So distinguishable is the line of cases on which defendants rely, where an unlicensed architect sought compensation for architectural services rendered and the claim was denied because of a failure to comply with the statutory law. (See Force v. Hart, 209 Cal. 600, 605 [ 289 P. 828]; Payne v. DeVaughn, 77 Cal.App. 399, 403 [ 246 P. 1069]; Jones v. Wickstrom, 92 Cal.App. 292, 295-296 [ 268 P. 449]; Meyer Holler v. Bowman, 121 Cal.App. 112, 114-115 [ 8 P.2d 936]; Baer v. Tippett, 34 Cal.App.2d 33, 35 [ 92 P.2d 1028]; Cash v. Blackett, 87 Cal.App.2d 233, 237 [ 196 P.2d 585].) [1a] Nor does it appear that in its business dealings with defendants, under authority of section 5539, the partnership failed to meet the statutory requirement of identifying the architects in the firm on "all instruments of service."
( Id., at p. 35.) To the same effect see Force v. Hart, 209 Cal. 600 [ 289 P. 828]; Jones v. Wickstrom, 92 Cal.App. 292 [ 268 P. 449]; Medak v. Cox, 12 Cal.App.3d 70, 78 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 452]. Nor is Bennett v. Hayes, supra, 53 Cal.App.3d 700, persuasive in holding an automobile repair shop cannot recover even on a quantum meriut basis for repair work done on an automobile where the repairer had failed to put the estimate for the work in writing as required by Business and Professions Code section 9884.
(Bus. Prof. Code, §§ 5536, 5537; Force v. Hart, 209 Cal. 600, 605 [ 289 P. 828]; Baer v. Tippett, 34 Cal.App.2d 33 [ 92 P.2d 1028].) Appellant's contention that he need not have shown licensing because the plans were for his own building, falls with the determination that the property was not his but decedent's.
[2] Accordingly, "if the case presents one of illegality of the contract, it must be considered by the court whether pleaded or unpleaded." (P. 210 of 91 Cal.App.) (See, also, Morey v. Paladini, 187 Cal. 727, 733 [ 203 P. 760]; Force v. Hart, 209 Cal. 600, 604-605 [ 289 P. 828]; Fewel Dawes, Inc. v. Pratt, 17 Cal.2d 85, 91-92 [ 109 P.2d 650], defendant in his answer denied liability under the contract, introduced evidence showing illegality, and moved to vacate the judgment and for judgment in his favor on the ground of illegality; Loving Evans v. Blick, 33 Cal.2d 603, 607 [ 204 P.2d 23]; Grimes v. Nicholson, 71 Cal.App.2d 538, 542-543 [ 162 P.2d 934], principle recognized but found inapplicable when issue raised for first time on appeal, and entirely new theory from that on which tried; Dealey v. East San Mateo Land Co., 21 Cal.App. 39, 42, and 43 [ 130 P. 1066], the pleading of a fraud against the public is not a condition precedent to a court taking cognizance of that fraud.) In Dean v. McNerney, supra, after some testimony had been given tending to show that defendant had received the money in suit as a part of an illegal transaction, defendant asked leave to amend her answer to present that issue.
For this reason those who practice the learned professions are required to be licensed, as well as accountants, architects, contractors, brokers, etc. Broad discretion is vested in the licensing agencies with respect to the scope of the examinations to be given, but the purpose in all cases is to screen out the dishonest and incompetent. ( Levinson v. Boas, 150 Cal. 185 [ 88 P. 825, 11 Ann.Cas. 661, 12 L.R.A.N.S. 575] [pawnbroker]; Van Wyke v. Burrows, 98 Cal.App. 415 [ 277 P. 190] [stockbroker]; Payne v. DeVaughn, 77 Cal.App. 399 [ 246 P. 1069] [architect]; Force v. Hart, 209 Cal. 600 [ 289 P. 828] [architect]; Meyer Holler v. Bowman, 121 Cal.App. 112 [ 8 P.2d 936] [architect]; Rench v. Harris, 79 Cal.App.2d 125 [ 179 P.2d 341] [real estate broker]; Kirman v. Borzage, 65 Cal.App.2d 156 [ 150 P.2d 3] [building contractor]; Fewel Dawes, Inc. v. Pratt, 17 Cal.2d 85 [ 109 P.2d 650] [insurance agent]. See, also, Estate of Butler, 29 Cal.2d 644 [ 177 P.2d 16, 171 A.L.R. 343] [attorney].
