Ford v. Piper Aircraft Corp.

19 Citing cases

  1. Kenn Air Corp. v. Gainesville-Alachua County Regional Airport Authority

    593 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 26 times
    Granting standing to a party to move to disqualify the opposing party's attorney because "switching sides and conflict of interest in simultaneous representation are two ethical violations that can be clearly seen by persons other than clients"

    The requisites to the issuance of a writ of certiorari are that the petitioner demonstrate that the lower court exceeded its jurisdiction in rendering the order or that the order does not conform to the essential requirements of law and may cause material injuries in subsequent proceedings for which remedy by appeal will be inadequate. Ford Motor Co. v. Edwards, 363 So.2d 867, 869 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). Orders granting or denying motions to disqualify a party's attorney may be appropriately reviewed by certiorari. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Harris Ins., Inc., 572 So.2d 1011 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Campbell v. American Pioneer Sav. Bank, 565 So.2d 417 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); Ford v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 436 So.2d 305 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), review denied, 444 So.2d 417 (Fla. 1984); Sears, Roebuck Co. v. Stansbury, 374 So.2d 1051 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979). Rule 4-1.6 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar provides that, except in limited circumstances not applicable here, "[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client . . . unless the client consents after disclosure to the client."

  2. Freund v. Butterworth

    117 F.3d 1543 (11th Cir. 1997)   Cited 14 times
    Stating the standard for proving a sixth amendment violation: "a habeas petitioner must demonstrate that an `actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.'"

    This obligation "lies at the very foundation of the attorney-client relationship." Ford v. Piper, 436 So.2d 305, 307 (Fla. 5th Dist.Ct.App. 1983). "Confidences," the Code explained, refer to information protected by the attorney-client privilege, while "secrets" refer to other information gained during the professional relationship which the client had requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which "would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client."

  3. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. K.A.W

    575 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1991)   Cited 100 times
    Holding a party "seeking to disqualify opposing counsel based on a conflict of interest must demonstrate that an attorney-client relationship existed, thereby giving rise to an irrefutable presumption that confidences were disclosed during the relationship, and the matter in which the law firm [or attorney] subsequently represented the interest adverse to the former client was the same or substantially related to the matter in which it represented the former client."

    GRIMES, Justice. We review State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. K.A.W., 557 So.2d 601 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), on the basis of conflict with Junger Utility Paving Co. v. Myers, 14 F.L.W. 2650 (Fla. 1st DCA, Nov. 15, 1989); Ford v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 436 So.2d 305 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), review denied, 444 So.2d 417 (Fla. 1984); and Sears, Roebuck Co. v. Stansbury, 374 So.2d 1051 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979). We have jurisdiction.

  4. Lee v. Florida Dept. of Ins

    586 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 18 times
    Holding that it is error to use an ethical rule as a basis to invalidate or render void a provision in a private contract between two parties

    Thus, it has been ruled that a lawyer is bound to respect the request of a client or former client not to use or disclose information or confidences learned during that representation, and is forbidden to use such information for the advantage of himself or of a third person. See Campbell v. American Pioneer Savings Bank, 565 So.2d 417 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); Ford v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 436 So.2d 305 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), rev. denied, 444 So.2d 417 (Fla. 1984); Buntrock v. Buntrock, 419 So.2d 402 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). Bateman and his firm's representation of NCCI gave rise to an irrefutable presumption that confidences were disclosed during the relationship. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. K.A.W., 575 So.2d 630 (Fla. 1991); Ford v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 436 So.2d 305. The client's restriction on the use or disclosure of such information could very well place Bateman or those in his firm in a conflict of interest position under rule 4-1.7 if and when confronted with the need to use or disclose it in the subsequent representation of another client.

  5. Freund v. Butterworth

    165 F.3d 839 (11th Cir. 1999)   Cited 178 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a petitioner must establish that the alternative defense strategy was inherently in conflict with or not undertaken due to the attorney's other loyalties or interests

    Because of this duty, a lawyer could be subject to discipline for revealing a client's confidences or secrets or for using them either to the disadvantage of the client or for the benefit of the lawyer or a third person without the client's informed consent. See Fla. Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101(B) (1986); Ford v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 436 So.2d 305, 307 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); see also Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar 4-1.9(b) (1994). The Code did allow a lawyer to reveal a client's confidences or secrets in two limited situations, neither of which is relevant in this case.

