Messrs. C.T. Graydon and Augustus T. Graydon, of Columbia, for Appellant, cite: As to the evidence not supportingthe charge of fraud and deceit: 234 S.C. 477, 109 S.E.2d 5; 107 S.E.2d 43; 177 S.C. 295, 181 S.E. 1; 126 S.C. 207, 119 S.E. 571; 104 F. Supp. 648; 61 S.C. 190, 39 S.E. 345. As to the plaintiff being barred fromrecovery by reason of his acts subsequent to the allegedfraud: 197 S.C. 178, 14 S.E.2d 886, 136 A.L.R. 1; 234 S.C. 477, 109 S.E.2d 5; 101 S.C. 221, 85 S.E. 585; 107 S.C. 200, 92 S.E. 861; 190 S.C. 392, 3 S.E.2d 38; 146 S.C. 385, 144 S.E. 82; 190 S.C. 392, 3 S.E.2d 38; 130 F.2d 499. As to there being noevidence of fraud and deceit, proof of damages, as a resultthereof, should have been rejected: 197 S.C. 178, 14 S.E.2d 886, 136 A.L.R.I. As to error on part of Trial Judgein allowing the defendant to be cross examined on issuessubsequent to and not related to the controversy in this case: 24 Am. Jur. 111, Fraud and Deceit, Sec. 271. Messrs. Thomas H. Pope, Robert D. Schumpert and R.D.Parler, of Newberry, and Frank L. Taylor, of Columbia, forRespondent, cite: As to there being sufficient evidence offraud and deceit as to require the submission of this case tothe jury: 176 S.C. 345, 166 S.E. 346; 174 S.C. 97, 177 S.E. 29; 182 S.C. 399, 189 S.E. 468; 218 S.C. 211, 62 S.E.2d 297; 113 F. Supp. 257. As to where awitness, who has testified over objection, is cross examined,without reservation, on the same subject, the exception tothe testimony is thereby rendered untenable: 192 S.C. 245, 6 S.E.2d 13; 191
217 S.C. 442, 60 S.E.2d 884; 124 S.C. 8, 117 S.E. 305; 192 S.C. 59, 5 S.E.2d 454, 125 A.L.R. 872. As to Plaintiff being barred fromrecovery by his signed release or "approval": 220 S.C. 401, 68 S.E.2d 340; 94 S.E. 1051, 108 S.C. 411; 78 S.C. 419, 59 S.E. 67; 123 S.E. 845, 129 S.C. 226; 217 S.C. 442, 60 S.E.2d 884; 161 S.C. 286, 159 S.E. 617; 154 S.C. 424, 151 S.E. 788; 195 S.E. 536, 12 S.E.2d 24. As to error in admitting oral testimony tending to varythe terms of the written agreement between the parties: 153 S.C. 168, 150 S.E. 652; 136 S.C. 496, 134 S.E. 505; 98 S.C. 279, 82 S.E. 422. As to rule that fraud must be plainlyand specifically alleged in the complaint: 203 S.C. 333, 27 S.E.2d 455; 222 S.C. 289, 72 S.E.2d 576. Messrs. Law, Kirkland Aaron, Henry W. Kirkland and Theodore W. Law, Jr., of Columbia, for Respondent, cite: As to the respondent submitting sufficient evidence to supporta finding by the jury that appellant had imposed afraudulent scheme on respondent to his damage: 190 S.C. 392, 3 S.E.2d 38; 225 S.C. 563, 83 S.E.2d 204; 225 S.C. 313, 82 S.E.2d 196; 199 S.C. 295, 19 S.E.2d 477; 194 S.C. 469, 10 S.E.2d 3; 23 Am. Jur., Fraud and Deceit, Secs. 78, 96; 186 S.C. 77, 194 S.E. 635; 220 S.C. 67, 66 S.E.2d 451. June 2, 1959.
