Opinion
23-3197-JWL
10-03-2023
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
JOHN W. LUNGSTRUM UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff brings this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is incarcerated at the Hutchinson Correctional Facility in Hutchinson, Kansas (“HCF”). The Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. On August 23, 2023, the Court entered a Memorandum and Order to Show Cause (Doc. 5) (“MOSC”), granting Plaintiff until September 25, 2023, in which to show good cause why his Complaint should not be dismissed or to file an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies set forth in the MOSC. Plaintiff has failed to respond by the Court's deadline.
As Count I, Plaintiff alleges cruel and unusual punishment. (Doc. 1, at 3.) He claims that transferring him to a maximum custody facility, “where people are getting stabbed and beaten as punishment,” puts his life in danger. Id. at 5. As Count II, Plaintiff alleges interference with access to the courts. Id. at 3. Plaintiff alleges that Warden Williams has refused to answer Plaintiff's grievances. Id. at 6.
The Court found in the MOSC that Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to a particular security classification or to be housed in a particular yard. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976); Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 577 (6th Cir. 2005) (increase in security classification does not constitute an atypical and significant hardship because “a prisoner has no constitutional right to remain incarcerated in a particular prison or to be held in a specific security classification”)). Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to dictate where he is housed, whether it is which facility or which classification within a facility. See Schell v. Evans, 550 Fed.Appx. 553, 557 (10th Cir. 2013) (citing Meachum, 427 U.S. at 228-29; Cardoso v. Calbone, 490 F.3d 1194, 1197-98 (10th Cir. 2007). Moreover, jail officials are entitled to great deference in the internal operation and administration of the facility. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547-48 (1979).
“Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials have a duty to ‘provide humane conditions of confinement,' including ‘tak[ing] reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of . . . inmates.'” Requena v. Roberts, 893 F.3d 1195, 1214 (10th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 800 (2019) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quotation marks omitted)). This duty includes “a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833 (ellipsis and quotation marks omitted). To prevail on a failure to protect claim, a plaintiff must show: “(1) ‘that the conditions of his incarceration present an objective substantial risk of serious harm' and (2) ‘prison officials had subjective knowledge of the risk of harm,' ‘[i]n other words, an official must both be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.'” Requena, 893 F.3d at 1214 (citation omitted).
“The unfortunate reality is that threats between inmates are common and do not, under all circumstances, serve to impute actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm.” Turner v. Okla. Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 804 Fed.Appx. 921, 926 (10th Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (citing Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1236 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted); Prater v. Dahm, 89 F.3d 538, 541 (8th Cir. 1996) (same)). “[S]ubjective awareness of only some risk of harm to a prisoner is insufficient for a deliberate-indifference claim.” Id. (citing Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1238). Rather, “officials must possess enough details about a threat to enable them to conclude that it presents a strong likelihood of injury, not a mere possibility.” Id. (citing Marbury, 936 at 1236 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The Court found in the MOSC that Plaintiff's allegations suggest a mere possibility that he is in danger at HCF, and directed him to file an amended complaint that adds additional factual allegations to show that a defendant possessed enough details about a threat to enable them to conclude that it presents a strong likelihood of injury to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff also claims that Warden Williams failed to respond to Plaintiff's grievances and denied him court access. The Court found in the MOSC that the Tenth Circuit has held several times that there is no constitutional right to an administrative grievance system. Gray v. GEO Group, Inc., No. 17-6135, 2018 WL 1181098, at *6 (10th Cir. March 6, 2018) (citations omitted); Von Hallcy v. Clements, 519 Fed.Appx. 521, 523-24 (10th Cir. 2013); Boyd v. Werholtz, 443 Fed.Appx. 331, 332 (10th Cir. 2011); see also Watson v. Evans, Case No. 13-cv-3035-EFM, 2014 WL 7246800, at *7 (D. Kan. Dec. 17, 2014) (failure to answer grievances does not violate constitutional rights or prove injury necessary to claim denial of access to courts); Strope v. Pettis, No. 03-3383-JAR, 2004 WL 2713084, at *7 (D. Kan. Nov. 23, 2004) (alleged failure to investigate grievances does not amount to a constitutional violation); Baltoski v. Pretorius, 291 F.Supp.2d 807, 811 (N.D. Ind. 2003) (finding that “[t]he right to petition the government for redress of grievances . . . does not guarantee a favorable response, or indeed any response, from state officials”).
The Court found that Plaintiff's request for compensatory damages is barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). The Court also found that if Plaintiff intends to allege a discrimination or equal protection claim, he should provide additional factual allegations in his amended complaint.
Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint or responded to the MOSC by the Court's deadline. The MOSC provides that “[i]f Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint within the prescribed time that cures all the deficiencies discussed herein, this matter may be dismissed without further notice for failure to state a claim.” (Doc. 5, at 11.)
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that this matter is dismissed for failure to state a claim.
IT IS SO ORDERED.