Opinion
No. C 03-1010 SI
September 30, 2003
JUDGMENT
Defendants' motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and improper venue have been granted without leave to amend. Accordingly, judgment is entered against plaintiff and in favor of defendants.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION, LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION, AND IMPROPER VENUE; DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED; AND DENYING AS MOOT ALL OTHER MOTIONS PENDINGDefendants move to dismiss for (1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction, (2) lack of personal jurisdiction, (3) improper venue, and (4) failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Defendants have requested that these motions be determined without oral argument. Accordingly, the court grants the request and takes defendants' motions under submission without argument pursuant to the Northern District of California's Local Rule 7-1(b). Having carefully reviewed the arguments submitted, the Court hereby GRANTS without leave to amend the defendants' motions to dismiss for (1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction, (2) lack of personal jurisdiction, and (3) improper venue. The Court DENIES as moot defendants' motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and all other motions pending at this time.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Darrell Foley ("FOLEY"), filed a complaint on March 7, 2003 against eleven defendants. The defendants who brought these motions are Janice Marquez ("MARQUEZ"), plaintiff's ex-wife; Edwin Wainscott ("WAINSCOTT") and Quarles Brady Streich Lang ("QBSL"), Marquez's attorneys in her divorce proceedings with plaintiff; Harold Hurtt ("HURTT"), Chief of Phoenix Police Department; Skip Rimza ("RIMZA"), Mayor of Phoenix; Janet Napolitano ("NAPOLITANO"), Governor of Arizona; and John Clayton ("CLAYTON'), Director of the Arizona Department of Economic Security, which oversees the Child Protective Services Division. Pl's Complaint at ¶ 1 and Exhibit A. Plaintiff alleges that defendants are co-conspirators in fraudulent acts, omissions, and schemes surrounding plaintiff's divorce and his attempts to visit his daughter, of whom Janice Marquez has custody. Pl's Complaint at ¶¶ 7-30.
There have been no appearances by defendants Arizona State Bar; James Lee, its chief counsel; or Charles Wirkin, a member of the Arizona State Bar. It appears that the jurisdiction and venue arguments made by the other defendants would apply as well to these defendants. In any event, plaintiff has filed no proofs of service demonstrating that these defendants have been served with process, in contravention of Rule 4(1) and (m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. These defendants are DISMISSED without prejudice.
Now before the court are: (1) Hurtt and Rimza's motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; (2) Hurtt, Rimza, Wainscott, QBSL, Napolitano, and Clayton's motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction; (3) Hurtt, Rimza, Napolitano, and Clayton's motions to dismiss for improper venue; (4) Wainscott and QBSL's motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and (5) numerous motions by plaintiff.
LEGAL STANDARD
1. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a party to challenge a federal court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint. As the party invoking the jurisdiction of the federal court, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court has the requisite subject matter jurisdiction to grant the relief requested. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 376-78 (1994).
A complaint will be dismissed if, looking at the complaint as a whole, it appears to lack federal jurisdiction either "facially" or "factually." See Thornhill Publishing Co., Inc. v. General Tel. Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). When the complaint is challenged for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on its face, all material allegations in the complaint will be taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See NL Indus, v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). As they are courts of limited jurisdiction, federal district courts "usually decline review of domestic relation cases over which state courts traditionally have jurisdiction." See Rash v. Rash, 173 F.3d 1376, 1380 (11th Cir. 1999). 'The strong state interest in domestic relations matters, the competence of state courts in settling family disputes [and] the possibility of incompatible federal and state court decrees in cases of continuing judicial supervision by the state" are all reasons for the federal court to use its discretion to abstain from domestic relations proceedings. See Brown v. Hammonds, 747 F.2d 320, 322 (5th Cir. 1984).
2. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction must comport with the state long-arm statute, and with the constitutional requirements of due process. See Omeluk v. Langsten Slip and Batbyggeri A/S, 52 F.3d 267, 271 (9th Cir. 1995), citingChan v. Society Expeditions, Inc., 39 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994). California's long-arm statute permits this court to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants on any basis not inconsistent with the California or United States Constitution.See California Code of Civil Procedure, § 410.10. Absent traditional bases for personal jurisdiction (physical presence, domicile, or consent), due process requires that the defendant have certain minimum contacts with the forum state such that 'the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
The court must determine whether sufficient minimum contacts between the moving defendants and the forum state exist to allow the exercise of personal jurisdiction over them. In this regard, courts may exercise either general or specific jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.See FDIC v. British-American Ins. Co., LTD., 828 F.2d 1439, 1442 (9th Cir. 1987).
General jurisdiction exists when the nonresident has substantial or systematic and continuous contacts with the forum state, and the exercise of jurisdiction satisfies traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.See Ziegler v. Indian River County, 64 F.3d 470 (9th Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit has established a three-step test to determine whether the court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. See British-American, 828 F.2d at 1442;see Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 473. First, specific jurisdiction requires a showing that the out-of-state defendants purposefully directed their activities toward residents of the forum state or purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-475 (1985). Second, the controversy must be related to or "arise out of defendants' contact with the forum. Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 473. Third, the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e., it must be reasonable. British-American, 828 F.2d at 1442. Generally, the relationship among the defendants, the forum, and the litigation is the essential foundation of personal jurisdiction. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984), citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
3. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) for Improper Venue
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3), a defendant may move to dismiss a case for improper venue. Venue is generally proper in a district where the defendant resides. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2001).
4. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The question presented by a motion to dismiss is not whether the plaintiff will prevail in the action, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence in support of the claim. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Davis v. Scheren 468 U.S. 183, 104 S.Ct. 3012 (1984).
In answering this question, the court must assume that the plaintiff's allegations are true and must draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). Even if the face of the pleadings suggests that the chance of recovery is remote, the court must allow the plaintiff to develop the case at this stage of the proceedings. See United States v. City of Redwood City, 640 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 1981). However, the court "need not automatically accept as true unreasonable inferences, unwarranted deductions of fact, or conclusory legal allegations cast in the form of factual allegations." See U.S. v. Real Prop. Located at 9832 Riceon Ave., 234 F. Supp.2d 1136, 1137 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
If the court dismisses the complaint, it must then decide whether to grant leave to amend. The Ninth Circuit has "repeatedly held that a district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
DISCUSSION
1. Hurtt and Rimza's Motions to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court has the requisite subject matter jurisdiction to grant the relief requested.See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 376-78. This action is part of an ongoing dispute that centers around plaintiff's divorce from Marquez. Plaintiff states no basis for why this court has the requisite subject matter jurisdiction to preside over his action. Federal district courts "usually decline review of domestic relation cases over which state courts traditionally have jurisdiction." See Rash, 173 F.3d at 1380; see Brown, 747 F.2d at 322. For the foregoing reasons, this court GRANTS Hurtt and Rimza's motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, without leave to amend.
2. Hurtt, Rimza, Wainscott, QBSL, Napolitano, and Clayton's Motions to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
All of the moving defendants are Arizona residents. Pi's Complaint at Exhibit A. Absent traditional bases for personal jurisdiction (physical presence, domicile or consent), due process requires that the defendant have certain minimum contacts with the forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. See International Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316. Plaintiff has failed to show that defendants Hurtt, Rimza, Wainscott, QBSL, Napolitano, and Clayton meet the Ninth Circuit's three requirements for establishing sufficient minimum contacts between the moving defendants and the forum state to allow the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendants. The moving defendants did not purposefully avail themselves of the privilege of conducting business in California. The purposeful availment requirement is satisfied if the defendants have taken deliberate action within the forum state or if they have created continuing obligations to forum residents. See Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995). Here, the plaintiff's cause of action arose out of a divorce proceeding that occurred in Arizona. There is no indication that the moving defendants ever took any action relating to this case in California.
The Ninth Circuit's second criterion, that the controversy must be related to or "arise out of defendants' contact with the forum, is also not satisfied in the instant case. A claim arises out of the forum-related activities if it would not have happened but for the forum-related activities. See Omeluk, 52 F.3d at 271. In the present case, the only parties who had any contact with California was the plaintiff, who is domiciled in California, and his daughter, who visited plaintiff at his California residence. Pl's Complaint at ¶ 98.
The United States Supreme Court, in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991), reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision in Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines 897 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1990), which articulates this standard. However, the Ninth Circuit has held that the Supreme Court did not reject this prong of the test, and thus it appears this standard has survived. Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d at 1500.
Plaintiff's allegation that the moving defendants and other defendants are involved in a conspiracy also fails to establish jurisdiction. California does not recognize conspiracy as a basis for acquiring jurisdiction over a party. See Crea v. Busby, 48 Cal.App.4th 509, 516-517 (1996). California courts consider the forum-related acts personally committed by the individual rather than the imputed conduct of a co-conspirator. The conduct of a co-conspirator is generally too tenuous to warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction.See Kipperman v. McCone, 422 F. Supp. 860, 873 (N.D. Cal. 1976). In the present case, plaintiff has alleged in his complaint that the moving defendants and other defendants conspired to defraud the plaintiff but has made no prima facie case for conspiracy.
Thus, plaintiff's allegation amounts to a bland assertion of a conspiracy and is simply insufficient to establish jurisdiction.
The Ninth Circuit's final criterion is whether the forum's exercise of personal jurisdiction is reasonable. The court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over the moving defendants must comport with fair play and substantial justice. See Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 477-478. Here, the moving defendants' contacts are too attenuated to justify subjecting them to extensive litigation in California. Requiring the moving parties to defend in California would impose an unjustifiable and unreasonable burden on them. Consequently, defendants' motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction are hereby GRANTED.
3. Hurtt, Rimza, Napolitano, and Clayton's Motions to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) for Improper Venue
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3), a defendant may move to dismiss a case for improper venue. Venue is generally proper in a district where the defendant resides. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (a). Defendants Hurtt, Rimza, Napolitano, and Clayton are domiciled in Arizona and plaintiff has failed to allege that defendants have had any contact with the Northern District of California. Accordingly, defendants' motions to dismiss for improper venue are hereby GRANTED.
4. Wainscott and QBSL's Motions to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted
Defendants Wainscott and QBSL have moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim against them upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff has failed to adhere to the pleading requirements, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which require a short and plain statement showing what relief plaintiff seeks from defendants and that he is entitled to that relief. The Court, however, DENIES this motion as moot given that the action is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
5. Plaintiff's Motions
Plaintiff has filed a variety of motions; all are DENIED as moot.