Force v. Hart

10 Citing cases

  1. Joseph v. Drew

    36 Cal.2d 575 (Cal. 1950)   Cited 29 times

    So distinguishable is the line of cases on which defendants rely, where an unlicensed architect sought compensation for architectural services rendered and the claim was denied because of a failure to comply with the statutory law. (See Force v. Hart, 209 Cal. 600, 605 [ 289 P. 828]; Payne v. DeVaughn, 77 Cal.App. 399, 403 [ 246 P. 1069]; Jones v. Wickstrom, 92 Cal.App. 292, 295-296 [ 268 P. 449]; Meyer Holler v. Bowman, 121 Cal.App. 112, 114-115 [ 8 P.2d 936]; Baer v. Tippett, 34 Cal.App.2d 33, 35 [ 92 P.2d 1028]; Cash v. Blackett, 87 Cal.App.2d 233, 237 [ 196 P.2d 585].) [1a] Nor does it appear that in its business dealings with defendants, under authority of section 5539, the partnership failed to meet the statutory requirement of identifying the architects in the firm on "all instruments of service."

  2. Felix v. Zlotoff

    90 Cal.App.3d 155 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979)   Cited 7 times

    ( Id., at p. 35.) To the same effect see Force v. Hart, 209 Cal. 600 [ 289 P. 828]; Jones v. Wickstrom, 92 Cal.App. 292 [ 268 P. 449]; Medak v. Cox, 12 Cal.App.3d 70, 78 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 452]. Nor is Bennett v. Hayes, supra, 53 Cal.App.3d 700, persuasive in holding an automobile repair shop cannot recover even on a quantum meriut basis for repair work done on an automobile where the repairer had failed to put the estimate for the work in writing as required by Business and Professions Code section 9884.

  3. Shea v. Paul

    208 Cal.App.2d 207 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962)   Cited 1 times

    (Bus. Prof. Code, §§ 5536, 5537; Force v. Hart, 209 Cal. 600, 605 [ 289 P. 828]; Baer v. Tippett, 34 Cal.App.2d 33 [ 92 P.2d 1028].) Appellant's contention that he need not have shown licensing because the plans were for his own building, falls with the determination that the property was not his but decedent's.

  4. Tevis v. Blanchard

    122 Cal.App.2d 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954)   Cited 18 times
    In Tevis v. Blanchard, 122 Cal.App.2d 731, at page 738 [ 266 P.2d 85], the court cited Randall v. Beber, supra, and Randall v. California Land Buyers Syndicate, supra, stating: "In an action for money had and received against a participant in the sale, such as an officer of the corporation making the sale, the buyer's right to recover is limited to the value of that which that participant received; not so limited if the buyer's action is for damages" as in the instant case.

    [2] Accordingly, "if the case presents one of illegality of the contract, it must be considered by the court whether pleaded or unpleaded." (P. 210 of 91 Cal.App.) (See, also, Morey v. Paladini, 187 Cal. 727, 733 [ 203 P. 760]; Force v. Hart, 209 Cal. 600, 604-605 [ 289 P. 828]; Fewel Dawes, Inc. v. Pratt, 17 Cal.2d 85, 91-92 [ 109 P.2d 650], defendant in his answer denied liability under the contract, introduced evidence showing illegality, and moved to vacate the judgment and for judgment in his favor on the ground of illegality; Loving Evans v. Blick, 33 Cal.2d 603, 607 [ 204 P.2d 23]; Grimes v. Nicholson, 71 Cal.App.2d 538, 542-543 [ 162 P.2d 934], principle recognized but found inapplicable when issue raised for first time on appeal, and entirely new theory from that on which tried; Dealey v. East San Mateo Land Co., 21 Cal.App. 39, 42, and 43 [ 130 P. 1066], the pleading of a fraud against the public is not a condition precedent to a court taking cognizance of that fraud.) In Dean v. McNerney, supra, after some testimony had been given tending to show that defendant had received the money in suit as a part of an illegal transaction, defendant asked leave to amend her answer to present that issue.

  5. Orlinoff v. Campbell

    91 Cal.App.2d 382 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949)   Cited 11 times
    In Orlinoff v. Campbell, 91 Cal.App.2d 382 [ 205 P.2d 67], the court construed and applied certain of the provisions of chapter 223 of the statutes of 1935, page 878, which provided for the regulation of highway carriers.

