Because the FMCSR are embedded within North Carolina law, holding that invocation of FMCSR could transform a state law claim into a federal question would contravene "the state's strong interest in developing its own personal injury doctrine without interference by federal courts." Fochtman v. Rhino Energy, LLC, No. 13-104, 2013 WL 5701468, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 17, 2013.) Finally, as explained in Grable, "Merrell Dow thought it improbable that the Congress, having made no provision for a federal cause of action, would have meant to welcome any state-law tort case implicating federal law ‘solely because the violation of the federal statute is said to [create] a rebuttable presumption [of negligence] . . . under state law."
e-law negligence claim based on allegation that defendant driver's negligence was attributable to defendant employer under FMCSR); Dumas v. Albaier, No. 1:20-cv-00387, 2020 WL 5943019, at *2-3 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 7, 2020) (finding no § 1331 subject-matter jurisdiction over state-law negligence claim based on allegations that defendant violated duties imposed by FMCSR); Dippel v. BestDrive, LLC, No. 3:19-cv-01135, 2020 WL 813971, at *1-4 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 2020) (finding no § 1331 subject-matter jurisdiction over state-law negligence claim based on allegations that defendant violated duties imposed by FMCSR); Moody v. Great West Cas. Co., No. 4:16-CV-276, 2017 WL 77417, at *1, *3-4 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 9, 2017) (finding no § 1331 subject-matter jurisdiction over state-law negligence claim based on allegation that one defendant's negligence was attributable to another defendant under FMCSR); Fochtman v. Rhino Energy, LLC, Civil No. 13-104-ART, 2013 WL 5701468, at *1-3 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 17, 2013) (finding no § 1331 subject-matter jurisdiction over state-law negligence claim based on allegation that defendants violated duties imposed by FMCSR); Coffman v. Dutch Farms, Inc., No. 2:16-CV-157, 2017 WL 1217238, at *1-4 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 24, 2017) (finding no § 1331 subject-matter jurisdiction over state-law negligence claim based on allegation that defendants violated duties imposed by FMCSR); Langer v. Infinity Moving & Storage, Inc., No. 11 CV 3955 (HB), 2011 WL 3792822, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2011) (finding no § 1331 subject-matter jurisdiction over state-law negligence claim based on allegations in plaintiffs' discovery responses that defendants violated duties imposed by FMCSR). New Millenium cited no cases going the other way, and I found none.
Furthermore, the court relied on several cases to hold that the defendants had no objectively reasonable basis to remove the case and awarded costs and attorney's fees. Id. at *3-4 (citing Merrell Dow , 478 U.S. at 816, 106 S.Ct. 3229 (rejecting the argument that a state-law tort claim raised substantial federal question even though it required a court to interpret a federal misbranding provision); Empire Healthchoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh , 547 U.S. 677, 690, 126 S.Ct. 2121, 165 L.Ed.2d 131 (2006) (rejecting the argument that a breach-of-contract claim raised a substantial federal question even though it sought to vindicate a contractual right contemplated by a federal statute); Hampton , 683 F.3d at 708 (rejecting the argument that a state-law claim raised a substantial federal question even though it required a court to interpret the Federal Railroad Safety Act); Fochtman v. Rhino Energy, LLC , No. 13-104-ART, 2013 WL 5701468, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 17, 2013) (rejecting the argument that a state-law tort claim raised a substantial federal question even though it required a court to interpret Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations)).
In any event, it “has been established in the Sixth Circuit [that] the FMCSR[s] do[ ] not create a private right of action.” Tassin v. BNK Trans., Inc., No. 3:19-CV-00064-JHM, 2019 WL 2271163, at *2 (W.D. Ky. May 28, 2019) (citing Fochtman v. Rhino Energy, LLC, No. 13-104-ART, 2013 WL 5701468, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 17, 2013)); see Steinberg v. Luedtke Trucking, Inc., No. 4:17-CV-9, 2018 WL 3233341, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. July 2, 2018) (collecting cases).
