Opinion
Civil Action No. 3: 04-CV-1303-B.
March 29, 2005
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the Court are the following motions: (1) The Motion of Defendant Stuart Oring ("Oring") to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (doc. 8), (2) the Motion of Oring to Dismiss for Forum Non Conveniens (doc. 6), and (3) the Motion of Oring to Dismiss for Improper Venue (doc. 7), all filed July 22, 2004. The Plaintiffs, Gary and Carlene Fleming, (the "Flemings") have filed no response to the Motions. For the reasons explained below, after reviewing the motions and the Defendant's uncontroverted affidavit, the Court GRANTS Oring's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and DENIES his motions to dismiss for improper venue and forum non conveniens as moot.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This is a diversity case arising under Section 2.501 of the Texas Family Code. (Complaint at 2). The Flemings filed this lawsuit against Stuart Oring on June 15, 2004, seeking "recovery and reimbursement of amounts paid by the [Plaintiffs] to provide food, shelter, clothing, medical care, and other necessities for the support, care, and maintenance of Mary Fleming Oring ("Mary Oring"), the [deceased] wife of the Defendant." ( Id.).
According to the Flemings, Stuart Oring was married Mary Oring and lived cohabitated with her from their wedding date in August 1957 until "on or about March 5, 2001, when Mary Oring suffered a heart attack that required a surgical bypass operation." Following this surgery, because of the serious deterioration in Mary Oring's health, the Flemings allege that they "provided financial support to Mary Oring to pay for her medications, medical supplies, other medical care, nurse's aid care, and her day-to-day physical needs such as food, clothing, diapers, bathing, meal preparation, transportation, physical therapy, and all insurance and Medicare deductibles, and all other uninsured and unreimbursed health care expenses." Ultimately, the Flemings allege that they moved Mary Oring to their DeSoto, Texas home on January 5, 2002, and that she remained living with them in Texas until her death on March 28, 2004. ( Id. at 4). During the relevant time period, the Flemings allege that Stuart Oring "wholly failed to provide any financial support for his wife," ( Id.) in violation of section 2.501 of the Texas Family Code, which provides that, under Texas law, "[e]ach spouse has the duty to support the other spouse," and that "[a] spouse who fails to discharge the duty of support is liable to any person who provides necessaries to the spouse to whom support is owed." Id. The Flemings now seek reimbursement of "$350,000.00 in out-of-pocket expenditures for food, clothing, diapers, shelter, nursing care, healthcare, and transportation costs provided to Mary Oring by the Plaintiffs." ( Id.).
While the Flemings admit that Stuart Oring periodically contacted his wife in Texas, he failed to financially support her, and allegedly spent Mary Oring's Social Security benefits.
In response to the Flemings' Complaint, Stuart Oring filed motions to dismiss on three separate grounds — personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and forum non conveniens — on July 22, 2004. On August 25, 2004, the Court granted the Plaintiffs' motion for extension of time to respond to the Defendant's motions to dismiss, authorizing the Plaintiffs to "conduct a limited deposition of the Defendant as to the issues raised in the Dismissal Motions . . . and Affidavit filed by the Defendant therein. In that Order, the Court specifically mandated that the Defendant's deposition be taken no later than September 30, 2004, and ordered the Plaintiffs to file their responses and controverting affidavits within twenty (20) days of the completion of Stuart Oring's deposition. On September 27, 2004, Stuart Oring moved to quash the Plaintiffs' deposition notice which sought to take his deposition in Dallas on September 30, 2004. Although the Plaintiffs allegedly served the notice on the Defendant's counsel via facsimile on September 24, 2004, a Friday, counsel claimed that he did not become aware of it until September 27, 2004, the following Monday. The Court referred the Motion to Magistrate Judge Stickney on September 30, 2004, and, after no response was filed by the Plaintiffs, Judge Stickney granted the motion to quash on October 21, 2004. The Court has not received any notification that there has been any further effort to take Mr. Oring's deposition, and almost five months have passed since the September 30, 2004 deadline that the Court set for the taking of that deposition. Nor has the Plaintiff filed a response to any of the motions to dismiss.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard.
