Thus, even if the claims are logically related, "a party is not required to assert a counterclaim" if the counterclaim "had not matured at the time [the party] serves his pleading." Fogarty v. State, 705 P.2d 72, 75 (Haw. Ct. App. 1985); Kuschner v. Nationwide Credit, Inc., 256 F.R.D. 684, 689 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (noting that a counterclaim "is not considered compulsory although it may arise from the same transaction or occurrence as the opposing party's claim" where "the counterclaim has matured after the pleading was filed"). The Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals has noted that "[a] claim is matured for the purposes of the rule if the person asserting the counterclaim knew or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that his claim existed at the time he served his pleading."

B. Attorneys' Fees ParEn claims that, inasmuch as it and the State "sought contractual remedies such as damages for the breach of contract[and] rescission, . . . the claims by and between the [State] and [ParEn] remain fundamentally a contract lawsuit and in the nature of assumpsit," warranting reimbursement of its attorneys' fees pursuant to HRS § 607-14, see supra note 3. (Citing Blair v. Ing, 96 Hawai`i 327, 31 P.3d 184 (2001); Leslie v. Estate of Tavares, 93 Hawai`i 1, 6, 994 P.2d 1047, 1052 (2000); Braham v. Honolulu Amusement Co., 21 Haw. 583 (1913); Fogarty v. State, 5 Haw.App. 616, 705 P.2d 72 (1985); Hong v. Kong, 5 Haw.App. 174, 683 P.2d 833 (1984); Helfand v. Gerson, 105 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1997).) HGG asserts that "since a contribution claim `sounds in contract' and is in the nature of assumpsit, HGG should recover its . . . fees . . . pursuant to [HRS] § 607-14."

that circuit court properly dismissed state as party because plaintiffs' defamation and false imprisonment claims against state were precluded under HRS § 662-15(4)); Orso v. City and County of Honolulu, 56 Haw. 241, 242, 246-47, 534 P.2d 489, 490, 492-93 (1975) (in action for damages for defamation, false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, holding, inter alia, that the immunity retained in HRS § 662-15(4) was not applicable to the City and County of Honolulu); Salavea v. City and County of Honolulu, 55 Haw. 216, 222 n. 2, 517 P.2d 51, 55 n. 2 (1973) (Levinson, J., concurring and dissenting) (noting that "under HRS § 662-15(4), the `State' is not liable for the intentional torts of its agents"); Littleton v. State, 6 Haw. App. 70, 74, 708 P.2d 829, 832-33 (in general discussion of the STLA, observing that, "under [HRS] § 662-15(4)[, the state] is exempt from liability in situations where a private person might be liable"),affirmed, 68 Haw. 220, 708 P.2d 824 (1985); Fogarty v. State, 5 Haw. App. 616, 620-23, 705 P.2d 72, 76-77 (1985) (observing that state employee's misrepresentations could support claim for relief either in tort or in assumpsit and holding that, while HRS § 662-15(4) barred tort claim of misrepresentation, claim for breach of implied warranty sounding in assumpsit could, nonetheless, be maintained against state under HRS § 661-1(1) (Supp. 1984), even though such an assumpsit claim would be based on employee's misrepresentations); Mitsuba Publ'g Co. v. State, 1 Haw. App. 517, 517, 620 P.2d 771, 772 (1980) (holding,inter alia, that circuit court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing defamation claim against state and Office of Consumer Protection because neither was a "proper part[y]," citing HRS § 662-15(4)).

For those reasons, Booth's claims were compulsory counterclaims under Rule 13(a), HRCP, and Booth was required to interpose them in No. 88-0549(1) or be forever barred. Bailey v.State, 57 Haw. 144, 552 P.2d 365 (1976); Fogarty v. State, 5 Haw. App. 616, 705 P.2d 72 (1985). 2.