Further, "[a]s has been established in the Sixth Circuit, the FMCSR[s] do[ ] not create a private right of action." Tassin v. BNK Trans., Inc., No. 3:19-CV-00064-JHM, 2019 WL 2271163, at *2 (W.D. Ky. May 28, 2019) (citing Fochtman v. Rhino Energy, LLC, No. 13-104-ART, 2013 WL 5701468, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 17, 2013)); see Steinberg v. Luedtke Trucking, Inc., No. 4:17-CV-9, 2018 WL 3233341, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. July 2, 2018) (collecting cases). Plaintiff cites Heffelfinger v. Connolly, No. 3:06-CV-2823, 2009 WL 112792 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 15, 2009) for the proposition that 49 C.F.R. § 396.3 confers federal-question jurisdiction.
Giles v. Chicago Drum, Inc., 631 F.Supp.2d 981, 990 (N.D. Ill. 2009). Still, "it is persuasive evidence that Congress did not intend to set out a 'welcome mat' inviting state claims with embedded federal issues like this one into federal court." Fochtman v. Rhino Energy, LLC, No. 13-104, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150279, at *7 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 17, 2013) (citing Grable, 545 U.S. at 317-18)). There is widespread consensus among federal district courts that there is no federal private right of action allowing personal injury or wrongful death plaintiffs to hold defendants liable for violations of the FMCSR.Leon v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., No. 13-1005, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30281, at *29 (D.N.M. Feb. 16, 2016); see also Fochtman, LEXIS 150279, at *6.
While the FMCSR arguably evinces a federal interest in regulating the conduct of motor carriers, neither the regulations nor the relevant statutes provide a private right of action for the type of personal injury claims at issue here. See, e.g., Burkett v. SE Indep. Delivery Servs., Inc., No. 2:17-cv-786, 2018 WL 1093320, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 28, 2018); Fochtman v. Rhino Energy, LLC, No. 13-104, 2013 WL 5701468, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 17, 2013) (collecting authorities); Bryant v. Benchmark Logistics, Inc., No. H-13-2205, 2014 WL 12607019, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2014). Furthermore, there is nothing in the complaint's general allegations of negligence which suggests that this case involves anything other than questions of fact. Under these circumstances, the Court concludes Tucker's complaint does not raise a substantial question of federal law and, therefore, remand is required.
As has been established in the Sixth Circuit, the FMCSR does not create a federal private right of action. Fochtman v. Rhino Energy, LLC, No. 13-104, 2013 WL 5701468, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 17, 2013) (citing Schramm v. Foster, 341 F. Supp. 2d 536, 547 (D. Md. 2004) (collecting cases)); Steinberg v. Luedtke Trucking, Inc., No. 4:17-CV-9, 2018 WL 3233341, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. July 2, 2018). Without a private right of action, the Defendants are correct, the FMCSR cannot act as a platform for any claim by Mr. Tassin.
Accordingly, the federal issues presented here, which do not involve a dispute over the meaning or applicability of the federal regulations, are not substantial enough to warrant federal jurisdiction. See Coffman v. Dutch Farms, Inc., 2017 WL 1217238, at *3-4 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 24, 2017) (claimed violation of the Federal Motor Safety Carrier Regulations is not substantial enough to trigger federal jurisdiction); Fochtman v. Rhino Energy, LLC, 2013 WL 5701468, at *1-2 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 17, 2013) (concluding that an alleged violation of the Federal Motor Safety Carrier Regulations embedded in a negligence per se claim failed to satisfy the substantiality and balance-of-power prongs of the Grable test). Furthermore, courts applying Merrell Dow and Grable have recognized a crucial distinction between primarily factual and legal inquiries.
The defendants' second argument is that Gearheart's claim falls into the second category of cases that "arise under" federal law, namely "state-law claims that implicate significant federal issues." Fochtman v. Rhino Energy, LLC, No. CIV. 13-104-ART, 2013 WL 5701468, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 17, 2013). As the Supreme Court noted two terms ago, it is not always easy to determine which cases fall into that category.