Opinion
No. 04-04-00436-CV
Delivered and Filed: February 9, 2005.
Appeal from the 37th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, Trial Court No. 1993-CI-00222, Honorable John D. Gabriel, Jr., Judge Presiding.
Affirmed.
Sitting: Alma L. LÓPEZ, Chief Justice, Sandee Bryan MARION, Justice, Phylis J. SPEEDLIN, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an appeal from the trial court's order denying appellant's motion for clarification of a qualified domestic relations order. Because all issues of law are settled, our opinion only advises the parties of the court's decision and the basic reasons for it. See Tex.R.App.P. 47.4. We affirm.
Appellant and appellee were divorced on June 30, 1994, on which date, the trial court signed the final decree of divorce, which states in pertinent part as follows:
[Appellee] is awarded the following as [her] sole and separate property . . . [a]ny and all sums, whether matured, accrued or unaccrued, vested or otherwise, together with all increases thereof, the proceeds therefrom, and any other rights related to any profit-sharing plan [sic] retirement plan, pension plan, employee stock option plan, employee savings plan, accrued unpaid bonuses, or other benefit program existing by reason of [appellee's] past, present, or future employment except that portion awarded to [appellant] herein;. . . .
. . .
[Appellant] is awarded the following as [his] sole and separate property . . . [a]ll right, title, and interest in and to that portion of the Defined Benefit and Money Purchase Benefit Pension Plan to be paid as a result of [appellee's] employment with Frank L. Bond, D.D.S., Inc. awarded to him pursuant to the Qualified Domestic Relations Order entered simultaneously with this Decree of Divorce.
The Qualified Domestic Relations Order ("the QDRO") states in pertinent part as follows:
This qualified domestic relations order assigns a portion of the benefits payable under the Plan to [appellant] in recognition of [appellant's] marital rights in [appellee's] benefits payable under the Plan.
. . .
As part of a just and right division of the estate of the parties, [appellant] is hereby awarded a portion of any benefits payable with respect to [appellee] that [appellee] . . . may become entitled to receive from the Plan, by way of a return of accumulated contributions or by way of any annuity that may become payable as a result of [appellee's] participation in the Plan, such portion to be determined by multiplying forty-five percent by a fraction, the numerator of which is all accumulated contributions deposited to [appellee's] individual account with the Plan between November 29, 1980 and the date of this order (together with all accumulated interest on those contributions) and the denominator of which is the total of all contributions made by [appellee] before or after this time to [appellee's] individual account with the Plan (together with all accumulated interest on those contributions), and then multiplying that product by the benefit that would otherwise be payable by the Plan to [appellee]. . . ."
(Emphasis added.)
In 2003, appellant inquired about the balance of appellee's retirement plan. The plan administrator stated, "This benefit award is detailed, based upon a formula multiplying a certain fraction by 45%. The Order provides the denominator of this fraction be defined as `the total of all contributions made by [appellee]. . . .' Because there are no participant contributions, this results in a denominator of zero. Therefore the formula results in a benefit award of zero." Appellant subsequently filed a motion to clarify the QDRO, in which he asserted the QDRO was ambiguous. The trial court denied the motion, and in its findings of fact and conclusions of law, determined appellant was attempting a "substantive modification" of the unambiguous QDRO, which the court had no authority to grant.
On appeal, appellant asserts the trial court erred in concluding (1) his motion for clarification was an impermissible collateral attack on the QDRO and an attempt to substantially modify the QDRO; (2) the QDRO was unambiguous; and (3) limitations barred his contractual defenses of ambiguity and mutual mistake.
DISCUSSION
While a trial court may enter a "clarifying order" to enforce compliance with an insufficiently specific decree, Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 9.008(b) (Vernon 1998), a court "may not amend, modify, alter, or change the division of property made or approved in the decree of divorce." Id. § 9.007(a). Parties to an agreed judgment are prohibited from raising contractual defenses in an action to enforce the agreement when those defenses attack the validity of the agreement at its inception, execution, or at the time it was approved by the court in the divorce decree. Spradley v. Hutchison, 787 S.W.2d 214, 219-20 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1990, writ denied); Giddings v. Giddings, 701 S.W.2d 284, 289 (Tex.App.-Austin 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). As with other final, unappealed judgments that are regular on their face, divorce judgments are not vulnerable to collateral attack. Berry v. Berry, 786 S.W.2d 672, 673 (Tex. 1990).
