(Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Floyd v. State, 251 Ga.App. 346, 347(1), 553 S.E.2d 658 (2001). (Footnote omitted.)
Johnson, supra.Floyd v. State, 251 Ga. App. 346, 349 (1) ( 553 S.E.2d 658) (2001) (Conviction for second degree forgery affirmed when the evidence showed that check stuffed into passenger door of defendant's automobile was drawn on the same account as forged check cashed by defendant shortly before), compare Nelson, supra at 585 (1) (Evidence was insufficient to support defendant's conviction for second degree forgery when it revealed only that defendant merely possessed a counterfeit bill, but did not prove intent to defraud). 2.
Because there is no competent evidence establishing the essential element that Archer uttered or delivered check 1467, the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the guilty verdict as to forgery in the first degree as alleged in Count 2 of the indictment, and Archer's conviction as to that count must therefore be reversed. See Floyd v. State, 251 Ga. App. 346, 348-349 (1) ( 553 SE2d 658) (2001). 2.
"If the indictment [or accusation] sets out the offense as done in a particular way, the proof must show it so, or there will be a variance." Floyd v. State, 251 Ga. App. 346, 348 (1) ( 553 SE2d 658) (2001) (punctuation and footnote omitted). See OCGA ยง 10-6A-3 (8); Killearn Partners v. Southeast Properties, 279 Ga. 144, 146 (1) ( 611 SE2d 26) (2005).
Accordingly, the trial court's charge to the jury did not "permit the prosecution to prove that [the] crime was committed in a wholly different manner than that specifically alleged in the indictment," and so we find no reversible error. Floyd v. State, 251 Ga. App. 346, 348 (1) ( 553 SE2d 658) (2001). See also Hughes v. State, 266 Ga. App. 203, 204 (3) ( 596 SE2d 697) (2004) (no reversible error when language of indictment encompassed the more specific definition of the crime that was charged to the jury).
As our Georgia colleagues cogently noted, to permit the prosecution to prove that a crime was committed in a different manner than that specifically alleged in the indictment could subject an accused to unfair surprise at trial. See Floyd v. State (GA. App. 2001), 553 S.E.2d 658, 661. Here, the state could have crafted an indictment with less specific language or language that included other devices or other facts to help to identify every occasion that appellant engaged in improper conduct with the victim.