See Foote v. State ("[w]here it affirmatively appears that the possible time for investigation and preparation of the defense is short, and the defendant has not been dilatory in obtaining counsel, the discretion of the court on motions for postponement should be liberally exercised in favor of a fair trial") (emphasis supplied); Patterson v. State (finding no error in denial of continuance; after quoting O.C.G.A. § 17-8-20, we wrote "[t]he defendants . . . proffered no evidence that they had exercised . . . due diligence, nor did they explain their delay in hiring counsel"); Marion v. State (no error in denial of continuance requested because of recent retention as counsel; O.C.G.A. § 17-8-20 quoted and Patterson, supra, cited); accord, Turner v. State.Foote v. State, 136 Ga. App. 301 (1) ( 220 S.E.2d 786) (1975).Patterson v. State, 202 Ga. App. 440 (1) ( 414 S.E.2d 895) (1992).

"The mere obtention of counsel, without giving him time to acquaint himself with the case and subpoena witnesses, is an empty right." Foote v. State, 136 Ga. App. 301 ( 220 S.E.2d 786) (1975). The refusal to grant a continuance under the circumstances here was an abuse of the court's discretion.

WEBB, Judge. For a prior appearance of this case see Foote v. State, 136 Ga. App. 301 ( 220 S.E.2d 786) (1975), where we reversed Foote's conviction of aggravated assault because a postponement to assure effective assistance of counsel had not been granted. Foote was again convicted upon retrial, and this appeal followed.

Under the facts of the instant case, we regard the denial of the instant continuance motion as error. See Brown v. State, 134 Ga. App. 771 ( 216 S.E.2d 356); Foote v. State, 136 Ga. App. 301 ( 220 S.E.2d 786); and Tucker v. State, 136 Ga. App. 456 ( 221 S.E.2d 664). 4. Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the finding that he violated the terms of his probation.