We recognize that this holding is in tension with our current approach to assessing whether the trial court erred by not giving certain instructions to the jury based on the text of statutes requiring corroboration. Tellingly, Herrington cites Fleming v. State , 269 Ga. 245, 247 (2), 497 S.E.2d 211 (1998), in support of the proposition that no corroboration instruction need be given where there is sufficient corroborating evidence. Fleming dealt with whether the trial court was required to give an accomplice-corroboration instruction requested by the defendant.

We acknowledge that this holding stands at odds with precedent from this Court establishing that there is no error in declining to give an instruction on accomplice corroboration, even if such a charge is requested, where the accomplice's testimony is in fact corroborated by independent evidence. See Fleming v. State, 269 Ga. 245(2), 497 S.E.2d 211 (1998) (no reversible error in trial court's failure to give requested instruction on accomplice corroboration where State relied in part on defendant's statements to police); Hall v. State, 241 Ga. 252(7), 244 S.E.2d 833 (1978) (no error in declining defendant's request to charge on accomplice corroboration where State relied on testimony of other witnesses as well); see also Jackson v. State, 294 Ga. 34, 36(2), 751 S.E.2d 63 (2013) (stating in dicta that an accomplice corroboration instruction is not required, even when it is requested, where the accomplice's testimony is in fact independently corroborated). This line of precedent appears to have originated with Hall v. State, supra, in which this Court held that the trial court had not erred in refusing to give the requested instruction, on the ground that “there were other witnesses to the crime so that the State did not rely solely on [the alleged accomplice's] testimony” and thus OCGA § 24–4–8 was inapplicable

See Turner v. State, 267 Ga. 149, 151(2) ( 476 S.E.2d 252) (1996).King v. State, 273 Ga. 258, 263 (12) (c) ( 539 S.E.2d 783) (2000); Jenkins v. State, 269 Ga. 282, 286(4) ( 498 S.E.2d 502) (1998); Fleming v. State, 269 Ga. 245, 248(5) ( 497 S.E.2d 211) (1998). Not until appeal does Palmer argue that reviewing those records would have allowed her to determine whether similarly-situated members of another race were seated on the jury.

Thus, evidence of the burglary was admissible to show appellant had access to a weapon similar to the weapon used to kill Mr. Van Allen. See Fleming v. State, 269 Ga. 245(7), 497 S.E.2d 211 (1998). Accordingly, this enumeration of error cannot be sustained.

Another witness testified to seeing appellant with a pearl-handled gun sometime before the murders. Thus, evidence of the burglary was admissible to show appellant had access to a weapon similar to the weapon used to kill Mr. Van Allen. See Fleming v. State, 269 Ga. 245 (7) (497 SE2d 211) (1998). Accordingly, this enumeration of error cannot be sustained.

This Court has repeatedly held since Ross that a defendant's completing a form requesting the appointment of counsel does not, in itself, cause the attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel; however, in none of those decisions is it clear whether or not the completing of the form involved the participation of a judge. Fleming v. State, 269 Ga. 245, 249 (9) ( 497 SE2d 211) (1998); Raulerson v. State, 268 Ga. 623, 628 (2) (b) ( 491 SE2d 791) (1997); Turner v. State, 267 Ga. 149, 156 (5) ( 476 SE2d 252) (1996). In one case in which this Court found that the completion of such a form was insufficient to cause the attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Court noted as follows:

Holmes v. State, 269 Ga. 124, 126 ( 498 S.E.2d 732) (1998). See Fleming v. State 269 Ga. 245, 248, ( 497 S.E.2d 211) (1998); Perry v. State, 264 Ga. 524 (2) ( 448 S.E.2d 444) (1994). 6. Smith raises several contentions concerning his convictions and sentences for voluntary manslaughter and felony murder.

[Cits.]" Fleming v. State, 269 Ga. 245, 247 (2) ( 497 S.E.2d 211) (1998). Kelly admitted his involvement to the police, including his and Ms. Spann's plans, his role in dropping off Horne and Piazzi and meeting them afterwards, and his full expectation that the victim would be dead. Furthermore, Kelly himself took the stand and admitted his presence during the conversations of his co-indictees, but claimed that he was not actively involved and was surprised that the murder actually occurred.

Considering the totality of the circumstances, Bryant's commission of the earlier theft "was clearly relevant . . . to show where the murder weapon came from." Fleming v. State, 269 Ga. 245, 248(7) ( 497 S.E.2d 211) (1998). See also King v. State, 230 Ga. 581, 582(2) ( 198 S.E.2d 305) (1973); Hall v. State, 163 Ga. App. 515, 517(5) ( 295 S.E.2d 194) (1982).

Consequently, these enumerations are moot and need not be addressed. See Fleming v. State, 269 Ga. 245, 247(3), 497 S.E.2d 211 (1998) (concluding that the appellant's enumerations are moot since they pertained to an offense for which he was not convicted); Farley v. State, 314 Ga.App. 660, 664(1)(b), n. 11, 725 S.E.2d 794 (2012) (we need not address an appellant's challenge concerning a merged offense for which he was never convicted and sentenced).When reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress, this court's responsibility is to ensure that there was a substantial basis for the decision.