    For this reason those who practice the learned professions are required to be licensed, as well as accountants, architects, contractors, brokers, etc. Broad discretion is vested in the licensing agencies with respect to the scope of the examinations to be given, but the purpose in all cases is to screen out the dishonest and incompetent. ( Levinson v. Boas, 150 Cal. 185 [ 88 P. 825, 11 Ann.Cas. 661, 12 L.R.A.N.S. 575] [pawnbroker]; Van Wyke v. Burrows, 98 Cal.App. 415 [ 277 P. 190] [stockbroker]; Payne v. DeVaughn, 77 Cal.App. 399 [ 246 P. 1069] [architect]; Force v. Hart, 209 Cal. 600 [ 289 P. 828] [architect]; Meyer Holler v. Bowman, 121 Cal.App. 112 [ 8 P.2d 936] [architect]; Rench v. Harris, 79 Cal.App.2d 125 [ 179 P.2d 341] [real estate broker]; Kirman v. Borzage, 65 Cal.App.2d 156 [ 150 P.2d 3] [building contractor]; Fewel Dawes, Inc. v. Pratt, 17 Cal.2d 85 [ 109 P.2d 650] [insurance agent]. See, also, Estate of Butler, 29 Cal.2d 644 [ 177 P.2d 16, 171 A.L.R. 343] [attorney].

  6. Burr v. Pacific Indemnity Co.

    56 Cal.App.2d 352 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942)   Cited 8 times

    If it had clearly appeared to the trial court or clearly appeared here that the contract was illegal the plaintiff should be denied a recovery. ( Force v. Hart, 209 Cal. 600 [ 289 P. 828]; Morey v. Paladini, 187 Cal. 727 [ 203 P. 760].) But in this case far from so appearing the suggested facts which would make the contract illegal were only stated on information and belief and were denied by the counter-affidavits.

  7. Meyer Holler v. Bowman

    121 Cal.App. 112 (Cal. Ct. App. 1932)   Cited 4 times

    While Mr. Wilkinson testified that he was in charge of the corporation's architectural department and that the work was done under his supervision, the bill of particulars furnished shows that the principal expense was for drafting during certain weeks and that during a number of these weeks no charge was put in for Mr. Wilkinson's time. In Force v. Hart, 209 Cal. 600 [ 289 P. 828, 830], the court said: "Neither plaintiff nor Davis, who was employed by him to draw the plans and specifications, was certified as required by said act. The act provides that it shall be a misdemeanor for any person to practice architecture without first having obtained a certificate to so practice, `provided, that nothing in this act shall prevent any person from . . . furnishing plans or other data for buildings for other persons, provided the person so furnishing such plans or data shall fully inform the person for whom such plans or data are furnished that he, the person furnishing such plans, is not a certified architect'.

  8. McDuffie v. Hooper

    294 Ala. 293 (Ala. 1975)   Cited 28 times
    Finding that the issue whether the parties had been engaged in a joint venture was tried by the implied consent of the parties because McDuffie “made no objection at any time during the course of the trial”

    Under the circumstances, an aggrieved party may not recover for unpaid services performed. Anderson v. Blair, 206 Ala. 418, 97 So. 279; Bankers Shippers Ins. Co. v. Blackwell, 255 Ala. 360, 51 So.2d 498; Bowdoin v. Alabama Chemical Co., 201 Ala. 582, 79 So. 4; Ellis v. Batson, 177 Ala. 313, 58 So. 193; Force v. Hart, 209 Cal. 600, 289 P. 828; Pfingstl v. Solomon, 240 Ala. 58, 197 So. 12; Pride v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 9 Ala. App. 334, 63 So. 803; Architect's Handbook of Professional Practice, The Architect and His Consultants, Chap. 10, Pp. 1-10 (Sept. 1963); 6 C.J.S. Architects § 5, p. 298 and § 8, p. 303; 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 205, p. 1008; 53 C.J.S. Licenses § 59, p. 711.

  9. Kivel v. McInerney

    No. D074173 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2021)

    An unlicensed person cannot recover consideration under a contract for, or the reasonable value of, any architectural services rendered. (§ 143, subd. (a); Force v. Hart (1930) 209 Cal. 600, 605.) Section 5537 provides an exception from licensing requirements for architectural services performed relating to certain woodframe structures, stating:

  10. Joseph v. Drew

    215 P.2d 80 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950)

    'A contract for architectural services to be performed in violation of the terms of the statute is void. Binford v. Boyd, 178 Cal. 458, 174 P. 56; People v. Allied Architects' Ass'n, 201 Cal. 428, 257 P. 511; Payne v. De Vaughn, 77 Cal.App. 399, 246 P. 1069; Jones v. Wickstrom, 92 Cal.App. 292, 268 P. 449.' Force v. Hart, 209 Cal. 600, 605, 289 P. 828, 830. See, also, Loving & Evans v. Blick, 33 Cal.2d 603, 607, 204 P.2d 23; Baer v. Tippett, 34 Cal.App.2d 33, 35, 92 P.2d 1028; Cash v. Blackett, 87 Cal.App.2d 233, 237, 196 P.2d 585, 588, in which latter case it was stated: 'The Public policy involved here has been determined by the legislature; it is not a subject of debate in the courts.