In Florida, governmental defendants have a common law "home venue privilege" to be sued in the county where they maintain their principal headquarters. Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Clay County Util. Auth., 802 So.2d 1190, 1192 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (citing Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Triple "A" Enters., Inc., 387 So.2d 940, 942 (Fla. 1980)). The primary purpose of this rule is to promote the orderly and uniform handling of litigation against governmental entities and to help minimize expenditures of public funds and manpower.

Governmental defendants in Florida have a common law "home venue privilege" to be sued in the county where they maintain their principal headquarters. See Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Triple "A" Enter., Inc., 387 So.2d 940, 942 (Fla. 1980). Absent waiver or application of an identified exception, the home venue privilege appears to be an absolute right. See, e.g., Carlile v. Game Fresh Water Fish Comm'n, 354 So.2d 362, 366 (Fla. 1977); Triple "A", 387 So.2d at 942; Dep't of Cmty. Aff. v. Holmes County, 668 So.2d 1096, 1102 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (citing Navarro v. Barnett Bank of West Florida, 543 So.2d 304 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)).

The home venue privilege provides that, absent waiver or exception, venue in a suit against the State, or an agency or subdivision of the State, is proper only in the county in which the State, or the agency or subdivision of the State, maintains its principal headquarters. Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Triple "A" Enters., Inc., 387 So.2d 940, 942 (Fla. 1980); Carlile v. Game Fresh Water Fish Comn'n, 354 So.2d 362, 363-64 (Fla. 1977). The circuit court declined to apply the home venue privilege and the district court affirmed.

In a civil action against the state or one of its agencies, the Florida common law home venue privilege provides that venue is proper in the county where the agency maintains its principal headquarters. Florida Public Service Commission v. Triple "A" Enterprises, Inc., 387 So.2d 940, 942 (Fla. 1980); Carlile v. Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission, 354 So.2d 362, 365 (Fla. 1977); Levy County School Board v. Bowdoin, 607 So.2d 479, 481 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Department of Transportation v. Robinson, 424 So.2d 883, 884 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). The home venue privilege is long standing and controls in most situations, but it is subject to two exceptions.

An exception to this general rule is the "sword-wielder" doctrine, which "applies only where direct judicial protection is sought from an unlawful invasion of a constitutional right of the plaintiff, directly threatened in the county where the suit is instituted." Florida Public Service Commission v. Triple "A" Enterprises, 387 So.2d 940, 942 (Fla. 1980). The test is whether the state is the original sword-wielder, and the plaintiff's suit a shield against the state's thrust. If so, a suit may be maintained in the county where the blow has been or is about to be struck.

In determining whether the sword-wielder doctrine is applicable, "[t]he test is whether the state is the original sword-wielder, and the plaintiffs suit a shield against the state's thrust. If so, a suit may be maintained in the county where the blow has been or is about to be struck." Nyberg v. Snover, 604 So.2d 894, 895 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (citing Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Triple "A", 387 So.2d 940, 942 (Fla. 1980)). Furthermore, "the sword-wielder exception is applicable only where the official action unlawfully infringes on the plaintiffs constitutional rights."

Addressing the venue issue, we hold that the circuit court erred in denying DCA's motion to transfer venue to the circuit court in Leon County, where DCA's headquarters are located. Venue in a civil action brought against a state agency properly lies in the county of the agency's principal headquarters. Florida Public Service Comm'n v. Triple "A" Enterprises, Inc., 387 So.2d 940 (Fla. 1980); Carlile v. Game and Fresh Water Fish Comm'n, 354 So.2d 362 (Fla. 1977); Smith v. Williams, 160 Fla. 580, 35 So.2d 844 (Fla. 1948). In the absence of waiver, the venue privilege is an absolute right. Navarro v. Barnett Bank of West Florida, 543 So.2d 304 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).

"Absent waiver or exception in civil actions brought against the state, its agencies or subdivisions, venue properly lies in the county of its principal headquarters." Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Triple "A" Enters. Inc., 387 So.2d 940, 942 (Fla. 1980). A waiver of the state's general venue privilege occurs where a real and imminent deprivation of the claimant's constitutional rights can be shown. 387 So.2d at 942; Board of Medical Examiners v. Kadivar, 482 So.2d 501 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986).

Although this Court has stated that there is no single test to determine whether the requirements of due process have been met, see Hadley, 411 So.2d at 187, “[t]he fundamental requirements of due process are satisfied by reasonable notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard.” Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Triple “A” Enter., Inc., 387 So.2d 940, 943 (Fla.1980) (citing Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So.2d 266 (Fla.1973) ; Powell v. State of Ala., 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) ; Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 50 S.Ct. 299, 74 L.Ed. 904 (1930) ). Further, due process cannot be compromised “on the footing of convenience or expediency.”

¶ 13 We agree with the trial court that, under Florida law, venue was only proper in Broward County. As the Florida Supreme Court has stated, "[V]enue in civil actions brought against the state or one of its agencies or subdivisions, absent waiver or exception, properly lies in the county where the state, agency, or subdivision, maintains its principal headquarters." Carlile v. Game Fresh Water Fish Comm'n, 354 So.2d 362, 363-64 (Fla. 1978); see also Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Triple "A" Enters., Inc., 387 So.2d 940, 942 (Fla. 1980) ("Absent waiver or exception in civil actions brought against the state, its agencies or subdivisions, venue properly lies in the county of its principal headquarters."); Lake County v. Friedel, 387 So.2d 514, 514-15 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1980) (recognizing a county's "common law privilege, as a political subdivision of the state, to be prosecuted in a tort action only in [that county]"). While there are exceptions to this rule, see, e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Grice, 438 So.2d 392, 394-95 (Fla. 1983), Trillium has not argued that they apply.