Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-1950-11T4
03-14-2013
TYRONE FLOYD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HIGH POINT INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Respondent.
Gerald F. Miksis argued the cause for appellant. Louise Ann Watson argued the cause for respondent (Law Offices of Debra Hart, attorneys; Nina L. Pettersen, of counsel and on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Lihotz, Ostrer and Kennedy.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Atlantic County, Docket No. L-4854-09.
Gerald F. Miksis argued the cause for appellant.
Louise Ann Watson argued the cause for respondent (Law Offices of Debra Hart, attorneys; Nina L. Pettersen, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
Plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Law Division, following a bench trial, dismissing with prejudice his complaint for personal injury protection (PIP) benefits under a policy of insurance issued by defendant. We affirm.
The facts that follow are drawn from the findings of fact made by Judge Nelson C. Johnson following the close of evidence.
Plaintiff had a valid New Jersey driver's license, but it was suspended on May 9, 2004, because plaintiff failed to pay various surcharges arising from several unpaid parking tickets. Plaintiff attempted to get the license reinstated, but was unsuccessful in doing so.
At some point in 2006, plaintiff applied for a license from the "Yamassee Native Americans." Plaintiff claimed he had to submit an application and a fee of $125 to this group to enable it to ascertain his heritage and his eligibility for membership. Apparently satisfied, the Yamassee Native Americans on October 2, 2006, issued to plaintiff a "drivers license" enabling him to "travel the roadways, highways, byways, waterways and airways unhindered." The license displayed a photograph of plaintiff and had a serial number and an expiration date of October 2, 2009.
During argument in the trial court, plaintiff's counsel repeatedly averred that the Yamassee Native Americans are "a recognized native American tribe." Although we need not address this issue to resolve the question on appeal, we note that the Yamassee Native Americans are not listed by the United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, among "Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible" by the federal government. See 75 Fed. Reg. 60810 (Oct. 1, 2010).
Plaintiff did not have to take a physical or driving ability test for this license, and was not asked to pass any written test to ascertain his "ability and understanding of any state's driving laws." He simply submitted an application with the required fee.
In the Fall of 2006, plaintiff purchased a used Dodge Ram pickup truck from a co-worker, and he asked a friend of his, Christine King, to take title to the vehicle in her name and to obtain insurance coverage for the vehicle. Plaintiff did not live with King, although he rented a residential property from her, where he kept the truck. He was the principal driver of the truck.
King agreed and the truck was then registered in her name and she secured insurance coverage for the vehicle, in her own name, from defendant. She did not list plaintiff as a "licensed operator" of a motor vehicle in her household in her insurance application. King paid for the insurance on the truck and was then reimbursed by plaintiff on a monthly basis.
On April 24, 2008, plaintiff was driving the truck when it was struck in the rear by another vehicle. Plaintiff was injured and sought PIP benefits from defendant. Defendant denied coverage and declined to extend PIP benefits to plaintiff, arguing that he was not an innocent eligible person under the policy. Plaintiff then filed a complaint against defendant for coverage.
Judge Johnson dismissed plaintiff's complaint and entered judgment for defendant following the bench trial. After making findings of fact, as noted above, he opined in pertinent part:
[T]he question that arises under the case law is would a reasonable person believe that, one, he could obtain a license without any sort of test; and that, two, the license he was granted had . . . such broad authority, which again basically exempts the holder of this license from any of the political rules of any nation and reserves all rights to travel the roadways, highways, byways, waterways and airways unhindered. So the question is would a reasonable person believe that they could, they could secure such a license. And I conclude that, no, they could not. I don't believe it's reasonable for a person to be able to conclude that.
. . . .
Clearly this gentleman, the plaintiff, Mr. Floyd, was excluded from purchasing insurance pursuant to N.J.S.A. 17:33B-13. He could not buy insurance, that's why he had Ms. King buying it for him. . . . And so if Christine King was an unlicensed driver they could decline coverage to her. Mr. Floyd is an unlicensed driver in New Jersey and High Point has denied coverage to him. So based upon all of the facts as I perceive them, based upon the case law as I apply it, plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of proof to show that a reasonable person would believe that this license was something that would permit him to drive in New Jersey. And so plaintiff's complaint is dismissed.
Plaintiff appeals and raises the following issues:
I. Appellant had reasonable good faith belief as a Black Native American Indian seeking to realize his cultural identity that the Yamassee Native American Driver's License permitted him to operate a motor vehicle in the State of New Jersey.We find no merit to these arguments, Rule 2:11-(e)(1)(E), and affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Johnson in his thorough oral opinion issued on November 14, 2011. We add only the following.
II. Insurance contracts must be strictly construed by their plain language.
III. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 must be interpreted broadly.
Our review of the factual findings made by the trial judge in a non-jury trial is quite limited. Estate of Ostlund v. Ostlund, 391 N.J. Super. 390, 400 (App. Div. 2007). "'[W]e do not weigh the evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, or make conclusions about the evidence.'" Mountain Hill, LLC v. Twp. of Middletown, 399 N.J. Super. 486, 498 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting State v. Barone, 147 N.J. 599, 615 (1997)). In general, the judge's factual "findings . . . should not be disturbed unless they are so wholly insupportable as to result in a denial of justice[.]" Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 483-84 (1974) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, "[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
In Martin v. Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co., 346 N.J. Super. 320 (App. Div. 2002), we affirmed the denial of PIP and uninsured motorist benefits to an unlicensed driver who was involved in a one-car accident while driving a vehicle belonging to her fiancé's stepfather while her license was suspended. The plaintiff applied for both UM and PIP benefits. Id. at 322. Her license had been suspended for six years and "[t]he period of suspension was periodically extended because on several occasions she was ticketed for driving while on the revoked list." Ibid.
We discern no reason to deviate from the holding of Martin in affirming the judgment entered by the trial court in this case. The proper test for measuring whether a plaintiff's belief that he was reasonably entitled to operate a vehicle is "'the reaction of a reasonable [person] of [plaintiff's] age, personality and social milieu, subject to such attendant influences on his judgment and mind as may be credibly discerned from the proofs.'" Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Collins, 158 N.J. 542, 550 (1999) (quoting State Farm Ins. Co. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 155, 171-72 (1973)). In the present matter, nothing suggests that plaintiff had a reasonable belief that he was entitled to operate a vehicle on a public highway in New Jersey because he had obtained a tribal driver's license from the Yamassee Native Americans. His New Jersey driver's license was suspended and the Yamassee license was patently invalid.
Further, we find no basis for concluding that, because the policy at issue lacked a provision, found in other policies, raising a conclusive presumption that a person operating a vehicle without a license lacks a reasonable belief that the person is entitled to do so, an ambiguity was somehow created or that the outcome of this matter is affected.
As we explained in Martin, supra,
In our judgment, such a holding is fully consonant with the policies articulated in N.J.S.A. 17:29C-7, which permits an insurer to decline coverage if the named insured or other customary operator has had his driver's license suspended or revoked. It is also in accord with N.J.S.A. 17:33B-13, which defines a person eligible to purchase automobile insurance as excluding one whose driver's license has been suspended or revoked.
[346 N.J. Super. at 326.]
Accordingly, we affirm.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION