A trial court's failure to comply with a defendant's request for findings of fact requires reversal is particularly relevant when the failure impedes appellate review of the trial court's decision. SeeJoseph v. State , 3 S.W.3d 627, 639 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (citing Ford v. State , 488 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) ). The trial court need not issue separate findings if the judgment or revocation order discloses the grounds for revocation found by the trial court.
W. 615, 615 (Tex. 1892); James v. James, 81 Tex. 373, 16 S.W. 1087, 1089 (1891); Abercrombie v. Stillman, 11 Tex. 589, 14 S.W. 196, 197 (1890); Houston T.C. Ry. Co. v. Baker, 57 Tex. 419, 422 (Tex. 1882); Porcheler v. Bronson, 50 Tex. 555, 561 (Tex. 1879); Armendiaz v. De La Serna, 40 Tex. 291, 297 (Tex. 1874); Green v. Rugely, 23 Tex. 539, 544-45 (Tex. 1859); Moseby v. Burrow, 52 Tex. 396, 405 (Tex. 1880); Bradshaw v. May field, 18 Tex. 21, 30 (Tex. 185 6).See, e.g., Crane v. State, 786 S.W.2d 338, 347 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990); Langston v. State, lib S.W.2d 586, 587 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989); Smith v. State, 683 S.W.2d 393, 406 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984); Acosta v. State, 650 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983); Hall v. State, 619 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980); Ex parte Nichols, 604 S.W.2d 81, 82 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980); Almand v. State, 536 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Tex.Crim.App. 1976); McKinney v. State, 505 S.W.2d 536, 541 (Tex.Crim.App. 1974); Jackson v. State, 494 S.W.2d 550 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973); Ford v. State, 488 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex.Crim.App. 1972); Doby v. State, 454 S.W.2d 411, 413-14 (Tex.Crim.App. 1970); Watts v. State, 430 S.W.2d 200, 202 (Tex.Crim.App. 1968); Holcombe v. State, 424 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tex.Crim.App. 1968); Melancon v. State, 367 S.W.2d 690, 692 (Tex.Crim.App. 1963); Dillard v. State, 153 Tex. Crim. 134, 218 S.W.2d 476, 478 (1949); McDonald v. State, 138 Tex.Crim. 510, 136 S.W.2d 816, 818 (1940). That is, until today.
The State cites Garrett v. State, 619 S.W.2d 172 (Tex.Cr.App. 1981), and other related decisions, particularly about an appellate court "substituting its collective judgment." Interestingly, therein the late Judge Teague cited Ford v. State, 488 S.W.2d 793 (Tex.Cr.App. 1972), in which, writing for the Court the late Judge Douglas pointed out that because the Court had long suggested that trial judges should enter findings on grounds relied upon to revoke probation, "[f]ailure to comply with a request to make findings in support of an order revoking probation may call for a reversal." Id., at 795.
When a foreign conviction is involved, in absence of proof of the laws of the other state, this Court will presume that its law is the same as that of the State of Texas. See e.g. Smith v. State, 683 S.W.2d 393, 406 (Tex.Cr.App. 1984); Ex parte Nichols, 604 S.W.2d 81, 82 (Tex.Cr.App. 1980); Almand v. State, 536 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976); Ford v. State, 488 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex.Cr.App. 1972). In fact, in McKinney v. State, 505 S.W.2d 536, 541 (Tex.Cr.App. 1974), we applied such a presumption to the law of Kansas regarding juvenile offenders in absence of any contrary proof.
When supported by the evidence, this Court will not substitute its collective judgment for the decision of the trial court. Ford v. State, 488 S.W.2d 793 (Tex.Cr.App. 1972). Even where the standard of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt, it is the rare case where self-defense may be established as a matter of law.
"Probation may not be revoked upon a finding of any violation of the law other than that alleged or necessarily included within the allegations of that alleged in the motion to revoke. Franks v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 516 S.W.2d 185; Ford v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 488 S.W.2d 793."
See also Almand v. State, 536 S.W.2d 377 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976); McKinney v. State, 505 S.W.2d 536 (Tex.Cr.App. 1974). And more particularly, it was assumed in Ford v. State, 488 S.W.2d 793 (Tex.Cr.App. 1972), that the laws of Oklahoma were the same as the laws of Texas absent a showing to the contrary. Moreover, an examination of Oklahoma statutes, 21 Okla.St.Ann., § 801, reveals that prior to March 30, 1973 the offense of robbery by firearms in Oklahoma was punishable by maximum penalty of death.
A growing body of law now stands for the proposition that a probation may not be revoked upon a finding of any violation of any probationary condition other than that alleged or necessarily included within the allegations contained in the State's motion to revoke. See, e. g., Cleland v. State, 572 S.W.2d 673 (Tex.Cr.App. 1978); Chacon v. State, 558 S.W.2d 874 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977); Pickett v. State, 542 S.W.2d 868 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976); Franks v. State, 516 S.W.2d 185 (Tex.Cr.App. 1974); Ford v. State, 488 S.W.2d 793 (Tex.Cr.App. 1972); Mason v. State, 438 S.W.2d 556 (Tex.Cr.App. 1969). The trial court here specifically concluded that the State failed to meet its burden of proof "as to the allegations in the Motion to Revoke;" furthermore, we are not persuaded that, by alleging "appellant appeared in a public place . . . under the influence of alcohol to the degree that (he) might endanger himself and others," the State adequately notified him that his probation was in jeopardy for failure to comply with the requirements that he "avoid places where alcoholic beverages are sold" and "abstain from the use of alcohol in any form at anytime."
"(p)robation may not be revoked upon a finding of any violation of the law other than that alleged or necessarily included within the allegations of that alleged in the motion to revoke. Franks v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 516 S.W.2d 185; Ford v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 488 S.W.2d 793."
Those contentions were overruled in that the probations there were revoked for the commission of an offense, not for conviction for an offense. In contrast, appellant here urges the rules of law that it is an abuse of discretion to revoke probation where the proof does not conform to the allegations set out in the motion to revoke, Ford v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 488 S.W.2d 793, or where it fails to establish an element of the offense. Reed v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 533 S.W.2d 35. He then asserts that the record here is devoid of evidence to support the allegation in the motion to revoke that appellant committed the offense of murder.