ts); Eads v. Sayen, 281 F.2d 791 (7th Cir. 1960) (affirming dismissal of lawsuit because airline pilot association was a necessary party to the action but could not be joined because unincorporated association could not be sued as an entity under Illinois law); Jenkins v. Reneau, 697 F.2d 160 (6th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff's sister was an indispensable party to legal malpractice action because she was a party to the contract for legal services); Allen ex rel. Allen v. Devine, 726 F. Supp. 2d 240, 256-57 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (dismissing constructive trust claim in fraud and RICO action because joinder of indispensable party—who held the assets at issue in his possession—destroyed diversity jurisdiction); R. J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Hous. Auth., 92 F.R.D. 17, 21-22 (D. Mont. 1981) (contracting company was necessary party to action against tribal housing authority when the company had "an interest in the property attached and should be joined in order to adequately protect that interest"); Fletcher Aircraft Co. v. Bond, 77 F.R.D. 47 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (transferee of Federal Aviation Administration Aircraft Type Certificate was an indispensable party in action against FAA employees for injunction and declaratory judgment contending that transfer of the certificate to another corporation was not proper); Ford v. Adkins, 39 F. Supp. 472 (E.D. Ill. 1941) (property owner that executed warranty deed regarding gas and oil rights twenty years prior to the action was not an indispensable party). Put simply, Ms. Sullivan does not demonstrate why Joseph must be joined in this action when Ms. Sullivan is already protecting his interest in the Trust.
Rule 19 and the joinder of indispensable parties arise from the concept of due process. See R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Housing Authority, 92 F.R.D. 17, 21 (D. Mont. 1981) ("[A] court must protect the interests of the parties not before it to avoid possible prejudicial effect; failure of a court to protect those interests by joinder may amount to a violation of due process."); Fletcher Aircraft Co. v. Bond, 77 F.R.D. 47, 51 (C.D. Cal 1977) ("It is a firmly established procedural maxim that a judgment which substantially affects the rights of a party who is not joined violates due process."). ¶12 Indispensable parties are "those without whom the action cannot proceed, and necessary parties are those who have an interest in the controversy but whose interests are separable and will not be directly affected by a decree rendered in their absence, which does full justice between the parties before the court."