Epps Hoffman, of Conway, for Appellants, cite: As to Trial Judge erring in directing verdict for respondenton ground appellants were guilty of such negligenceas would preclude their recovery: 155 S.C. 147, 152 S.E. 17: 220 S.C. 401, 68 S.E.2d 340; 218 S.C. 211, 62 S.E.2d 297; 217 S.C. 453, 60 S.E.2d 891; 197 S.C. 178, 14 S.E.2d 886; 174 S.C. 97, 177 S.E. 29; 129 S.C. 226, 123 S.E. 845. Messrs. Suggs McCutcheon, of Conway, for Respondents, cite: As to Appellant's evidence being insufficient to establisha case of actionable fraud warranting submission ofsame to Jury: 190 S.C. 392, 3 S.E.2d 38; 208 S.C. 355, 38 S.E.2d 358; 214 S.C. 263, 52 S.E.2d 199; 214 S.C. 45, 51 S.E.2d 163; 177 S.C. 295, 181 S.E. 1; 186 S.C. 381, 195 S.E. 652; 150 S.C. 476, 148 S.E. 476; 197 S.C. 178, 14 S.E.2d 886; 195 S.C. 536, 12 S.E.2d 24. As to Trial Judge not erring in directing verdictfor respondents on ground that appellants failed to use reasonableprudence and diligence for their own protection: 107 S.C. 201, 92 S.E. 861; 110 S.C. 421, 96 S.E. 905; 155 S.C. 147, 152 S.E. 17; 187 S.C. 311, 197 S.E. 326; 197 S.C. 178, 14 S.E.2d 886; 207 S.C. 15, 35 S.E.2d 47; 217 S.C. 442, 60 S.E.2d 884; 220 S.C. 67, 66 S.E.2d 451; 220 S.C. 401, 68 S.E.2d 340. August 10, 1954.
As to there being no allegation that anyfraudulent act accompanied the alleged breach of contract towarrant the assessment of punitive damages: 194 S.C. 395, 9 S.E.2d 790; 188 S.C. 1, 198 S.E. 417; 96 S.C. 240, 80 S.E. 437; 110 S.C. 233, 96 S.E. 295; 166 S.C. 454, 165 S.E. 203; 169 S.C. 384, 169 S.E. 78; 169 S.C. 540, 169 S.E. 430; 173 S.C. 448, 176 S.E. 340; 182 S.C. 240, 188 S.E. 864; 192 S.C. 151, 2 S.E.2d 382; 206 S.C. 344, 34 S.E.2d 218; 77 F. Supp. 826; 206 S.C. 344, 34 S.E.2d 218; 166 S.C. 454, 165 S.E. 203. Asto the complaint failing to allege the necessary elements ofan action bottomed on fraud and deceit: 190 S.C. 392, 3 S.E.2d 38; 199 S.C. 335, 19 S.E.2d 457; 192 S.C. 454, 7 S.E.2d 169; 174 S.C. 97, 177 S.E. 29; 182 S.C. 399, 189 S.E. 468; 107 S.C. 200, 92 S.E. 861; 168 S.C. 178, 167 S.E. 232; 175 S.C. 139, 173 S.E. 76. Asto complaint not alleging sufficient facts to sustain an actionbased on an alleged fraud: 58 S.C. 56, 36 S.E. 437; 96 S.C. 240, 80 S.E. 437; 194 S.C. 469, 10 S.E.2d 3.
Induce Purchaseof Stock: 73 A.L.R., 1111; 73 A.L.R., 117; 84 App. Div., 610, 82 N.Y. Supp., 1003; 147 F., page 72. Asto "Stock Having No Value": Ann. Cas., 1915-C, page 65, Note. As to Admissibility of "Estimate of Value of Stock"of Expert: 20 A.J., 346, Sec. 382, Evidence; 133 Mass. 343; 132 Mo., 513, 34 S.W. 252; 33 S.D., 263, 146 N.W., 561; 45 Wn., 594, 88 P., 1027; 72 F.2d 874; 136 A., 560, 105 Conn., 572; 208 N.W., 929, 202 Iowa, 422; 269 Mass. 401, 169 N.E., 268; 71 A.L.R., page 619; 23 A.J., page 784, Section 28; 34 F.2d 140. As to errorof Trial Court in holding that "The only way value andAgency can be proved is by proof inside the Corporation": 14 C.J., page 718, Section 1099 and Footnotes; 19 C.J. S., page 99, Section 756 and Footnotes; 75 S.C. 334, 55 S.E., 774; 90 S.C. 359, 73 S.E., 625; 10 R.C.L., page 913, Section 69. Messrs. Hendersons Salley, of Aiken, S.C. Counsel for Respondents, cite: As to Fraud and Deceit: 146 S.C. at page 404, 144 S.E., 82; 190 S.C. at page 395, 3 S.E.2d 38; 194 S.C. at page 476, 10 S.E.2d 3; 202 S.C. 384, 25 S.E.2d 243; 75 S.C. 338, at page 341; 177 S.C. pages 228, 230, 181 S.E., 56; 37 Ann. Cas., 1916-C, page 63, Annot., 75 Wn., 525. " Dealer's Talk": 101 S.C. 221, 85 S.E., 585; 107 S.C. 200, 92 S.E., 861; Fletcher's Cyc. Corp., Section 5586; 55 N.Y., 83; 272 N.Y.S., 189; 272 N.Y.S., 559; 93 F.2d 449 (C.C.A., N.Y., 1938); (Cal.), 166 P., 332; 101 N.E., 467, 207 N.Y., 587; 282 N.Y.S., 972, at page 978. Asto Agency: 202 S.C. 333, 24 S.E., 2d 873.