  6. Bancor Grp. v. Rodriguez

    1:22-cv-20201-GAYLES/TORRES (S.D. Fla. Apr. 13, 2023)   Cited 1 times

    Ins. Co. v. K.A.W., 575 So.2d 630, 633 (Fla. 1991) (emphases added) (citing Ford v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 436 So.2d 305, 305 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stansbury, 374 So.2d 1051, 1051 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979)). Hence, we turn first to the analysis of whether there had previously been an attorney-client relationship between Mr. Santaella and Diaz.

  7. Bedoya v. Aventura Limousine & Transp. Serv., Inc.

    CASE NO. 11-24432-CIV-ALTONAGA/Simonton (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2012)   Cited 1 times

    In order to succeed on a motion for disqualification on the basis of a conflict of interest, the party seeking disqualification must show: "(1) an attorney-client relationship existed, thereby giving rise to an irrefutable presumption that confidences were disclosed during the relationship, and (2) the matter in which the law firm subsequently represented the interest adverse to the former client was the same or substantially related to the matter in which it represented the former client." Id. at 633 (emphasis added) (citing Ford v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 436 So. 2d 305, 305 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stansbury, 374 So. 2d 1051, 1051 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979)). The Court now turns to the specific previous representations Plaintiff asserts form a basis for Kleppin's disqualification.

  8. In re Lawrence

    217 B.R. 658 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1998)   Cited 5 times

    The burden to establish the nature of the representation in the matter as being the same or substantially related falls squarely upon the party seeking the disqualification. Ford v. Piper Aircraft Corporation, et al., 436 So.2d 305, 307 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) ("Requiring the disqualification of an attorney is, however, a matter of no small consequence. Before a client's former attorney will be disqualified from representing a party whose interest are adverse to the former client's, the former client must show that the matters embraced in the pending suit are substantially related to the matters or the cause of action wherein the attorney previously represented him, the former client.").

  9. Stopa v. Cannon

    330 So. 3d 1033 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021)   Cited 1 times
    Affirming denial of disqualification of opposing counsel for lack of privity with movant

    [O]ne seeking to disqualify opposing counsel [i]s required to show that (1) an attorney-client relationship existed, thereby giving rise to an irrefutable presumption that confidences were disclosed during the relationship, and (2) the matter in which the law firm subsequently represented the interest adverse to the former client was the same or substantially related to the matter in which it represented the former client. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. K.A.W. , 575 So. 2d 630, 633 (Fla. 1991) (first citing Ford v. Piper Aircraft Corp. , 436 So. 2d 305, 305 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) ; and then citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stansbury , 374 So. 2d 1051, 1051 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979) ). Mr. Stopa's motion failed the first K.A.W. factor; he cannot show the existence of a client-lawyer relationship between him and Attorney McGrath.

  10. Galaxy Fireworks, Inc. v. Kozar

    150 So. 3d 256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

    See Kenn Air Corp. v. Gainesville–Alachua Cnty. Reg'l Airport Auth., 593 So.2d 1219, 1223 n. 3 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stansbury, 374 So.2d 1051, 1053 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979). If the litigation of the second matter might involve testimony or evidence presented in the first, those cases likely would be substantially related for disqualification purposes. See Key Largo Rest. v. T.H. Old Town Assocs., Ltd., 759 So.2d 690, 693 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (holding that matters were substantially related when the evidence established that the first matter involved a landlord-tenant dispute that was eventually settled and the second matter involved litigation over the settlement agreement; the court considered the settlement agreement and the pleadings in both lawsuits); Ford v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 436 So.2d 305 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (stating that lawyer representing an injured plaintiff was properly disqualified; lawyer had previously represented one of the defendants in a matter involving a crash of the same aircraft, and an affidavit established that he had discussed matters relating to the crash with that party). To support his contention that the prior matters and the present one are substantially related, Kozar filed an affidavit along with a copy of a settlement agreement in one of the tenant-eviction cases filed by Serralles. He testified that the real property involved in the tenant-eviction cases was one of the properties covered in the joint venture agreement at issue in this case.