United Artists Corp. v. Bd. of Censors, 189 Tenn. 397, 225 S.W.2d 550 (1949); Nashville, C. St. L. Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 53 S.Ct. 345, 77 L.Ed. 730. The license to exhibit film without the transfer or purchase of such film would be valueless. Together they are one transaction and constitute a sale of tangible personal property. United Artists Corp. v. Taylor, 273 N.Y. 334, 7 N.E.2d 254 (1937); Florida Ass'n of Broadcasters, et al. v. Kirk, et. al., 264 So.2d 437 (Fla.Dist.Ct. of Appeals, First Dist. 1972); Id. cert. den., Fla., 268 So.2d 534. A foreign Corporation is considered to be "doing business" within this State when it transports its property into the State and uses such property within the State, after it has come to rest here.

Together they are one transaction. . . ."); Am. Television Co. v. Hervey, 253 Ark. 1010, 490 S.W.2d 796, 799 (1973)("[T]he right to use property cannot be separated from the property itself and the `right' spoken of by appellant would have no value except for the use of the tape or film — the two cannot be separated."); see also Am. Multi-Cinema, 910 P.2d at 66 ("[T]he possession of almost any item of personal property is of little value unless such possession is accompanied by the intangible right to use that item for a useful purpose."); Fla. Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Kirk, 264 So.2d 437, 438 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1972) ("Every purchase or rental of property is the acquisition of the right to use that property for its intended purposes."). Thus, the worth of the copyright and any payment for it is dependent upon its being transmitted with the corporeal film reel.

Likewise, practically every piece of property subject to rent or sale is a product of someone's original idea and the rental thereof is for the purpose of using it. American TV Co., 253 Ark. at 1018, 490 S.W.2d at 801 (quoting from Florida Association of Broadcasters v. Kirk, 264 So.2d 437 (Fla. App. 1972)). The court then concluded that to separate the right to use from the possession of the videotape would create an impossible tax situation and held the sales tax to be applicable. See, also, Mt. Mansfield Television v. Commr. of Taxes, 133 Vt. 284, 336 A.2d 193 (1975).

The severability argument is not a new one in sales tax cases. It has been rejected in a line of cases where those who rent motion picture films from producers have argued that the intellectual property or the right to use the copy transmitted for commercial exhibition should be severed from the tangible copy of the film. See, e.g., Boswell v. Paramount Television Sales, Inc., 291 Ala. 490, 282 So.2d 892 (1973); Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Tax Commissioner, 176 Conn. 604, 410 A.2d 457 (1979); Florida Association of Broadcasters v. Kirk, 264 So.2d 437 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); United Artists Corp. v. Taylor, 273 N.Y. 334, 7 N.E.2d 254 (1937); Crescent Amusement Co. v. Carson, 187 Tenn. 112, 213 S.W.2d 27 (1948). In the latter case the court reasoned that

A final consideration is whether the transaction can be achieved without the intervention of a tangible medium. Returning to the computer program example discussed in Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, supra, there can be no taxable transfer when a program is transmitted by the seller to the buyer's computer electronically, as by transmission through a telephone line. Motion pictures, on the other hand, cannot exist without the tangible celluloid medium, and therefore courts have uniformly subjected their rental value to use tax. See, Florida Assn. of Broadcasters v. Kirk, 264 So.2d 437 (Fla.Dist.App. 1972); Crescent Amusement Co. v. Carson, 187 Tenn. 112, 213 S.W.2d 27 (1948). In our view, the question presented in the instant case is extremely close, and we do not find the resolution easy. Intangible property, such as information, may be transferred with or without the use of a tangible medium.

Most courts which have decided the issue have held the transactions are taxable. See Boswell v. Paramount Television Sales, Inc., 291 Ala. 490, 282 So.2d 892 (1973); American Television Company, Inc. v. Hervey, 253 Ark. 1010, 490 S.W.2d 796 (1973); Florida Association of Broadcasters v. Kirk, 264 So.2d 437 (Fla.App. 1972); Mount Mansfield Television, Inc. v. Vermont Commissioner of Taxes, 133 Vt. 284, 336 A.2d 193 (1975). At least one court has held license agreements are not taxable as a transfer of tangible personal property.

The court found more appealing the former view, citing more recent decisions. In accord, Boswell v. Paramount Television Sales, Inc., 291 Ala. 490 ( 282 So.2d 892) (1973); American Television Co., Inc. v. Hervey, 253 Ark. 1010, 1014 ( 490 S.W.2d 796) (1973) ("the right to use property cannot be separated from the property itself and the `right' spoken of by appellant would have no value except for the use of the tape or film — the two cannot be separated."); Florida Assn. of Broadcasters v. Kirk, 264 So.2d 437, 438 (Fla.Ct.App. 1972) ("Every purchase or rental of property is the acquisition of the right to use that property for its intended purposes. Likewise, practically every piece of property subject to rent or sale is a product of someone's original idea and the rental thereof is for the purpose of using it."); Saenger Realty Corp. v. Grosjean, 194 La. 470 (193 S 710) (1940) (interpreting a statutory definition of "tangible property" which is identical to the definition in Georgia's Sales and Use Tax and finding that "[t]he license to exhibit without transfer of possession would be valueless," therefore the rental of film is one transaction under the Act); and Crescent Amusement Co. v. Carson, 187 Tenn. 112, 116, 117 ( 213 S.W.2d 27) (1948) (interpreting the Tennessee statute, which served as a model for Georgia's Act, and finding that "[t]here is scarcely to be found any article susceptible to sale or rent that is not the result of an idea, genius, skill and labor applied to a physical substance" and that "[

Cases cited by the Department of Taxes, on the other hand, stand for the proposition that it is a finished product (video tape or film) which is the subject of the transaction and that a license to exhibit or broadcast without the tangible finished product itself would be valueless. See Boswell v. Paramount Television Sales, Inc., 291 Ala. 490, 282 So.2d 892 (1973); Florida Association of Broadcasters v. Kirk, 264 So.2d 437 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.), cert. denied, 268 So.2d 534 (Fla. 1972); Crescent Amusement Co. v. Carson, 187 Tenn. 112, 213 S.W.2d 27 (1948). To the extent that these cases can be extracted from their singular factual and statutory contexts and reduced to abstract legal holdings, we must recognize the existence of a genuine split of authority on the issue before us. The opposing theories are not difficult to conceptualize; the choices are clear.

It is obvious we do not agree with this argument since we have already pointed out that there is a difference in the definition of sale in the use tax act and the 1941 sales tax act. No need exists for the General Assembly to enact additional legislation for the two acts now complement each other. We like the reasoning of the Florida court (District Court of Appeal, First District) in the case of Florida Association of Broadcasters, et al v. Claude R. Kirk, Jr., et al, as and constituting the State Revenue Commission, 264 So.2d 437, where the same argument was presented. There, appellants sought review of a declaratory judgment concerning their liability for sales and use taxes arising out of their use of films and transcriptions during the year 1969.

October 18, 1972. Certiorari denied. 264 So.2d 437. ROBERTS, C.J., and CARLTON, BOYD and McCAIN, JJ., concur.