Opinion
C. A. 8:23-cv-4892-DCC-JDA
12-04-2023
Kevin J. Ford, Plaintiff, v. State of South Carolina, Oconee County Sheriffs Department, Oconee County Detention Center, MPD L Underwood, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jacquelyn D. Austin United States Magistrate Judge
Kevin J. Ford (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the above-named Defendants violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff filed this action in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. For the reasons explained below, the undersigned concludes that this action is subject to summary dismissal.
Plaintiff's initial hand-written pleading stated he wished to “file a civil rights suit against the State of South Carolina and the Oconee County Sheriff's Department.” [Doc. 1 at 1.] On the standard complaint form that he later filed, Plaintiff listed the State of South Carolina, the Oconee County Sheriff's Department (the “Sheriff's Office”), MPD L Underwood, and the Oconee County Detention Center (the “Detention Center”) as Defendants. [Doc. 1-2 at 1.]
BACKGROUND
Procedural History
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a hand-written document, which was construed as a complaint seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [Doc. 1.] By Order dated October 3, 2023, Plaintiff was instructed to file a complaint on the standard court form, pay the filing fee or file an application to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee, and complete and return the appropriate service documents including a summons form and Forms USM-285 for the named Defendants. [Doc. 5.]
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a complaint on the standard form [Doc. 1-2]; a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 9], which was granted [Doc. 13]; a proposed summons [Doc. 8]; and Forms USM-285 for some of the named Defendants [Doc. 8-1].
Thereafter, by Order dated November 7, 2023, the Court notified Plaintiff that this action was subject to summary dismissal for the reasons identified by the Court in that Order. [Doc. 14.] The Court noted, however, that Plaintiff may be able to cure the pleading deficiencies of his Complaint and granted Plaintiff twenty-one days to amend his Complaint. [Id. at 15.] Further, Plaintiff was specifically warned as follows:
If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint that corrects those deficiencies identified [in the Court's Order], this action will be recommended for summary dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A without further leave to amend.[Id. at 9-10 (emphasis omitted).] Nevertheless, Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint, and he has failed to cure the deficiencies identified by the Court in its Order.
Factual Allegations
Because Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint, the Court briefly summarizes the allegations from Plaintiff's original Complaint, which includes both the hand-written document [Doc. 1] and standard form [Doc. 1-2].
When Plaintiff commenced this action, he was a pretrial detainee incarcerated at the Detention Center. [Id. at 2.] From the mail returned to the Clerk of Court, it appears that Plaintiff might have been released from custody and thus might no longer be at the Detention Center. [Doc. 17.] However, Plaintiff has not informed the Court of his new address, if he has indeed been released from custody.
The Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff has been charged with following crimes in the Oconee County Court of General Sessions: resisting/assault, beat, or wound police officer serving process or while resisting arrest at case number 2023A3710400028, resisting/resisting arrest; oppose or resist law enforcement officers serving process or making arrest at case number 2023A37104000289, and traffic/failure to stop for a blue light, no injury or death at case number 2023A3710400030. See Oconee County Tenth Judicial Circuit Public Index, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Oconee/ PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (last visited Dec. 4, 2023) (search by case numbers listed above); see also Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”). Further, Plaintiff has been indicted by the grand jury on those charges.
Plaintiff contends Defendants have violated his rights in that he has been denied the right to be informed of the grounds for his arrest, his freedom of speech has been infringed, he was unlawfully arrested, he has been subjected to racial profiling and discrimination, and he has been subjected to unconstitutional treatment and harassment while a prisoner. [Doc. 1-2 at 4.] For his injuries, Plaintiff contends that, on January 10, 2023, he injured his left knee, foot, both shoulders, and back. [Id. at 6.] He was taken to the hospital and his left knee was x-rayed. [Id.] In March 2023, he lost a tooth while eating food at the Detention Center and had to wait until August for dental treatment. [Id.] He contends he has a plate with six screws in his left foot and that, as a result, he was in pain and could not receive dental treatment. [Id.] For his relief, Plaintiff contends he lost his apartment in New York just after he signed a 24-month lease, he lost his job, he lost his new car, and he lost the ability to pay for various expenses including his electric bill, insurance, and phone bill. [Id.] Plaintiff seeks money damages in the amount of $500,000 to $1.5 million for pain and suffering. [Id.]
