Six Flags' construction and maintenance manager, Nelson Boyd, testified that the conveyor belt material was used as a runner and mat in the area to provide higher traction for the wet surface near the water ride. Six Flags' operations manager, Kenry Pierce, testified that he was not responsible for installing and maintaining the mat, but he "assume[d]" that it would be bolted down. See Flournoy v. Hosp. Auth. of Houston County, 232 Ga. App. 791, 792-793 ( 504 SE2d 198) (1998); Jet Food Stores, 226 Ga. App. at 553 (1). Valentin gave deposition testimony relating the incident and describing the sliding, mildewed condition of the mat on that date.
This evidence, combined with the expert testimony, is sufficient for a factfinder to infer that the steps were a hazardous condition of which the hotel had actual or constructive knowledge. Flournoy v. Hosp. Auth. of Houston County, 232 Ga. App. 791 ( 504 S.E.2d 198) (1998). Therefore, for purposes of summary judgment, plaintiff has satisfied the first prong of the Robinson test.
This evidence, combined with the expert testimony, is sufficient for a fact finder to infer that the steps were a hazardous condition of which West had actual or constructive knowledge. Flournoy v. Hospital Auth. of Houston County, 232 Ga. App. 791 ( 504 S.E.2d 198) (1998). Therefore, for purposes of summary judgment, plaintiff has satisfied the first prong of the Robinson test.
In short, there was no reason that defendants should have discovered the defective positioning of the ladder against the wall. Compare Flournoy v. Hosp. Auth. of Houston County, 232 Ga. App. 791 ( 504 S.E.2d 198) (1998). Accordingly, the court properly concluded that defendants lacked actual or constructive knowledge of the defect.
Id. 182-183. As to the second prong, the fact that Rutherford had walked into the store once does not as a matter of law give her actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard she faced walking out of the store directly onto the steep ramp. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Kentucky Fried Chicken, 248 Ga. App. 245, 246 (1) ( 545 SE2d 375) (2001); Flournoy v. Hosp. Auth. of Houston County, 232 Ga. App. 791, 793 ( 504 SE2d 198) (1998); Hatcher v. City of Albany, 147 Ga. App. 843, 845 (2) ( 250 SE2d 537) (1978). The rule imputing knowledge of a danger to a person who has successfully negotiated [an alleged dangerous condition] before applies only to cases involving a static condition that is "readily discernible" to a person exercising reasonable care for his own safety.
Id. at 680; compare also Jackson v. Waffle House, 245 Ga. App. 371, 374 (2) ( 537 SE2d 188) (2000) (evidence presented that invitee had never traversed the area of the parking lot in which she fell). Compare Flournoy v. Hosp. Auth. c., 232 Ga. App. 791, 792-793 ( 504 SE2d 198) (1998) (fall resulted from a combination of the slope of the ramp, the fact that the nonskid coating had worn down, and the fact that the ramp was wet). Compare Freyer v. Silver, 234 Ga. App. 243, 244 ( 507 SE2d 7) (1998) (invitee "couldn't see" slant in pavement because it was obscured by a shadow).
Further, "[g]iven that defendant used the ramp continuously, it can be inferred that defendant had actual or constructive knowledge" that the concrete was bare. Flournoy v. Hosp. Auth. of Houston County, 232 Ga. App. 791, 792 ( 504 SE2d 198) (1998). The danger allegedly posed by the entryway resulted from a combination of the moist bare concrete, the slope of the ramp, and the presence of an elderly man having trouble opening the door.
However, there is evidence from which a jury could find that the Walkers at least had constructive knowledge of the defects because the defects were construction defects, because the defects amounted to code violations, or because the defects could have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable care in inspecting the deck. See Freyer, supra; Murray v. West Building Materials of Ga., 243 Ga. App. 834, 835 ( 534 S.E.2d 204) (2000) (physical precedent only); see generally Hardeman v. Spires, 232 Ga. App. 694, 695 ( 503 S.E.2d 588) (1998); Flournoy v. Hospital Authority of Houston County, 232 Ga. App. 791, 792 ( 504 S.E.2d 198) (1998). The trial court is correct that an owner is not liable when he and the licensee have equal knowledge of the property's dangerous condition.
Given this evidence, a question of fact remained as to whether the plaintiff had equal knowledge of the hazard allegedly posed by "a combination of the slope of the ramp, the fact that the non-skid coating had worn down, and the fact that the ramp was wet." 232 Ga. App. 791 ( 504 S.E.2d 198) (1998). Id. at 792-793.
Matjoulis v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp., 226 Ga. App. 459 (1), 486 S.E.2d 684 (1997). Accord Flournoy v. Hosp. Auth. of Houston County, 232 Ga. App. 791 ( 504 S.E.2d 198) (1998). The record reveals that Air Park was developed in 1979 or 1980 by Mathis and McLaughlin. William R. McGrath was the first person to purchase a lot in the subdivision.