Opinion
23A-CR-3060
11-26-2024
Antoine Ford, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT R. Patrick Magrath Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP Madison, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Ellen H. Meilaender Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Bartholomew Circuit Court The Honorable Kelly S. Benjamin, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 03C01-2307-F4-3528.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT R. Patrick Magrath Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP Madison, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Ellen H. Meilaender Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pyle, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[¶1] Antoine Ford ("Ford") appeals the trial court's denial of his pretrial motion for writ of habeas corpus. Ford argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his habeas corpus motion. Specifically, he contends that the trial court should have ordered his release from pretrial incarceration based on his challenge to the constitutional validity of a traffic stop involving a vehicle in which he was a passenger. Ford raised the same constitutional challenges in his motion to suppress, which the trial court denied and from which he did not bring an interlocutory appeal. Because Ford is improperly attempting to bypass his failure to seek an interlocutory appeal from the denial of his motion to suppress by raising the same arguments in his habeas corpus motion, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Ford's pretrial motion for writ of habeas corpus.
[¶2] We affirm.
Issue
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Ford's pretrial motion for writ of habeas corpus.
Facts
[¶3] In July 2023, Columbus Police Officers ("the officers") from a narcotics enforcement team conducted a traffic stop on a vehicle, in which Ford was a passenger. A K-9 officer conducted a dog sniff around the vehicle, and the dog alerted for the presence of drugs. When the officers asked Ford and the driver to step out of the vehicle, Ford admitted that there was a little bit of methamphetamine in the vehicle. On the front passenger seat, the officers found fentanyl pills in a baggie that was next to Ford's wallet and identification. Ford told the officers that he had swallowed some drugs, and they took Ford to the hospital. The officers also sought and obtained a warrant to search Ford's cellphone.
[¶4] The State charged Ford with Level 4 felony dealing in a narcotic drug (fentanyl). Thereafter, Ford filed two separate pro se motions to dismiss, in which he challenged the constitutional validity of the traffic stop, detention, and search and seizure of his cellphone. The trial court denied both of Ford's motions to dismiss.
The State also initially charged Ford with Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine, Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia, but it later dismissed those charges.
[¶5] In September 2023, Ford filed a pro se motion to suppress. Ford again challenged the constitutional validity of the traffic stop, detention, and search and seizure of his cellphone. Following a hearing on Ford's suppression motion in November 2023, the trial court issued an order denying Ford's motion to suppress. Ford did not ask the trial court to certify its suppression order for an interlocutory appeal.
[¶6] Also in November 2023, Ford filed a pro se motion for writ of habeas corpus and then a pro se amendment to that motion. In Ford's habeas motion, he again challenged the constitutional validity of the traffic stop, detention, and search and seizure. Thereafter, Ford sought the appointment of a public defender, and the trial court granted his request. Following a hearing on Ford's motion, the trial court denied Ford's motion for writ of habeas corpus.
[¶7] Ford now appeals.
Decision
[¶8] Ford contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his pretrial motion for writ of habeas corpus. The State asserts that Ford is essentially using his habeas corpus motion as a second motion to suppress and points out that he is again arguing about the constitutional validity of the traffic stop. The State argues that "[b]ecause the arguments [Ford] raises go to the admissibility of the evidence obtained through the traffic stop and not to the legality of his current detention, they are not cognizable claims to litigate in a petition for habeas corpus and should not be addressed in this appeal." (State's Br. 15). The State points out that if Ford believes that the trial court erred in its ruling on his original suppression motion, then his remedy was either to file a discretionary interlocutory appeal or to raise the issue in a direct appeal if he ends up being convicted of his pending charge at a future trial. We agree with the State.
[¶9] INDIANA CODE § 34-25.5-1-1 provides that "[e]very person whose liberty is restrained, under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of the restraint, and shall be delivered from the restraint if the restraint is illegal." "The purpose of a writ of habeas corpus is to determine the lawfulness of custody or detention of the defendant[.]" Hardley v. State, 893 N.E.2d 740, 742 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008). A writ of habeas corpus "may not be used [by a defendant] to determine collateral matters not affecting the custody process." Id. Additionally, "[t]he writ of habeas corpus cannot . . . be used as a substitute for an appeal." Van Meter v. Heath, 602 N.E.2d 143, 144 (Ind. 1992). We review the trial court's habeas corpus decision for an abuse of discretion. Willet v. State, 151 N.E.3d 1274, 1278 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020). "We may affirm a trial court's judgment on any basis sustainable by the record, even though not on a theory used by the trial court." Id.
[¶10] Here, it is apparent from Ford's pretrial habeas motion and his argument on appeal that he is again challenging the constitutional validity of the traffic stop, detention, and search and seizure that he already challenged in his motion to suppress. The trial court denied Ford's motion to suppress, and Ford did not seek to bring an interlocutory appeal of that denial order. Instead, Ford is improperly attempting to bypass his failure to seek an interlocutory appeal from the denial of his motion to suppress by raising the same arguments in his habeas corpus motion. However, a writ of habeas corpus "may not be used to determine collateral matters not affecting the custody process[,]" Hardley, 893 N.E.2d at 742, nor may it be used "as a substitute for an appeal." Van Meter, 602 N.E.2d at 144. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Ford's pretrial motion for writ of habeas corpus.
[¶11] Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Crone, Sr. J., concur.