Summary
holding that officer had reasonable suspicion for making stop of defendant's vehicle for failure to comply with Section 550.025 when defendant struck privately-owned mailbox
Summary of this case from Mitchell v. StateOpinion
No. 11-03-00152-CR.
February 5, 2004. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b).
Appeal from Collin County.
Panel consists of: ARNOT, C.J., and WRIGHT, J., and McCALL, J.
Opinion
The trial court convicted appellant of the misdemeanor offense of driving while intoxicated and assessed his punishment at 180 days confinement in the Collin County Jail. The trial court suspended the sentence and placed appellant on community supervision for a period of one year. In his sole appellate issue, appellant complains of the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. Specifically, appellant attacks the basis of the initial traffic stop of his vehicle which led to his arrest. We affirm. Department of Public Safety Trooper Kevin Huggins was the only witness at the hearing on appellant's motion to suppress. He testified that, on August 15, 2002, at about 9:30 p.m., he received a dispatch to investigate an incident that had occurred at Tim Bagert's residence on FM 1377 in Collin County. Trooper Huggins said that, at about 9:15 p.m., a motor vehicle had struck and destroyed Bagert's mailbox. Trooper Huggins arrived at Bagert's residence at about 10:15 p.m. Bagert did not know who had hit his mailbox. The front license plate of the vehicle had fallen off during the incident, and Bagert gave it to Trooper Huggins. Trooper Huggins contacted the Collin County dispatchers to have them run the license plate for registration and ownership information. By doing so, Trooper Huggins determined that the vehicle was a 1999 Ford pickup and that appellant was the registered owner of the pickup. Trooper Huggins went to appellant's residence, arriving at about 11:00 p.m. He knocked on the front door several times but there was no response. Trooper Huggins decided to drive around appellant's neighborhood to see whether there were any vehicles that had damage consistent with the incident that he was investigating. He saw someone driving a pickup that was very similar to the 1999 Ford pickup that he was looking for. The pickup turned on to appellant's street. Trooper Huggins turned on his emergency lights as the pickup approached appellant's driveway. The pickup pulled into the driveway. The driver got out of the pickup and walked toward the garage. Trooper Huggins asked the driver to stop because he needed to talk with him. Appellant was the driver. Trooper Huggins testified that, after the pickup came to a stop, he saw that the license plate on the back of the pickup matched the license plate that had been left at Bagert's residence. Trooper Huggins said that there was damage to the front of the pickup. Trooper Huggins said that it was about 15 minutes from the first time that he knocked on appellant's door until he stopped appellant's vehicle. Trooper Huggins arrested appellant for DWI. Trooper Huggins testified that one of the purposes of his stop of appellant's pickup was to investigate whether a criminal offense had occurred. The criminal offense was the pickup operator's failure to comply with the statutory notification requirements on striking a fixture at or near the highway. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 550.025 (Vernon 1999). Trooper Huggins testified that the statute requires the person to reasonably notify the owner of the property of the damage. At a suppression hearing, the trial court is the sole and exclusive trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and their testimony. Maxwell v. State, 73 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex.Cr.App. 2002); Allridge v. State, 850 S.W.2d 471, 493 (Tex.Cr.App. 1991), cert. den'd, 510 U.S. 831 (1993). In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, appellate courts give great deference to the trial court's findings of historical facts as long as the record supports the findings. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex.Cr.App. 1997). We must afford the same amount of deference to the trial court's rulings on "mixed questions of law and fact," such as the issue of probable cause, if the resolution of those ultimate questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor of the witnesses. Guzman v. State, supra at 89. Appellate courts, however, review de novo "mixed questions of law and fact" not falling within the previous category. Guzman v. State, supra. When faced with a mixed question of law and fact, the critical question under Guzman is whether the ruling "turns" on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Loserth v. State, 963 S.W.2d 770, 773 (Tex.Cr.App. 1998). A question turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor when the testimony of one or more witnesses, if believed, is enough to decide the substantive issue. Loserth v. State, supra. Because the trial court did not make explicit findings of fact, we review the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. See Maxwell v. State, supra at 281; State v. Ballard, 987 S.W.2d 889 (Tex.Cr.App. 1999). Appellant contends that the stop of his pickup and his subsequent detention were illegal because the stop was made without a warrant, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion. A police officer may stop and briefly detain persons suspected of criminal activity if the officer possesses a "reasonable suspicion" to justify the investigative detention. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Tex.Cr.App. 1997). In determining the reasonableness of the investigative stop, we examine the totality of the circumstances. Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 38 (Tex.Cr.App. 1997). We look to the facts available to the officer at the time of the stop to determine if a reasonable suspicion existed. Davis v. State, supra at 243. When viewed under the totality of the circumstances and in light of the officer's experience, there must be particular facts and inferences rationally drawn from those facts that create a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Terry v. Ohio, supra at 27; Woods v. State, supra at 38. Under the totality of the circumstances presented to Trooper Huggins, we conclude that he had reasonable suspicion for making the stop of appellant's vehicle. Section 550.025 of the Transportation Code provides in part:
(a) The operator of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting only in damage to a fixture or landscaping legally on or adjacent to a highway shall:
(1) take reasonable steps to locate and notify the owner or person in charge of the property of the accident and of the operator's name and address and the registration number of the vehicle the operator was driving.Trooper Huggins traced the license plate found at Bagert's residence to appellant's pickup, a 1999 Ford pickup. When Trooper Huggins was driving around in appellant's neighborhood, he saw a pickup that was very similar to the description of the pickup that he had received from the Collin County dispatchers. Trooper Huggins testified that the pickup approached appellant's driveway. Trooper Huggins had reason to believe that the person who was operating the pickup at the time had been involved in the offense of striking a fixture legally on or adjacent to a highway without notifying the owner and leaving identifying information. The facts justified Trooper Huggins's investigative stop of appellant. Appellant's sole issue is overruled. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.