Plaintiff and his wife commenced this action against defendant, the owner of the property where plaintiff was working, alleging causes of action in common-law negligence and based upon violation of Labor Law §§ 200, 240 (1), and § 241 (6). On a prior appeal, we concluded that plaintiffs were not entitled to partial summary judgment on the Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action and granted defendant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing that cause of action ( Flihan v. Cornell Univ., 237 A.D.2d 921). Thereafter, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the remaining causes of action.
Memorandum: Plaintiff seeks to recover damages for injuries he sustained when the rear gate of a dump truck gave way and released 10 tons of stone onto him. Supreme Court properly granted the motion of third-party defendant for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied plaintiff's cross motion for partial summary judgment on liability under Labor Law § 240 Lab. (1) and § 241 Lab. (6). We reject plaintiff's contention that the accident involved an elevation-related hazard covered by Labor Law § 240 Lab. (1) (see, Tillman v. Triou's Custom Homes, 253 A.D.2d 254 [decided Mar. 19, 1999]; Phelan v. State of New York, 238 A.D.2d 882, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 812; Flihan v. Cornell Univ., 237 A.D.2d 921; cf., Orr v. Christa Constr., 206 A.D.2d 881). We also reject plaintiff's contention that 12 NYCRR 23-1.5 (c) is specific enough to support the Labor Law § 241 Lab. (6) claim (see, Ozzimo v. H.E.S., Inc., 249 A.D.2d 912; Dann v. City of Syracuse, 231 A.D.2d 855; Williams v. White Haven Mem. Park, 227 A.D.2d 923; contra, Gonzalez v. United Parcel Serv., 249 A.D.2d 210; McCormack v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 233 A.D.2d 203).
Those special hazards, however, "do not encompass any and all perils that may be connected in some tangential way with the effects of gravity" ( Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 N.Y.2d 494, 501; see also, Rodriguez v. Tietz Ctr. for Nursing Care, 84 N.Y.2d 841, 843-844). We conclude that an incident involving objects falling from the bed of a flatbed truck is not the type of special, elevation-related hazard contemplated by Labor Law § 240 (1) ( see, Flihan v. Cornell Univ., 237 A.D.2d 921; DePuy v. Sibley, Lindsay Curr Co., 225 A.D.2d 1069; Malecki v. Wal-Mart Stores, 222 A.D.2d 1010; Colopy v. William C. McCombs, Inc., 203 A.D.2d 920). Claimants' reliance upon Orr v. Christa Constr. ( 206 A.D.2d 881) is misplaced because the issue in that case was whether claimant was engaged in a protected activity ( see, Flihan v Cornell Univ., supra). Because claimants failed to allege the violation of a specific provision of the Industrial Code in either the claim or the bill of particulars, the Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action should have been dismissed ( see, Orr v. Christa Constr., supra, at 882).