Summary
In Fludd, as in Huff, the prior pending action was pending in federal court, but both decisions were based on the recognition that federal and state courts "may be considered courts of separate jurisdictional sovereignties."
Summary of this case from Flagg Energy Development Corp. v. General Motors Corp.Opinion
74920.
DECIDED SEPTEMBER 8, 1987.
Action for damages. Richmond Superior Court. Before Judge Pierce.
John P. Batson, Sam B. Nicholson, for appellant.
Robert C. Daniel, Jr., for appellees.
The appellant, Willie Fludd, commenced this action against Frank Tiller and J. B. Dykes (as police officers), on November 30, 1984, seeking damages for a chest wound he sustained when Tiller apprehended a criminal suspect. On February 17, 1983, Fludd had commenced an action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, against the same defendants and based on the same incident. The trial court granted the appellees' motion to dismiss, because of the pending federal action involving the same subject matter, parties, and cause of action, and this appeal followed. Held:
Comparison of the two complaints shows the same set of operative facts, the same parties, the same amount of damages sought, and essentially the same cause of action in the federal action and this state action. However, the pendency of a prior federal action generally is not a bar to a state action by the same plaintiff against the same defendant for the same cause of action. Inter-Southern Life Ins. Co. v. McQuarie, 148 Ga. 233 ( 96 S.E. 424) (1918); Barkley-Cupit Enterprises v. Equitable Life c. of the U.S., 157 Ga. App. 138 ( 276 S.E.2d 650) (1981). Under these circumstances, the trial court certainly had the discretion to stay the state proceeding until the disposition of the pending federal action, Bloomfield v. Liggett Myers, 230 Ga. 484 ( 198 S.E.2d 144) (1973), but outright dismissal at this juncture was inappropriate.
Judgment reversed. Birdsong, C. J., and Pope, J., concur.