In McDonald v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association it is said: ". . . the status of one in loco parentis is temporary, and may be abrogated at will by either the person thus standing in loco parentis or by the child." To the same effect is this language from In re McCardle's Estate [95 Colo. 250, 35 P.2d 850 (1934)]: "It (loco parentis) is not, as argued, to be likened to that of adoption. The one is temporary in character, the other permanent and abiding."

D. v. D., 56 N.J. Super. 357, 153 A.2d 332 (1959); State ex rel. Gilman v. Bacon, 249 Iowa 1233, 91 N.W.2d 395 (1958). In re McCardle's Estate, 95 Colo. 250, 35 P.2d 850 (1934). D. v. D., supra n. 11; Taylor v. Taylor, 58 Wn.2d 510, 364 P.2d 444 (1961); McDowell v. McDowell, Ky., 378 S.W.2d 814 (1964); Swain v. Swain, 250 Cal.App.2d 1. 58 Cal.Rptr. 83 (1967).

In McDonald v. Texas Employers'Insurance Association, Tex. Civ. App., 267 S.W. 1074, 1076, it is said: `* * * the status of one in loco parentis is temporary, and may be abrogated at will by either the person thus standing in loco parentis or by the child.' To the same effect is this language from In re McCardle'sEstate, 95 Colo. 250, 35 P.2d 850, 851: `It ( loco parentis) is not, as argued, to be likened to that of adoption. The one temporary in character, the other permanent and abiding.

The Chancellor found this to be true; and we cannot say that his finding is against the preponderance of the evidence. There is no claim that A. R. Wilson ever adopted Lois as his child; and our statute on pretermitted children (Ark. Stat. Ann. 60-507 [1947] is not broad enough to cover a child to whom the testator only stood in loco parentis, because birth or adoption, each, creates a permanent relationship; and the relationship in loco parentis is temporary. Ford v. Donahue (Colo.), 35 P.2d 850; Schneider v. Schneider (N. J.), 52 A.2d 564; and see also 67 C.J.S. 804. Affirmed.

Loco parentis exists when a person undertakes the care and control of another in the absence of such supervision by the latter's natural parents and in the absence of formal legal approval. It is temporary in character and is not to be likened to adoption which is permanent. In re McCardle's Estate, 95 Colo. 250, 35 P.2d 850. Appellant contends for the rule that where a confidential relation exists, courts of equity in examining such transactions "will carefully search for suspicious circumstances having a tendency to show unfairness or undue influence.

We agree that the fact that the appellant was a stepdaughter of the decedent furnishes no basis for an appeal. In re McCardle's Estate, 95 Colo. 250, 35 P.2d 850. But a memorandum which the testatrix has sought to incorporate by reference should.

In McDonald v. Texas Employers' Insurance Assn., Tex. Civ. App., 267 S.W. 1074, 1076, it is said: `* * * the status of one in loco parentis is temporary, and may be abrogated at will by either the person thus standing in loco parentis or by the child.' To the same effect is this language from In re Estate of McCardle, 95 Colo. 250, 252, 35 P.2d 850, 851: `It [loco parentis] is not, as argued, to be likened to adoption. The one is temporary in character, the other permanent and abiding.

In McDonald v. Texas Employers' Insurance Assn., Tex. Civ. App., 267 S.W. 1074, 1076, it is said: "* * * the status of one in loco parentis is temporary, and may be abrogated at will by either the person thus standing in loco parentis or by the child." To the same effect is this language from In re Estate of McCardle, 95 Colo. 250, 252, 35 P.2d 850, 851: "It [loco parentis] is not, as argued, to be likened to adoption. The one is temporary in character, the other permanent and abiding.

In re Adoption of Cheney, 244 Iowa 1180, 59 N.W.2d 685; London Guarantee Accident Co. v. Smith, 242 Minn. 211, 64 N.W.2d 781; Popejoy v. Hydraulic Press Brick Co., 193 Mo.App. 612, 186 S.W. 1133. See United States v. Rock, 92 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 200 F.2d 357; In re McCardle's Estate, 95 Colo. 250, 35 P.2d 850; Schneider v. Schneider, 25 N.J.Misc. 180, 52 A.2d 564. The action was instituted under Code 1951, § 11-762 (Supp.

The one is temporary in character, the other permanent and abiding." In re Estate of McCardle, 95 Colo. 250, 252, 35 P.2d 850, 851. Directly in point factually is the Montana case of State ex rel. Sheedy v. District Court, 66 Mont. 427, 432, 213 P. 802, 804.