Opinion
NO. 2016-CA-001296-MR
06-23-2017
EDWARD H. FLINT APPELLANT v. COACH HOUSE, INC. APPELLEES
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Edward H. Flint, pro se Louisville, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Robert T. Watson Chris J. Gadansky Louisville, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE A.C. MCKAY CHAUVIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 15-CI-000571 OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: COMBS, D. LAMBERT AND NICKELL, JUDGES. NICKELL, JUDGE: This appeal represents the latest of more than two dozen filed by Edward H. Flint, pro se, since 2009 involving Coach House, Inc., its Board of Directors, management company, residents and/or attorneys. After carefully reviewing the record, we affirm.
A very recent Opinion indicated Flint had filed twenty-six appeals in this Court concerning these parties. See Flint v. Coach House, Inc., 2015-CA-000827, 2017 WL 1379779 (Ky. App. April 14, 2017, unpublished). Flint's unilateral feud has spawned countless lawsuits and appeals across all levels of state and federal courts and continues unabated despite numerous warnings and imposition of sanctions by this and other Courts. Thus, we are hesitant to include a specific number of appeals as such may well be obsolete before this Opinion is rendered.
Following a failed bid to be elected to Coach House's Board of Directors in 2007, Flint began his decade-long campaign against Coach House, its Board of Directors, and any other entity he deemed sympathetic to or aligned with Coach House. The instant appeal is the second arising from an action filed in early 2015 related to Flint's claims the Board of Directors conspired against him to prevent his election to the Board for the 2015 term. Shortly thereafter, Coach House simultaneously filed an answer to the complaint, a motion for a protective order staying discovery, and a motion seeking dismissal. Approximately seventeen days after filing the complaint, Flint filed a lengthy and rambling motion seeking recusal by the trial judge. The trial court scheduled a hearing on Coach House's motions for April 15, 2015, and set specific dates for responses to the opposing motions to be filed. Each party timely tendered responses opposing the relief sought by the other.
On March 3, 2015, the trial court denied Flint's motion for recusal, and Flint timely appealed the denial. By Opinion and Order rendered on December 4, 2015, this Court dismissed the appeal as being improperly brought from an interlocutory order and, upon concluding the appeal was frivolous, awarded sanctions against Flint. The Supreme Court of Kentucky subsequently denied Flint's petition seeking discretionary review.
Flint v. Coach House, Inc., 2015-CA-000391, 2015 WL 7810069 (Ky. App. December 4, 2015, unpublished).
Shortly after filing his first notice of appeal, Flint moved the trial court to cancel the April 15, 2015, hearing, alleging the failure to do so would constitute a violation of the civil rules. In response, Coach House argued the taking of an interlocutory appeal would, at most, divest the trial court of the ability to rule on the precise question that is the subject of such appeal. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Flint's request. Based on Flint's behavior at the hearing, he was held in contempt and sentenced to serve twenty-four hours in the Jefferson County Jail.
No video recording of the hearing was designated for inclusion in the record on appeal. The trial court's contempt order references Flint's "blatant and willful disregard of the Court's directive" as a basis for its finding of contempt.
The record is unclear whether the April 15, 2015, hearing occurred, but a notice of submission for final adjudication was tendered on April 17, 2015. No further action was taken in the matter until the trial court entered an order on August 24, 2016, granting Coach House's motion to dismiss the action and denying all other motions as moot. Flint timely appealed the dismissal to this Court.
As an initial matter, we note Flint's two-page brief falls woefully short of compliance with CR 76.12(4)(c) as it contains no introduction; no statement concerning oral argument; no statement of points and authorities; no statement regarding preservation of his alleged errors; and includes passing reference to only one state and one federal statute and "Cannons (sic) 1 and 2 and 3" as legal "support" for his position. Disregarding the severe defects in form, we have carefully reviewed the record and determined no error occurred. We have further concluded the instant action is frivolous, being completely devoid of any factual or legal merit. Because of Flint's continued refusal to heed the warnings of this—or any—Court regarding prosecuting such actions, increased procedural sanctions are warranted pursuant to CR 73.02(4) which shall be imposed by separate Order entered contemporaneously with this Opinion.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. --------
As to the merits of the appeal, it appears Flint is attempting to challenge the trial court's refusal to recuse itself from the matter. He reiterates his unsupported belief the trial judge is "corrupt and being brought (sic)," thereby continuing the vilifying bluster he has utilized throughout his campaign against Coach House, which now extends to any member of the judiciary who issues a ruling Flint interprets as unfavorable to his position on any matter, no matter how trivial. The rambling and delusional tone of his brief in this matter makes discerning his arguments nearly impossible. What is clear from the brief is no challenge is raised as to the merits of the order dismissing his action. Rather, we believe Flint is alleging a jurisdictional defect in the proceedings. However, no such defect exists.
Flint is laboring under the mistaken belief his failed interlocutory appeal should have stayed all proceedings in the action below.
Generally, an appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed further in the underlying case. An interlocutory appeal, however, generally only deprives the trial court of the authority to act further in the matter that is subject of the appeal, and the trial court is not divested of the authority to act in matters unrelated to the appeal.Commonwealth v. Bailey, 71 S.W.3d 73, 84 (Ky. 2002), as amended (Apr. 29, 2002) (internal footnotes omitted). Flint's initial appeal challenged nothing but Judge Chauvin's denial of his motion to recuse, leaving the court jurisdiction to proceed with matters unrelated to that challenge. Nevertheless, in an abundance of caution, the trial court made no rulings of any sort until well after the Opinion of this Court was rendered dismissing the appeal as frivolous. In any case, the trial court acted well within its jurisdiction in dismissing Flint's action and we discern no error.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is AFFIRMED.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Edward H. Flint, pro se
Louisville, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Robert T. Watson
Chris J. Gadansky
Louisville, Kentucky