Beyond the allegations noted above, Plaintiff's Complaint contains a lengthy, rambling, and confusing narrative of various events leading up to his arrest and subsequent to his arrest during his ongoing incarceration at the Detention Center. [See Docs. 1 at 1-6; 1-2 at 7-17.] In sum, Plaintiff's allegations, to the extent they can be understood, appear to assert two general claims-(1) a claim for false arrest, unlawful detention, and/or malicious prosecution (the “Fourth Amendment claim”); and (2) a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need (the “Fourteenth Amendment claim”). The Court will summarize the relevant facts supporting each claim in the analysis below.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute, which authorizes the district court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if Plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court would still be charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se pleading remains subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411,417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the Court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se pleadings and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in the Complaint, the Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
DISCUSSION
The Action is Subject to Dismissal Pursuant to Rule 41(b)
As an initial matter, the undersigned concludes that this action is subject to dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to prosecute and for failure to comply with the Orders of the Court. As noted, Plaintiff was directed to file an amended complaint in accordance with this Court's Order dated November 7, 2023. [Doc. 14.] However, Plaintiff has not filed a response to the Court's Order and has failed to correct the pleading deficiencies of his original Complaint.
Additionally, the Court's Order was returned to the Court as undeliverable. [Doc. 17.] It appears to the Court that Plaintiff has been released from custody. Plaintiff has been warned multiple times to always keep the Court apprised in writing of his current address in the event that his address has changed:
You are ordered to always keep the Clerk of Court advised in writing (250 East North Street, Suite 2300, Greenville, South Carolina 29601) if your address changes for any reason, so as to assure that orders or other matters that specify deadlines for you to meet will be received by you. If as a result of your failure to comply with this Order, you fail to meet a deadline set by this Court, your case may be dismissed for violating this Order. Therefore, if you have a change of address before this case is ended, you must comply with this Order by immediately advising the Clerk of Court in writing of such change of address and providing the Court with
the docket number of all pending cases you have filed with this Court. Your failure to do so will not be excused by the Court.[Docs. 5 at 3; 12 at 3 (emphasis in originals).] However, Plaintiff has failed to keep the Court apprised of his current mailing address.
Because Plaintiff did not respond to the Court's Order, and the time for response has lapsed, and because he has failed to keep the Court apprised of his current mailing address, he has failed to prosecute this case and has failed to comply with the Orders of this Court. As Plaintiff has already ignored this Court's Order and deadlines, sanctions less drastic than dismissal would not be effective. Accordingly, this case should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
The Complaint is Subject to Dismissal
Additionally, the Complaint filed in this action is subject to dismissal for the reasons below.
The Complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Defendants Entitled to Dismissal
As an initial matter, the undersigned notes that certain Defendants are entitled to dismissal from this action.
State of South Carolina
First, the State of South Carolina is entitled to summary dismissal from this action. It is well settled that only “persons” may act under color of state law, and, therefore, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a “person.” See Harden v. Green, 27 Fed.Appx. 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001). The State of South Carolina cannot be sued under § 1983 because it is not a “person.” See Cobb v. South Carolina, No. 2:13-cv-02370-RMG, 2014 WL 4220423, at *6 (D.S.C. Aug. 25, 2014); Ackbar v. South Carolina, No. 4:17-cv-1019-RMG-TER, 2017 WL 2348460, at *2 (D.S.C. May 17, 2017), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 2364302 (D.S.C. May 30, 2017).