We interpret a divorce decree like any other judgment. Reiss v. Reiss, 118 S.W.3d 439, 441 (Tex. 2003). If the decree, read as a whole, is not ambiguous we interpret the judgment literally. Id. The final divorce decree and the QDRO in this case are not ambiguous. The QDRO provides that appellant will receive his interest in appellee's retirement benefits based upon the following formula:
all accumulated contributions deposited into appellee's account from November 29, 1980 to June 30, 1994, plus interest
45% x _________________ x benefit payable to appellee total of all contributions made by appellee before or after November 29, 1980, plus interest
Appellant does not dispute that appellee did not make any contributions to her retirement benefits plan. Although the effect of the formula may, and apparently has, resulted in appellant receiving no interest in appellee's retirement plan because she made no contributions as a plan participant, such effect does not alter the QDRO's plain language. See Reiss, 118 S.W.3d at 442; see also Shanks v. Treadway, 110 S.W.3d 444, 448 (Tex. 2003). Because the divorce decree and QDRO are unambiguous, the trial court correctly concluded it had no authority to enter an order altering or modifying the original disposition of property. See Shanks, 110 S.W.3d at 449.
In his motion for clarification, appellant alleged that appellee's account had a balance of approximately $21,000. Although the record does not reveal the source of the contributions, presumably, all contributions to her account were made by her employer.
CONCLUSION
We overrule appellant's issues on appeal and affirm the trial court's judgment.
This case emphasizes the patent unfairness of interpreting divorce decrees "based only on the literal meaning of a few isolated words, phrases, or sentences." Reiss v. Reiss, 118 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Tex. 2003) (Jefferson, J., dissenting). In this case, the divorce decree awarded the appellee, who was the petitioner below, the following as her sole and separate property:
Any and all sums, whether matured or unmatured, accrued or unaccrued, vested or otherwise, together with all increases thereof, the proceeds therefrom, and any other rights related to any profit-sharing plan[,] retirement plan, pension plan, employee stock option plan, employee savings plan, accrued unpaid bonuses, or other benefit program existing by reason of Petitioner's past, present, or future employment except that portion awarded to Respondent herein;
(emphasis added). The divorce decree further awarded the appellant, who was the respondent below, the following as his sole and separate property:
All right, title, and interest in and to that portion of the Defined Benefit and Money Purchase Benefit Pension Plan to be paid as a result of VALERIE LAMOYNE FLOYD'S employment with FRANK L. BOND, D.D.S., INC. awarded to him pursuant to Qualified Domestic Relations Order entered simultaneously with this Decree of Divorce.
Notwithstanding these express awards, the formula for calculating the appellant's interest in the appellee's retirement plan contained in the Qualified Domestic Relations Order ("QDRO") resulted in appellant's interest being worth nothing because the formula was based on contributions made by the appellee to the plan even though no participant contributions were made to the plan.
The result in this case is more egregious than the result in Reiss because in that case the ex-spouse was awarded an amount that was slightly greater than the amount the ex-spouse would otherwise have been entitled to receive under a calculation based on the date of divorce rather than the date of retirement. In this case, the ex-spouse will receive nothing. Accordingly, the interpretation we are forced to apply to the QDRO renders the award in the divorce decree meaningless. As a result, the trial court included provisions in its decree that provided for an exception to the award to the appellee that was, in reality, no exception and an award to the appellant that was, in reality, worthless. If we were to read the decree as a whole and assume that the trial court would not engage in a meaningless act, we could reasonably conclude that the formula used in the QDRO was intended to be primarily based on the contributions made on appellee's behalf to the Frank L. Bond, D.D.S., Inc. Defined Benefit and Money Purchase Benefit Pension Plan prior to the date of the parties' divorce. Constrained by the holding in Reiss, however, we must conclude that the divorce decree was intended to expressly award appellant nothing.