Opinion
Civil Action No. 00-5373 (JBS)
March 26, 2001
Mr. Henry Ford, Fort Dix, New Jersey, Petitioner pro se.
Robert J. Cleary, United States Attorney, By: Irene E. Dowdy, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Trenton, New Jersey.
OPINION
Presently before the court is Henry Ford's petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, filed by Mr. Ford ("Petitioner") on November 8, 2000. Because Mr. Ford's petition challenges the validity and not the execution of his sentence, this Court lacks jurisdiction to decide the petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The petition, therefore, will be dismissed.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner Ford, who appears pro se, is currently incarcerated at Federal Correctional Institution Fort Dix, New Jersey ("FCI Fort Dix"). On November 18, 1996, Petitioner was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. On July 29, 1997, that court sentenced petitioner to 78 months imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release. Petitioner's projected release date is February 26, 2002. (Answer at 1, Ex. 1.)
Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, and his conviction was affirmed on July 29, 1998. Petitioner then filed a motion in the sentencing court on August 11, 1997, attacking his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, which motion was denied by the sentencing court on September 5, 1997. (Answer at 2.) Petitioner applied to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on November 18, 1997 for leave to file a second or successive petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The Third Circuit denied Petitioner's application in an Order dated December 30, 1998. (Answer at 3.) Petitioner brought this Section 2241 petition in the district of his incarceration, filed with the Clerk of Court on November 8, 2000, challenging the validity of his conviction by federal authorities. On November 18, 2000, this Court issued notice to Petitioner consistent with Miller v. United States, 197 F.3d 644 (3d Cir. 1999). On November 27, 2000, petitioner advised this Court that he desired his petition to be ruled upon as filed.
II. DISCUSSION
As explained below, this court finds that we do not have jurisdiction over this petition as filed by petitioner under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The petition, which challenges the jurisdiction of the sentencing court and therefore the validity of the sentence itself, should have been brought as a successive petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 before the court of appeals for the district in which petitioner was sentenced. Petitioner argues that he should be allowed to challenge the imposition of his sentence under Section 2241 because his current incarceration is illegal. (Pet'r's Reply at 4.) As discussed below, this Court finds that 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is the appropriate means by which to address Petitioner's complaints, and therefore, we are without jurisdiction to rule on the merits of Mr. Ford's petition. As such, this case will dismissed.
28 U.S.C. § 2241 constitutes the general habeas corpus statute under which federal prisoners may seek relief for claims of unlawful custody. A petition brought under Section 2241 challenges the very fact or duration of physical imprisonment, and seeks a determination that the Petitioner is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484-86, 500 (1973). See also Benson v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 947 F. Supp. 827, 829-31 (D.N.J. 1996) (noting § 2241 generally appropriate only for claims challenging continued execution of sentence for which immediate or speedier release is appropriate).
Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 2255 as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 ("AEDPA"). As of the AEDPA's effective date of April 24, 1996, a motion to vacate, correct or set aside a sentence under § 2255 must be filed in the sentencing court within one year of the latest of (1) the date on which the judgment of conviction became final; (2) the date of the removal of any impediment to making such a motion that was created by unlawful government action; (3) the date on which a right asserted by a movant was first recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactive to cases pending on collateral review; or (4) the date on which the movant could have discovered the facts supporting the claim[s] presented through the exercise of due diligence. Id. Furthermore, once a prisoner has filed one § 2255 motion, he may not file another unless he first obtains a certification from a panel of the appropriate court of appeals permitting him to do so on the grounds of (1) newly discovered evidence that would clearly and convincingly negate the possibility that a reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense charged, or (2) a previously unavailable and retroactively applicable new rule of constitutional law. Id.
The Third Circuit recognized in In re Dorsainvil that there may be some rare situations in which a prisoner who cannot satisfy the gatekeeping requirements of § 2255 should be permitted to proceed under § 2241, but emphasized that a prisoner's inability or failure to comply with those gatekeeping requirements generally does not render § 2255 "inadequate or ineffective" so as to permit resort to § 2241, noting that such a holding "would effectively eviscerate Congress's intent in amending § 2255." 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997). The Dorsainvil exception is an extremely narrow one, not applicable here. Petitioner agrees that Dorsainvil does not apply in this case. Despite Petitioner's assertion that this court should review the sentence imposed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania because the sentencing court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to convict him, (Pet'r's Br. at 6; Pet'r's Reply Br. at 3), this Court does not have jurisdiction to review such a case under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In order to address the violations alleged by petitioner, which challenge the imposition of his sentence, he would have to apply to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals for leave to file a successive petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Such an application, as discussed earlier, has already been considered and denied by the Third Circuit.
Because petitioner wishes this Court to rule upon his petition as filed under § 2241, even though he is challenging the jurisdiction of the sentencing court and therefore his sentence, this Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction to rule on this petition. Accordingly, plaintiff's petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 must be dismissed.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Ford's petition shall be dismissed from this court for lack of jurisdiction.
The accompanying Order is entered.
O R D E R
This matter having come before the court upon the petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241; and the Court having considered the submissions of the parties; and for the reasons stated in the Opinion of today's date;
IT IS, this day 26TH of March 2001, hereby
ORDERED that the petition shall be DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.