Further, the State of South Carolina has Eleventh Amendment immunity from a suit for damages brought in this Court. See Belcher v. S.C. Bd. of Corr., 460 F.Supp. 805, 808-09 (D.S.C. 1978). The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution divests this Court of jurisdiction to entertain a suit for damages brought against the State of South Carolina or its integral parts. U.S. Const. amend. XI; see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Harter v. Vernon, 101 F.3d 334, 338-39 (4th Cir. 1996); Bellamy v. Borders, 727 F.Supp. 247, 248-50 (D.S.C. 1989). Since the Eleventh Amendment bars the relief that Plaintiff requests against the State of South Carolina, the Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted against this Defendant and, as a result, it should be dismissed. Hagood v. South Carolina, No. 6:20-cv-00362-HMH-JDA, 2020 WL 981290, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 4, 2020), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2020 WL 980163 (D.S.C. Feb. 28, 2020).
Oconee County Sheriff's Department
Similarly, the Sheriff's Office is subject to summary dismissal from this action because it is not a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Ramirez v. Anderson Cnty. Sheriff's Office, No. 1:14-cv-3217-TMC-SVH, 2016 WL 4394505, at *2 (D.S.C. July 25, 2016) (explaining the sheriff's office, as an arm of the state, is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2016 WL 4266130 (D.S.C. Aug. 12, 2016).
Oconee County Detention Center
Likewise, the Detention Center is a facility or building and, as such, is not subject to suit because it cannot be sued as a “person” in a § 1983 lawsuit. See Preval v. Reno, 57 F.Supp.2d 307, 310 (E.D. Va. 1999) (“[T]he Piedmont Regional Jail is not a ‘person,' and therefore not amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”), aff'd in part, modified in part on other grounds, and vacated in part on other grounds by 203 F.3d 821 (4th Cir. 2000); Brooks v. Pembroke City Jail, 722 F.Supp. 1294, 1301 (E.D. N.C. 1989) (“Claims under § 1983 are directed at ‘persons' and the jail is not a person amenable to suit.”); Williams v. Dorchester Cnty. Det. Ctr., 987 F.Supp.2d 690, 696 (D.S.C. 2013); Morrison v. Greenville Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 4:17-cv-2657-JMC-TER, 2017 WL 7732598, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 10, 2017), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 936383 (D.S.C. Feb.16, 2018). Accordingly, the Detention Center is entitled to summary dismissal from this § 1983 action.
Plaintiff's claims are subject to dismissal.
Further, the Complaint as a whole is subject to dismissal because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief that is plausible.
To the extent the Court does not address any claims herein that Plaintiff intended to assert, the undersigned finds that the allegations in the Complaint fail to state a claim for relief. For example, although Plaintiff references freedom of speech, racial profiling, and discrimination [Doc. 1-2 at 4], he provides no explanation or allegations to support any such claims. As such, the undersigned declines to address those claims and finds them to be without merit for failure to state a claim. To the extent Plaintiff intends to assert a claim for excessive use of force related to his arrest, his cursory allegations fail to state a claim for relief and he has not identified any individual responsible for his injuries. [See, e.g., Doc. 1-2 at 12 (“As they tripped me to the ground, I injured and hurt my leg, foot, both shoulders, and my back.”).]
The Fourth Amendment Claim
As noted, Plaintiff appears to assert a claim under the Fourth Amendment for false arrest, unlawful detention, and/or malicious prosecution.
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Section 1983 actions premised on false arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution are analyzed as actions claiming unreasonable seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367-68 (4th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that a plaintiff alleging a § 1983 false arrest claim needs to show that the officer decided to arrest him without probable cause to establish an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment); Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating claims of false arrest and false imprisonment “are essentially claims alleging a seizure of the person in violation of the Fourth Amendment”); Lambert v. Williams, 223 F.3d 257, 260 (4th Cir. 2000) (“What is conventionally referred to as a ‘§ 1983 malicious prosecution' action is nothing more than a § 1983 claim arising from a Fourth Amendment violation.”). To state a § 1983 claim for a seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, “a plaintiff must allege that the defendant (1) caused (2) a seizure of the plaintiff pursuant to legal process unsupported by probable cause, and (3) criminal proceedings terminated in plaintiff's favor.” Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th Cir. 2012).
