See Tesler v. State, 295 Ga.App. 569(1), 672 S.E.2d 522 (2009). Accordingly, the State was required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the crimes charged were committed in Harris County. “However, an erroneous charge does not warrant a reversal unless it was harmful and, in determining harm, the entirety of the jury instructions must be considered.” Foote v. State, 265 Ga. 58, 59(2), 455 S.E.2d 579 (1995). In this case, the charge correctly instructed the jury that venue would be established if they found beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was committed in Harris County; that the cause of death was inflicted in Harris County; or (as set forth in OCGA § 17–2–2(h)), if it could not be determined in what county the crime was committed, “it may be considered to have been committed in [Harris County]” if they found beyond a reasonable doubt that it might have been committed in Harris County. The evidence was sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that venue was established in Harris County under any of these theories of venue.

(a) The trial court gave an improper sequential charge when it instructed the jury to consider whether appellant was guilty of malice murder and felony murder before considering whether the defendant acted as a result of the provocation or passion that might authorize a verdict finding him guilty of voluntary manslaughter. However, the giving of an erroneous jury instruction must be harmful to warrant reversal of a judgment of conviction ( Foote v. State, 265 Ga. 58 (2) ( 455 SE2d 579) (1995)), and there can be no harmful Edge violation when, as in the case before us, the jury finds the defendant guilty of malice murder. Bellamy v. State, 272 Ga. 157 (6) ( 527 SE2d 867) (2000).

The testimony of a State expert that Whitner knew right from wrong at the time of the crimes, coupled with the testimony of arresting officers that he appeared rational immediately thereafter, is sufficient to authorize a rational juror to find that Whitner failed to prove his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. Foote v. State, 265 Ga. 58(1) ( 455 S.E.2d 579) (1995). As the evidence of insanity was hardly overwhelming, the jury's verdict will be affirmed.

OCGA §§ 16-3-2; 16-3-3. OCGA § 17-7-131(a)(2), (c)(2); Foote v. State, 265 Ga. 58, 59 ( 455 S.E.2d 579) (1995). When a delusional compulsion is the basis of an insanity defense, the delusion must be one that, if it had been true, would have justified the defendant's actions. As both parties agree, Boswell cannot have a viable delusional compulsion defense because a person is not justified in killing someone to save that person from burning by the Mafia.

270 Ga. 765, 766 ( 512 S.E.2d 892) (1999). See Foote v. State, 265 Ga. 58, 60 ( 455 S.E.2d 579) (1995). 4. We conclude that Pace's contention that the trial court erred in ruling on his Batson claim is without merit.

]" Nelms v. State, 255 Ga. 473, 475(2) ( 340 S.E.2d 1) (1986). The trial court, sitting as the trier of fact, was not compelled to accept the testimony of Fuss's psychologist, but was authorized to find proof of Fuss's criminal intent based upon the testimony of the State's expert, as well as the words, conduct, demeanor, motive and other circumstances connected with Fuss's acts. Pittman v. State, 269 Ga. 419, 420 ( 499 S.E.2d 62) (1998); Foote v. State, 265 Ga. 58, 59(1) ( 455 S.E.2d 579) (1995). Thus, the trial court was authorized to find that Fuss failed to prove his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence, and that the State met its burden of proving that Fuss was guilty, but mentally ill, beyond a reasonable doubt.

Lawrence v. State, supra at 312 (1). See also Foote v. State, 265 Ga. 58 (1) ( 455 S.E.2d 579) (1995) (testimony from State's expert that defendant knew right from wrong, coupled with arresting officer's observation that defendant appeared to be "rational" was sufficient to allow jury to reject insanity defense); Caldwell v. State, 257 Ga. 10 (1) ( 354 S.E.2d 124) (1987); Brown v. State, 250 Ga. 66 (2) ( 295 S.E.2d 727) (1982); Appling v. State, 222 Ga. App. 327, 329 (3) ( 474 S.E.2d 237) (1996). Compare Stevens v. State, 256 Ga. 440 ( 350 S.E.2d 21) (1986).

Moreover, in its original charge to the jury, the trial court gave accurate and extensive instructions on malice murder, felony murder and voluntary manslaughter. It is unlikely that a juror of ordinary intelligence would have been confused by the recharge. Foote v. State, 265 Ga. 58, 59-60 ( 455 S.E.2d 579) (1995). 4. Contrary to defendant's contention, the trial court did not belittle the prospect of returning a voluntary manslaughter conviction.

However, an erroneous charge does not warrant a reversal unless it was harmful and, in determining harm, the entirety of the jury instructions must be considered." Foote v. State, 265 Ga. 58, 59 (2) ( 455 S.E.2d 579) (1995). And "`[a] mere verbal inaccuracy in a charge, which results from a palpable "slip of the tongue," and clearly could not have misled or confused the jury' is not reversible error."Gober v. State, 247 Ga. 652, 655 (3) (1981), quoting Siegel v. State, 206 Ga. 252, 254 (2) ( 56 S.E.2d 512) (1949).

The appropriate standard of appellate review . . . is whether the evidence, when construed most favorably for the State, would be sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find that appellant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that [he] was insane at the time of the [crimes.] [Cit.]Foote v. State, 265 Ga. 58 (1) ( 455 S.E.2d 579) (1995). See also Brownv. State, 250 Ga. 66 ( 295 S.E.2d 727) (1982).