The plaintiff bears the burden of proof to show that a nonresident defendant is subject to the Court's jurisdiction. Gundle Lining Constr. Corp. v. Adams County Asphalt, Inc., 85 F.3d 201, 204 (5th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). Two preconditions must be met: (1) the nonresident must be amenable to service of process under Texas's long-arm statute; and (2) the assertion of jurisdiction over the nonresident must comport with the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. Jones v. Petty-Ray Geophysical, Geosource, Inc., 954 F.2d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1992). Because Texas's long-arm statute has been held to co-extend with the limits of due process, the Court need only determine whether jurisdiction over Stuart Oring is constitutionally permissible. Id. at 1067-68 (citing Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Tex. 1990)). To meet the federal constitutional test of due process, two elements must be satisfied: (1) the defendant must have purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of the forum state by establishing "minimum contacts" with that state such that it should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there; and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant must not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Jones, 954 F.2d at 1068.
"The Court may determine the jurisdictional issue by receiving affidavits, interrogatories, depositions, oral testimony, or any combination of the recognized methods of discovery." Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th Cir. 1985).
The "minimum contacts" test can be met by contacts giving rise to either general or personal jurisdiction. Gundle, 85 F.3d at 205. Specific jurisdiction exists when the nonresident defendant's contacts with the forum state arise from, or are directly related to, the cause of action. Id. (citation omitted). "General personal jurisdiction is found when the nonresident defendant's contacts with the forum state, even if unrelated to the cause of action, are continuous, systematic, and substantial." Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, 182 F.3d 291, 295 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). In either context, the Court considers the totality of the circumstances in conducting the minimum contacts analysis; no single factor is determinative. Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th Cir. 1985). The analysis ultimately reduces to whether the nonresident defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in this state, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of Texas law. Id. at 1191.
B. General Jurisdiction.
The Plaintiffs fail to make any jurisdictional allegations other than the statement that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case via diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Because the Plaintiffs have not alleged that Stuart Oring had continuous and systematic contacts with Texas outside of the Plaintiffs' claims, the prerequisite for general jurisdiction, see Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415-16, the Court declines to address the question of general jurisdiction.
C. Specific Jurisdiction.
As Plaintiffs, the Flemings bear the burden of demonstrating the Court's jurisdiction over Stuart Oring in the face of his motion to dismiss. Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 649 (5th Cir. 1994). Because the Court is ruling on the Defendant's motion to dismiss without an evidentiary hearing, the Flemings may satisfy their burden by presenting a prima facie case for jurisdiction. Felch v. Transportes Lar-Mex SA DE CV., 92 F.3d 320, 326 (5th Cir. 1996). In analyzing the motion, the Court must take all of the uncontroverted allegations in the Plaintiffs' Complaint as true, and additionally must resolve any conflicting allegations in the parties affidavits in the Plaintiffs' favor. Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 1990). This is not a difficult task in this case because both the allegations in the Plaintiffs' Complaint and Mr. Oring's August 3, 2004 Affidavit state that the Defendant an out of state resident of Maryland.
Additionally, the only contacts between the nonresident Defendant and Texas mentioned in the Complaint are a few telephone calls to talk with his wife, and a visit to Texas to see his wife while she was still living. (Complaint at 5). The Court finds that these activities cannot confer personal jurisdiction over Mr. Stuart because these are totally insufficient allegations of purposeful availment (if they can even be considered such). In short, the Court finds that the Flemings have failed to show that Mr. Oring should have reasonably anticipated being haled into court in Texas given his limited contacts with this state. Jones, 954 F.2d at 1068.
D. Traditional Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justice.
In light of the Court's conclusion that the Flemings have failed to establish that Stuart Oring had minimum contacts with the state of Texas, it need not reach the fairness prong of the constitutional test. Nevertheless, the Court finds that subjecting a defendant to the jurisdiction of a forum with which it had no minimum contacts would run afoul of principles of fair play and substantial justice. Woodson v. Copeland Trucking, 2002 WL 245975, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2002).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in this order, it is ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction is GRANTED, and the Defendant's Motions to Dismiss for Improper Venue and Forum Non Conveniens are DENIED as Moot.
SO ORDERED.