Opinion
SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2011-339
07-10-2012
Note: Decisions of a three-justice panel are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal.
ENTRY ORDER
APPEALED FROM:
Superior Court, Windham Unit, Civil Division
DOCKET NO. 472-10-06 Wmcv
Trial Judge: John P. Wesley
In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:
Plaintiff appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for a new trial following a verdict in defendant's favor. Plaintiff argues that a new trial was warranted because there was no evidence to support the jury's finding that defendant's negligence did not proximately cause injury to plaintiff. We affirm.
Following an automobile accident, plaintiff sued, alleging that defendant's negligent acts caused him serious and permanent personal injury to his neck and back. Defendant admitted negligence, but contested that his negligence caused harm to plaintiff, pointing to plaintiff's various preexisting medical conditions as the sources of plaintiff's pain and injury. The case was tried before a jury. Plaintiff presented testimony from several witnesses, including his medical doctor. Defendant did not introduce evidence, but challenged plaintiff's evidence as to the source and extent of injury through cross-examination.
The case was submitted to the jury on a special verdict form, which separated the question of proximate cause from the amount of damages incurred. The jury answered that defendant's negligence did not proximately cause plaintiff's injury and did not reach the questions regarding the amount of damages. Plaintiff moved for a new trial, arguing that the evidence did not support a finding that no injury occurred, and emphasizing that defendant presented no evidence. In deciding the issue, the court explained that "the jury was free to discount the opinions of both plaintiff and his expert as to any association between the collision and a new injury." The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict and denied the motion. Plaintiff appeals.
The trial court has sole discretion in deciding a motion for a new trial. V.R.C.P. 59; Hardy v. Berisha, 144 Vt. 130, 133 (1984). We will reverse only where there has been an abuse of that discretion. Brueckner v. Norwich Univ., 169 Vt. 118, 132-33 (1999). In deciding such a motion, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Irving v. Agency of Transp., 172 Vt. 527, 528 (2001) (mem.).
On appeal, plaintiff argues that, at trial, defendant essentially admitted there was some injury to plaintiff. The record does not support this contention. While defendant admitted negligence, defendant did not concede that his negligence caused plaintiff's injury. In opening statements, defendant's attorney explained that it would be up to the jury to determine "what, if any, injury [resulted] . . . from this accident." The special verdict form included a question regarding proximate cause, and the court instructed the jury to determine whether defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. The court explained that it was up to the jury "to determine what portion of [plaintiff's] present condition, if any, was caused by the Defendant." Plaintiff made no objection to the court's charge. Therefore, there was no admission by defendant concerning cause.
Furthermore, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion. The evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to defendant, Irving, 172 Vt. at 528, demonstrated the following. Plaintiff has a long history of medical problems, including injuries from two prior automobile accidents, a work place injury that resulted in total disability, and brain surgery. At the scene of the accident, plaintiff did not complain of injury. Two days later plaintiff sought treatment in the emergency room for pain. The x-ray did not show any new injury; there was no fracture or dislocation as a result of the accident, although there was evidence of degenerative damage. Plaintiff's expert testified that plaintiff had suffered new injuries and an aggravation of existing injuries, but defendant challenged this conclusion on cross-examination. Plaintiff's expert admitted that his diagnosis was based on plaintiff's subjective reports of his pain and range of motion and it is common for persons with degenerative spine problems to have back and neck pain without being caused by a specific traumatic incident. Plaintiff had chronic pain and was on narcotic pain medication prior to the accident. From the evidence the jury could have concluded that plaintiff's injuries were not caused by the accident.
Although plaintiff emphasizes that defendant did not present evidence, he was not required to do so since plaintiff bore the burden of proof. It was the jury's role to resolve any conflicting evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses. The jury was free to discount the testimony of plaintiff and opinion of plaintiff's expert on this point. Claude G. Dern Elec., Inc. v. Bernstein, 144 Vt. 423, 426-27 (1984) (explaining that jury weighs testimony and determines credibility of witnesses, even experts). Because there was evidence to support the jury's verdict, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial.
Affirmed.
BY THE COURT:
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Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice
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Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice
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Brian L. Burgess, Associate Justice