Under ยง 11-9-503, following a debtor's default, a secured creditor may take possession of secured assets without the permission of or giving notice to the debtor, so long as there is no breach of the peace during repossession. See generally Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Hunt, 241 Ga. 342, 245 S.E.2d 295 (1978) (applying statute); Fidelity Nat'l Bank v. Wood, 178 Ga. App. 171, 342 S.E.2d 350 (1986) (same). Despite the absence of judicial foreclosure proceedings, assigning the date of Baldwin's entry as the date of foreclosure for purposes of ยง 300.1100(d) is consistent with the intended functions of the Exemption, the Rule, and the Foreclosure Provisions.
We agree with FMCC that under the terms of the security agreement, its right to repossess the vehicle due to the default of the appellant existed independently of any right to accelerate the indebtedness due to that default. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Hunt, 241 Ga. 342, 245 S.E.2d 295 (1978). Consequently, the acceptance by FMCC of the late payment for February and the timely payment for March did not nullify the acceleration nor the remainder of the indebtedness; rather the payments received on March 7 must be considered as payments on the full indebtedness due on the appellant's account immediately after repossession on March 5. See Adamson v. Trust Co. Bank, 155 Ga. App. 646, 271 S.E.2d 899 (1980).
Over 45 days' notice of acceleration was given by letter hand delivered at the time the buyers were dispossessed from the leased premises in January, 1982. A public auction was held on March 3, 1982, at which Reis purchased the secured property including its goodwill and trade name. OCGA ยงยง 11-9-503, 504 (Code Ann. ยงยง 109A-9-503, 109A-9-504); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Hunt, 241 Ga. 342 ( 245 S.E.2d 295) (1978). Therefore, we find that the foreclosure was proper as against the buyers' objections.
Although notice must be sent prior to disposition of repossessed collateral, there is no requirement that notice be sent prior to repossession. Weaver v. O'Meara Motor Co., 452 P.2d 87 (Alaska 1969); Teeter Motor Co., Inc. v. First National Bank of Hot Springs, 260 Ark. 764, 543 S.W.2d 938 (1976); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Hunt, 241 Ga. 342, 245 S.E.2d 295 (1978). The requirement that reasonable notification be sent to the debtor, however, clearly does not require that the debtor receive it.
"`There being no agreed requirement of notice attached to the right to repossess, notice was not required prior to repossession.' Fulton Nat. Bank v. Horn, [ 239 Ga. 648, 651 ( 238 S.E.2d 358); OCGA ยง 11-9-503.]" Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Hunt, 241 Ga. 342, 343 ( 245 S.E.2d 295). See ITT Terryphone Corp. v. Modems Plus, Inc., 171 Ga. App. 710, 711-712 ( 320 S.E.2d 784).
The statute does not require as a prerequisite to repossession that the secured party have previously exercised any acceleration option which it might have. No authorities have been cited by appellant which would support such an interpretation and in our opinion the statute clearly does not impose such a requirement. As recognized in Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Hunt, 241 Ga. 342, 245 S.E.2d 295 (1978), the creditor's right to repossess under the Uniform Commercial Code exists independently and separately from the creditor's right to accelerate the indebtedness. Therefore, notice of acceleration is not required prior to repossession absent a provision in the agreement of the parties to the contrary.
McMURRAY, Judge. Our earlier decision (s. c., 144 Ga. App. 383 ( 241 S.E.2d 273)) was vacated by order of the Supreme Court dated May 23, 1978, and the case remanded for reconsideration in light of their decision in Ford Motor Credit Company v. Hunt, 241 Ga. 342. In Ford Motor Credit Company v. Hunt, supra, the Supreme Court held that under the contractual language in that case the creditor's right to repossession existed independently of its right to accelerate the indebtedness, and notice to the debtor is not required prior to repossession absent a provision in the agreement to the contrary.