Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the complaint failed to allege facts from which it could be inferred that the City assumed a duty to the plaintiff beyond what was owed to the public generally (see Cuffy v City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 255, 260; Flynn v Town of Southampton, 177 A.D.3d 855, 858; Sloninski v City of New York, 173 A.D.3d 801, 803). Therefore, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the City's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the negligence cause of action.

Since the City was engaged in a governmental function, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the municipality owed her a "special duty" ( Applewhite v. Accuhealth, Inc., 21 N.Y.3d at 426, 972 N.Y.S.2d 169, 995 N.E.2d 131 ; seeTara N.P. v. Western Suffolk Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 28 N.Y.3d at 714, 49 N.Y.S.3d 362, 71 N.E.3d 950 ). Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the complaint failed to allege facts from which it could be inferred that the City assumed a duty to the plaintiff beyond what was owed to the public generally (seeCuffy v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 255, 260, 513 N.Y.S.2d 372, 505 N.E.2d 937 ; Flynn v. Town of Southampton, 177 A.D.3d 855, 858, 111 N.Y.S.3d 350 ; Sloninski v. City of New York, 173 A.D.3d 801, 803, 104 N.Y.S.3d 634 ). Therefore, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the City's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the negligence cause of action.

Here, only the first and fourth elements are at issue. We conclude that defendants met their burden on the motion by establishing as a matter of law that there was no voluntary assumption of a duty of care, and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact whether defendants assumed, through promise or action, any duty to act on decedent's behalf (seeFlynn v. Town of Southampton , 177 A.D.3d 855, 858, 111 N.Y.S.3d 350 [2d Dept. 2019] ; Bower v. City of Lockport , 115 A.D.3d 1201, 1203, 982 N.Y.S.2d 621 [4th Dept. 2014], lv denied 24 N.Y.3d 905, 2014 WL 4693176 [2014] ). Moreover, even assuming, arguendo, that plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact with respect to that element, we conclude that defendants also met their initial burden by establishing that any alleged reliance upon representations made by defendants or their agents was not justifiable, and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in that regard (seeBower , 115 A.D.3d at 1203, 982 N.Y.S.2d 621 ; see alsoMiddleton v. Town of Salina , 108 A.D.3d 1052, 1054, 969 N.Y.S.2d 634 [4th Dept. 2013] ).

Since the City was engaged in a governmental function, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the municipality owed her a "special duty" (Applewhite v Accuhealth, Inc., 21 N.Y.3d at 426; see Tara N.P. v Western Suffolk Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 28 N.Y.3d at 714). Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the complaint failed to allege facts from which it could be inferred that the City assumed a duty to the plaintiff beyond what was owed to the public generally (see Cuffy v City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 255, 260; Flynn v Town of Southampton, 177 A.D.3d 855, 858; Sloninski v City of New York, 173 A.D.3d 801, 803). Therefore, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the City's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the negligence cause of action.