Our review, therefore, is de novo. See Flynn v. Industrial Comm'n, 211 Ill. 2d 546, 553 (2004) (where there are no factual disputes, review of Commission's ruling is de novo). As noted by the appellate court below, this issue has never before been addressed in any reported decision in Illinois.
We determine this intent by reading the statute as a whole and considering all the relevant parts. Sylvester, 197 Ill. 2d at 232; Flynn v. Industrial Comm'n, 211 Ill. 2d 546, 555 (2004) (declining to read section 8(d)(1) in isolation). We must construe the statute so that each word, clause, and sentence is given a reasonable meaning and not rendered superfluous, avoiding an interpretation that would render any portion of the statute meaningless or void.
When the facts are undisputed, deference should be given to the Commission's decision only when it must draw inferences from the facts in order to render its decision. Flynn v. Industrial Comm'n, 211 Ill.2d 546, 553, 286 Ill.Dec. 62, 813 N.E.2d 119, 123–24 (2004). When there is no question of inference or weight to be given evidence, and all the Commission does is apply the law to the undisputed facts, review is de novo.
When the facts are undisputed, deference should be given to the Commission's decision only when it must draw inferences from the facts in order to render its decision. Flynn v. Industrial Comm'n, 211 Ill. 2d 546, 553, 813 N.E.2d 119, 123-24 (2004). When there is no question of inference or weight to be given evidence, and all the Commission does is apply the law to the undisputed facts, review is de novo.
Id. Where statutes are related, they are to be read harmoniously, with specific language taking precedence over more general language. Flynn v. Indus. Comm'n, 813 N.E.2d 119, 125, 211 Ill. 2d 546, 286 Ill. Dec. 62 (2004). The Immunity Act clearly provides that the State does not waive its immunity except as provided in certain other acts. The IHRA is not mentioned as an exception to the Immunity Act.
In this case, the Workers' Compensation Act is a remedial statute intended to provide financial protection for injured workers and it is to be liberally construed to accomplish that objective. Flynn v. Industrial Comm'n, 211 Ill. 2d 546, 556 (2004). With this in mind, we turn to the applicable provisions of the Act.
While the majority's interpretation unduly limits the broad reach of section 3-103(2) by ignoring the legislature's language choices, the proper statutory analysis reads section 3 — 103(2) and section 3-107(a) in harmony, without rendering any portion of the statutes inoperative. See Flynn v. Industrial Comm'n, 211 Ill. 2d 546, 555 (2004). Properly construed, the two sections address different types of situations that may arise on administrative review.
General Motors Corp. v. State of Illinois Motor Vehicle Review Board, 224 Ill.2d 1, 13 (2007). The Act is a remedial statute intended to provide financial protection for injured workers and it is to be liberally construed to accomplish that objective. Flynn v. Industrial Comm'n, 211 Ill.2d 546, 556 (2004). Issues involving the interpretation of a statute present questions of law that courts review de novo.
When comparing and construing related statutes, "[w]e presume the legislature *** acted rationally and with full knowledge of other statutes and judicial decisions concerning existing law." Village of Chatham, 351 Ill.App.3d at 895; see also Flynn v. Industrial Comm'n, 211 Ill.2d 546, 555, 813 N.E.2d 119, 125 (2004). Consequently, we read relating statutes "harmoniously so that no provisions are rendered inoperative."
¶ 26 In contrast, and in considering the purview of the Compensation Act, we note again that the Compensation Act's provisions comprise a "trade-off between employer and employee promot[ing] the fundamental purpose of the [Compensation] Act, which [is] to afford protection to employees by providing them with prompt and equitable compensation for their injuries." Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d at 180-81; Illinois State Treasurer v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 2015 IL 117418, ¶ 41 ("The main purpose of the [Compensation] Act is to provide financial protection for injured workers ***."); Flynn v. Industrial Comm'n, 211 Ill. 2d 546, 556 (2004) ("the Workers' Compensation Act is a remedial statute intended to provide financial protection for injured workers"). "The [Compensation] Act does not apply to anticipated future injuries, and an employee's rights under the [Compensation] Act accrue only at such time when a work-related injury occurs."