Third, Mr. Ward's allegedly false representations about the presence of a differential lock on the Case Wheel Loader cannot support a claim for fraud in the inducement because the absence of the lock was discoverable by lifting the floor mat (Dkt. No. 47-1 at 2), and Defendants "cannot rely upon misstatement of facts, if the truth is easily within his reach." King v. Oxford, 318 S.E.2d 125 (S.C. 1984) (citing Flowers v. Price, 3 S.E.2d 38, 39 (S.C. 1939)) (holding that evidence was insufficient to establish fraud as the plaintiff could have easily accessed facts needed to make an accurate valuation of the business transaction). Further, that the absence of the differential lock was easily discoverable and Defendants used the Wheel Loader for about two years before returning it to CNH suggests that the presence of the differential lock was not material to their decision to enter the contract.
Thus, that IFC relied on representations made therein is a fundamentally flawed proposition. Further, as Wirth points out, "one cannot rely on misstatements of facts if the truth is easily within reach," see Def.'s Mem. at 27 (citing Flowers v. Price, 3 S.E.2d 38, 39 (S.C. 1939)). This proposition is well-established as the law in South Carolina. See, e.g., Armstrong, supra, 621 S.E.2d at 375 (citing King v. Oxford, 282 S.C. 307, 312, 318 S.E.2d 125, 128 (Ct. App.1984)); see also West v. Gladney, 341 S.C. 127, 533 S.E.2d 334 (Ct. App. 2000).
laim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); 1A Barron Holtzoff, Federal Practice Procedure section 356 at 361 (Wright ed. 1960). The South Carolina Supreme Court has many times accepted the analysis of an actionable fraud as consisting of nine elements: (1) A representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) his intent that it should be acted upon by the person; (6) the hearer's ignorance of its falsity; (7) his reliance on its truth; (8) his right to rely thereon; (9) and his consequent and proximate injury. E.g., Jones v. Cooper, 234 S.C. 477, 109 S.E.2d 5 (1959); Mishoe v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 234 S.C. 182, 107 S.E.2d 43 (1958); Tallevast v. Herzog, 225 S.C. 563, 83 S.E.2d 204 (1954); Weatherford v. Home Finance Co., 225 S.C. 313, 82 S.E.2d 196 (1954); Flowers v. Price, 190 S.C. 392, 3 S.E.2d 38 (1939). See Parks v. Morris Homes Corp., 245 S.C. 461, 141 S.E.2d 129 (1965); Gomillion v. Forsythe, 218 S.C. 211, 62 S.E.2d 297, 53 A.L.R.2d 169 (1950).
In the light of this recent surge of judicial opinion to which the prestige of the American Law Institute has added further weight, it is reasonable to assume that Brooker v. Silverthorne will be narrowly construed in future cases. But see Flowers v. Price, 1939, 190 S.C. 392, 3 S.E.2d 38, involving a young boy who was cursed, where Brooker v. Silverthorne was followed. Nevertheless, if I felt that Rankin v. Sievern & Knoxville Railroad Co. and Brooker v. Silverthorne were controlling, I would so hold.
In civil cases, we require trial courts to go to great lengths to define the nine elements of fraud. See, e.g. , Mishoe v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. , 234 S.C. 182, 193, 107 S.E.2d 43, 49 (1958) (listing nine elements) (quoting Flowers v. Price , 190 S.C. 392, 395, 3 S.E.2d 38, 39 (1939) ). It is absurd to suggest that when fraud becomes the basis for a crime, it is no longer necessary to define the term.