Thus, “[t]he Fourth Amendment is not violated by an arrest based on probable cause.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). “[A]n indictment, fair upon its face, returned by a properly constituted grand jury, conclusively determines the existence of probable cause.” Durham v. Horner, 690 F.3d 183, 189 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Provet v. South Carolina, No. 6:07-1094-GRA-WMC, 2007 WL 1847849, at *5 (D.S.C. June 25, 2007) (concluding that § 1983 claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution were precluded because of the issuance of an indictment). “Notwithstanding the conclusive effect of the indictment[],” however, “a grand jury's decision to indict will not shield a police officer who deliberately supplied misleading information that influenced the decision.” Durham, 690 F.3d at 189 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). Still, “a police officer is not liable for a plaintiff's unlawful seizure following indictment in the absence of evidence that the officer misled or pressured the prosecution.” Evans, 703 F.3d at 648 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “[f]alse statements alone do not . . . run afoul of the Fourth Amendment.” Massey v. Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 357 (4th Cir. 2014). To constitute a constitutional violation, the false statements or omissions must be material, meaning “necessary to the finding of probable cause,” and they “must have been made deliberately or with a reckless disregard for the truth.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
With respect to the favorable termination requirement, the Supreme Court has held “that a Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983 for malicious prosecution does not require the plaintiff to show that the criminal prosecution ended with some affirmative indication of innocence.” Thompson v. Clark, 142 S.Ct. 1332, 1341 (2022). Instead, “[a] plaintiff need only show that the criminal prosecution ended without a conviction.” Id.
Upon review, the record before the Court does not establish that Plaintiff was seized pursuant to legal process unsupported by probable cause. Because Plaintiff was indicted on the charges pending against him, the indictments conclusively determine the existence of probable cause as to those charges. Nothing in Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that any Defendant made material false statements or omissions deliberately or with a reckless disregard for the truth such that Defendant would not be shielded by those indictments. Accordingly, the Complaint does not show that Plaintiff was arrested without probable cause on the charges pending against him.
The Fourteenth Amendment Claim
Further, liberally construed, the Complaint might be asserting a claim for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's medical needs. Specifically, the Complaint contains various confusing and conclusory allegations about Plaintiff being tripped during his arrest and sustaining injuries, losing a tooth while incarcerated at the Detention Center, and being subjected to a mental health evaluation. [See, e.g., Docs. 1 at 3-5; 1-2 at 12-16.] However, Plaintiff's allegations fail to state a claim for relief that is plausible.
A pretrial detainee's deliberate indifference claim arises under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment; however, the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments provides the framework for analyzing such a claim. See Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 871 (4th Cir. 1988).
To establish a claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must allege facts showing that (1) he was deprived of an objectively serious medical need by a state actor and (2) the state actor knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his health or safety. Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 178 (4th Cir. 2014); Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008). Deliberate indifference “is a higher standard for culpability than mere negligence or even civil recklessness, and as a consequence, many acts or omissions that would constitute medical malpractice will not rise to the level of deliberate indifference.” Jackson, 775 F.3d at 178. Absent exceptional circumstances, a plaintiff cannot establish a cognizable deliberate indifference claim when there exists a mere disagreement between the plaintiff and the state official over the proper medical care. Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir. 1985).
Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that any Defendant knew of and disregarded a serious medical need and its associated risks. Simply put, Plaintiff does not provide any facts to support a deliberate indifference claim and he fails to identify any defendant responsible for his injury or for his medical care. Therefore, because Plaintiff has “not nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,” the Complaint is subject to dismissal. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
As the Fourth Circuit has noted:
To state a claim under Section 1983 for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, a prisoner must show that he had a serious medical need, and that officials knowingly disregarded that need and the substantial risk it posed. A “serious medical need” is a condition “diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” An official acts with deliberate indifference if he had actual knowledge of the prisoner's serious medical needs and the related risks, but nevertheless disregarded them.Depaola v. Clarke, 884 F.3d 481, 486 (4th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted).
Abstention under Younger
Additionally, the Court should abstain from hearing Plaintiff's claims related to his pending state court criminal charges. Plaintiff makes various confusing and cursory allegations regarding the underlying incidents and investigations related to the criminal charges pending against him. Indeed, the crux of this action appears to be a challenge to the charges pending against Plaintiff in the Oconee County Court of General Sessions as well as his detention at the Detention Center.
To the extent Plaintiff is seeking release from custody, such relief is not available in this civil rights action. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (stating that “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983”); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1973) (explaining a challenge to the duration of confinement is within the core of habeas corpus). “Release from pretrial detention is simply not an available remedy in a § 1983 action.” El v. Fornandes, No. 2:19-cv-3045-RMG-MGB, 2019 WL 7900140, at *4 (D.S.C. Nov. 22, 2019) (explaining a plaintiff cannot use § 1983 to get out of jail), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 6712057 (D.S.C. Dec. 10, 2019).
Further, to the extent Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief related to his pending state court criminal charges, including dismissal of those charges, such claims are not properly before this Court based on the Younger abstention doctrine. Liberally construed, the Complaint appears to assert that the pending state court criminal proceedings against Plaintiff are improper and violate his constitutional rights, and he asks that his criminal charges be dismissed. [See, e.g., Doc. 1-2 at 15 (“There is corruption in my case. My charges should be dropped.”).] Granting Plaintiff's requested relief, however, would require this Court to interfere with or enjoin the pending state court criminal proceedings against him. As discussed below, because a federal court may not award relief that would affect pending state proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances, this Court should abstain from interfering with it.
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances.” Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44; see also Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (explaining the circumstances when Younger abstention is appropriate).
From Younger and its progeny, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: “[1] there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; [2] the proceedings implicate important state interests; and [3] there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Hum. Rels., 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). Here, Plaintiff is involved in ongoing state court criminal proceedings, and Plaintiff asks this Court to award relief for alleged constitutional violations related to his pending criminal actions; thus, the first element is satisfied. The second element is satisfied for reasons the Supreme Court has explained: “[T]he States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The third element is also satisfied, as the Supreme Court has noted “that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights.” Gilliam, 75 F.3d at 903 (quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)).
A ruling in Plaintiff's favor in this case would call into question the validity of the state court criminal proceedings against him and would significantly interfere with those ongoing state proceedings. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45; Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1989) (“[F]ederal courts should abstain from the decision of constitutional challenges to state action, however meritorious the complaint may be, ‘whenever [the] federal claims have been or could be presented in ongoing state judicial proceedings that concern important state interests.'”) (citation omitted); Washington v. Tilton, No. 2:10-cv-997-HFF-RSC, 2010 WL 2084383, at *1 (D.S.C. May 19, 2010). This Court finds that Plaintiff can adequately litigate his federal constitutional rights in the state court proceedings. Thus, this Court should abstain from adjudicating Plaintiff's claims related to the pending criminal charges against him and the legality of his detention at the Detention Center.
In sum, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to state a cognizable constitutional claim, and this action is therefore subject to summary dismissal.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
In light of the foregoing, it is recommended that the District Court DISMISS this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A without further leave to amend and without issuance and service of process.
As noted, Plaintiff was directed to file an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies noted by the Court in its Order dated November 17, 2023. [Doc. 14.] Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint or attempted to cure the deficiencies in his original pleading. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends dismissal without further leave to amend.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 250 East North Street, Suite 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).