If it had clearly appeared to the trial court or clearly appeared here that the contract was illegal the plaintiff should be denied a recovery. ( Force v. Hart, 209 Cal. 600 [ 289 P. 828]; Morey v. Paladini, 187 Cal. 727 [ 203 P. 760].) But in this case far from so appearing the suggested facts which would make the contract illegal were only stated on information and belief and were denied by the counter-affidavits.
While Mr. Wilkinson testified that he was in charge of the corporation's architectural department and that the work was done under his supervision, the bill of particulars furnished shows that the principal expense was for drafting during certain weeks and that during a number of these weeks no charge was put in for Mr. Wilkinson's time. In Force v. Hart, 209 Cal. 600 [ 289 P. 828, 830], the court said: "Neither plaintiff nor Davis, who was employed by him to draw the plans and specifications, was certified as required by said act. The act provides that it shall be a misdemeanor for any person to practice architecture without first having obtained a certificate to so practice, `provided, that nothing in this act shall prevent any person from . . . furnishing plans or other data for buildings for other persons, provided the person so furnishing such plans or data shall fully inform the person for whom such plans or data are furnished that he, the person furnishing such plans, is not a certified architect'.
Under the circumstances, an aggrieved party may not recover for unpaid services performed. Anderson v. Blair, 206 Ala. 418, 97 So. 279; Bankers Shippers Ins. Co. v. Blackwell, 255 Ala. 360, 51 So.2d 498; Bowdoin v. Alabama Chemical Co., 201 Ala. 582, 79 So. 4; Ellis v. Batson, 177 Ala. 313, 58 So. 193; Force v. Hart, 209 Cal. 600, 289 P. 828; Pfingstl v. Solomon, 240 Ala. 58, 197 So. 12; Pride v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 9 Ala. App. 334, 63 So. 803; Architect's Handbook of Professional Practice, The Architect and His Consultants, Chap. 10, Pp. 1-10 (Sept. 1963); 6 C.J.S. Architects § 5, p. 298 and § 8, p. 303; 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 205, p. 1008; 53 C.J.S. Licenses § 59, p. 711.
An unlicensed person cannot recover consideration under a contract for, or the reasonable value of, any architectural services rendered. (§ 143, subd. (a); Force v. Hart (1930) 209 Cal. 600, 605.) Section 5537 provides an exception from licensing requirements for architectural services performed relating to certain woodframe structures, stating:
'A contract for architectural services to be performed in violation of the terms of the statute is void. Binford v. Boyd, 178 Cal. 458, 174 P. 56; People v. Allied Architects' Ass'n, 201 Cal. 428, 257 P. 511; Payne v. De Vaughn, 77 Cal.App. 399, 246 P. 1069; Jones v. Wickstrom, 92 Cal.App. 292, 268 P. 449.' Force v. Hart, 209 Cal. 600, 605, 289 P. 828, 830. See, also, Loving & Evans v. Blick, 33 Cal.2d 603, 607, 204 P.2d 23; Baer v. Tippett, 34 Cal.App.2d 33, 35, 92 P.2d 1028; Cash v. Blackett, 87 Cal.App.2d 233, 237, 196 P.2d 585, 588, in which latter case it was stated: 'The Public policy involved here has been determined by the legislature; it is not a subject of debate in the courts.