Although the State declined to prosecute three of the cases pending against the defendant-principal, the sureties bound themselves for the appearance of the defendant and they were liable for his default. The bondsmen were not released from liability merely because the cases were nol-prossed. United States v. Sulvani, 4 F. Supp. 775, 776 (W.D.N.Y. 1933); Busby v. State, 18 Ala. App. 549, 550, 93 So. 372, 373 (1922); Fly v. State, 550 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977). The appellants request that the amount of the forfeiture be decreased by $20,000.
Neither petitioner had been previously convicted of a criminal offense in the State of Texas or in Mexico. The primary object or purpose of an appearance bond is to secure the presence of the defendant in court upon the trial of the offense charged. Ex parte Vasquez, Tex.Cr.App., 558 S.W.2d 477 (1977); Fly v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 550 S.W.2d 684; McConathy v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 528 S.W.2d 594. While bail should be sufficiently high to assure the defendant's presence, it is not to be used as an instrument of oppression.
The burden of proof is on petitioner for reduction in bail to show that bail set is excessive. Ex parte August, 552 S.W.2d 169 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977); Ex parte Clark, 537 S.W.2d 40 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976); Holliman v. State, 485 S.W.2d 912 (Tex.Cr.App. 1972). The primary object or purpose of an appearance bond is to secure the presence of the defendant in court upon the trial of the accusation against him. Fly v. State, 550 S.W.2d 684 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977); McConathy v. State, 528 S.W.2d 594 (Tex.Cr.App. 1975). While bail should be sufficiently high to give reasonable assurance that the undertaking will be complied with, the power to require bail is not to be used so as to make it an instrument of oppression.
Further, issuance of an arrest warrant, without the principal actually being rearrested and released on another bond, does not nullify a prior appearance bond obligation. Fly v. State, 550 S.W.2d 684, 685 (Tex.Crim.App. 1977). Nothing in our record indicates Ganjizadeh was rearrested and released on any other bond.
See Op.Tex.Att'y Gen. No. JM-261 (1984) (noting that Article 2372p-3, § 13(c) applies to situations where there is no forfeiture of the bond); see also Garcia v. State, 686 S.W.2d 281, 283 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1985, no writ) (recommending to Legislature that words "Prior to the entry of a judgment nisi" be added as preface to Section 13(c)). It is well settled in Texas that mere subsequent appearance by the accused is not sufficient cause for complete remission of the forfeiture. State v. Warren, 17 Tex. 283, 284-85 (1856); Fly v. State, 550 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Tex.Crim.App. 1977); Makeig v. State, 802 S.W.2d 59, 62 (Tex.App. — Amarillo 1990), aff'd, 830 S.W.2d 956 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992). Otherwise, the defendant would not really be bound to appear as required by the terms of his recognizance, but would be able to create continuances at will.
It is settled law that mere subsequent appearance by the accused is not sufficient cause for complete remission of the forfeiture. State v. Warren, 17 Tex. at 284-85; Fly v. State, 550 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977). If it were, the defendant would not really be bound to appear as required by the terms of his recognizance, but would be able to create continuances at will.
When the post-indictment capias issued and was executed, the bond, by its terms, became an appearance bond. "The primary purpose of an appearance bond is to secure the presence of a defendant at court upon trial of the accusations against him." Fly v. State, 550 S.W.2d 684, 685 (Tex.Crim.App. 1977) (emphasis added); see also McConathy v. State, 528 S.W.2d 594, 596 (Tex.Crim.App. 1975). Consequently, we hold that appellant's presence was secured for purposes of the Speedy Trial Act on October 27, when the bond became operative, to the same degree as if she had been taken into physical custody on that date and held in jail pending the trial of her cause.