of contract claim (count II). Even though the statutes discussed above do not apply to Fordham, we find no support for the proposition that, as an inmate, he is generally disabled from entering into enforceable contracts. We therefore conclude that, to the limited extent that his complaint seeks damages for the University's failure to pay him his $200 per month stipend, as it had before, for work that he performed from March, 2013, to his "retirement" in June, 2014, he has alleged a viable contract claim. Whether Drew had actual or apparent authority to bind the University to this commitment is an issue that needs factual development. The contract claim should not have been rejected at the motion to dismiss stage.
c. Quantum meruit and unjust enrichment (counts III and V). In circumstances where there is no valid contract covering the subject matter, a plaintiff may recover quantum meruit damages upon demonstrating that (1) he conferred a measurable benefit upon the defendant; (2) he reasonably expected compensation from the defendant; and (3) the defendant accepted the benefit with the knowledge, actual or chargeable, of the plaintiff's reasonable expectation. Finard & Co., LLC v. Sitt Asset Mgmt., 79 Mass.App.Ct. 226, 229–230 (2011). Again, to the limited extent that Fordham seeks to recover his $200 per month stipend for services performed for the benefit of the University from March, 2013, to June, 2014, we conclude that he has stated a viable quasi contract claim. Whether his expectation of compensation was reasonable cannot be decided as matter of law on his complaint. The quasi contract claim should not have been rejected at the motion to dismiss stage.
Although Fordham alleges these theories as two separate claims, we address them together, as they are properly viewed as components of a single claim sounding in quasi contract. Quantum meruit refers to the measure of damages; the underlying basis for awarding quantum meruit damages is unjust enrichment of one party and unjust detriment to the other. See Liss v. Studeny, 450 Mass. 473, 479–480 (2008). "The injustice of the enrichment or detriment equates with the defeat of a person's reasonable expectations." Id. at 480.
d. Conversion (count IV). To prevail on a claim for conversion a plaintiff must allege and prove that the defendant "intentionally or wrongfully exercised acts of ownership, control, or dominion over personal property to which he has no right of possession at the time." Grand Pac. Fin. Corp. v. Brauer, 57 Mass.App.Ct. 407, 412 (2003) (quotation omitted). Fordham's complaint concerns only intangible property—an alleged debt. The conversion claim therefore was properly dismissed.
Conclusion. The portions of the judgment dismissing counts II, III, and V of the complaint are vacated to the limited extent that those counts allege that the University failed to pay Fordham a stipend of $200 per month for work performed between March, 2013, and June, 2014, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum and order. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.
So ordered.